Paul
Goble
Staunton, September 30 – Stalin’s
first act of ethnic engineering, one that he and many others believe eliminated
any chance that the Middle Volga could pursue independence, was to divide
Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, surround both by ethnically Russian territories,
and include significant ethnic Russian populations within them.
But now apparently concerned that
those arrangements may be insufficient, especially if the Russian Federation
becomes a Russian nation state, a Russian nationalist site argues that patterns
of ethnic settlement within these republics are such that they could not pursue
independence without disintegrating (sinn-fein-front.livejournal.com/565883.html
and sinn-fein-front.livejournal.com/565607.html).
This research – and the site
promises additional articles on the ethnic demography of other non-Russian
republics in the future – is interesting not only because it shows the kind of
studies that the 2010 all-Russian census makes possible but also because it unintentionally
highlights Russian nervousness about the aspirations of these republics.
Regarding Tatarstan, the
Sinn-Fein-Front site begins with three oft-cited statistics: the small size of
the Tatars relative to the population of the Russian Federation (3.72 percent),
the small share of Tatars living in Tatarstan (23.7 percent), and the
complicated ethnic mix within Tatarstan (with half of the population being
Tatar but almost as many being ethnic Russians).
And then it argues that most Tatars
living outside the republic are well integrated into Russian life and have
little interest in returning to their “historical Motherland.” Only Tatars
already living there are characterized by what the site calls “aggressive Tatar
nationalism” and far from all of them.
But the most interesting data in the
article are those concerning the ethnic composition of of Tatarstan’s regions
as displayed in a series of maps. Tatars
are a minority in most of the parts of the republic and Tatarstan, as an ethnic
entity, “is divided into three parts which are not connected with one another,”
and thus, “the separation of Tatarstan from Russia is impossible.”
The site provides a similar set of
data for Bashkortostan and the Bashkirs.
It notes that only slightly more than half of the Bashkirs live in
Bashkortostan, that they are outnumbered there by the Slavs (37 percent to 29.5
percent), and that they “dominate only in the south east and in a fragmentary
way in the north.”
Thus, the Sinn-Fein-Front page
concludes “the establishment of a pure Bashkiria even on the territory of
Bashkortostan is problematic.” And it is
made even more problematic, it asserts, because of the complicated relations of
the Bashkirs with the Tatars – the site suggests their relationship is
analogous to the Ukrainians and the Russians – and with the Finno-Ugrics.
Therefore, the site concludes, “the
risk of separatism is minimal” in Bashkortostan just as it is in
Tatarstan. Both republics, it continues,
will be satisfied if they have significant cultural autonomy and local
self-administration within a Russian nation state, something this Russian
nationalist says no one can reasonably oppose.
And consequently, the site says,
those who think that “the transformation [of the Russian Federation] into an
[ethnic] Russian state will automatically lead to the separation of the Middle
Volga and Siberia and more generally to the reduction of Rus to the borders of
Moscow oblast” are wrong.”
Unfortunately for the
Sinn-Fein-Front author, there are at least two reasons for thinking his
argument is incomplete. On the one hand,
and as was obviously the case with the non-Russian union republics of the USSR in
1991, nationalist movements do not assume that the demographic situation they
find themselves in is permanent.
Some of them clearly pursued
independence because they feared that they would be ethnically swamped by
Russians if they did not, and others did so out of a belief that as independent
countries, they would have the opportunity to change the demographic mix on
their territories in the future.
And on the other, if one uses the
data provided by Sinn-Fein-Front but considers it in terms of ethnic Russian
settlement patterns, those who argue for the elimination of the non-Russian
republics through amalgamation like Vladimir Putin does or those who want a Russian
nation state are up against the same problems that this page says the Tatars
and Bashkirs are.
Those areas in the Russian
Federation which are ethnically Russian in the sense Sinn-Fein-Front suggests
for the Tatars and Bashkirs are also disconnected one from another, and thus any
effort to unite them in an ethnically Russian state could prove just as futile –
and counterproductive – and this site says the non-Russians would find an
analogous pursuit to be.
No comments:
Post a Comment