Paul
Goble
Staunton, May 30 – Now that the
Chechens have become involved as foot soldiers in Vladimir Putin’s campaign to
destabilize and potentially occupy portions of Ukraine, it is worth comparing
Moscow’s “counter-terrorist” campaign in the North Caucasus with what Kyiv is
doing in its eastern oblasts.
Such a comparison is especially
useful now because it calls attention not only to the very different metrics
many in the West are using to evaluate what Ukrainian forces are doing compared
to those they have long employed for describing Moscow’s efforts in the North
Caucasus but also to thee remarkable success of Kyiv compared to Moscow.
A full comparison of the two conflicts
is obviously beyond the scope of a single essay, but three points immediately
attract attention. First, Moscow has
been engaged in its campaign for two decades without having been able to pacify
the region, but almost no one has suggested that Russia was a failed state
because of that.
Kyiv in contrast has been fighting
for only a few weeks, but it has become a Moscow mantra widely picked up in the
West that the Ukrainian government’s effort or even the need it has to make it
and enforce its sovereignty shows that it isn’t an “effective” or even a “real”
state and thus requires outside supervision or control.
Second, Moscow in the North Caucasus
has not been confronted by the effort of any state to annex part of its
territory, something that international law specifies is the basis for the use
of military force and not just police action. But Kyiv has been faced with
exactly that kind of violation and thus is fully within its rights to use
available force against the insurgents.
What is sad, even despicable, is
that many of those who are now attacking Ukraine for living within the law have
in the past defended Russian actions which violate that law, and they are
calling for Ukraine to stop using force even though they never issued similar
demands to Moscow.
Third, in the North Caucasus, Moscow
has faced opposition from the indigenous populations not from armed units introduced
by a neighboring state. The militants in many cases enjoy support or at least
sympathy from the population. Kyiv’s situation is different in both these
regards.
On the one hand, as ever more
evidence shows, Moscow is sending forces into Ukrainian territory to seize
Crimea and to destabilize what it calls “Novorossiya,” something that because
of Russia’s resources means that Ukraine faces a far better armed and organized
force than Moscow ever has in the North Caucasus.
But on the other hand, the Russian
subversive forces enjoy far less support in the population than do the
militants in the North Caucasus. Polls not conducted under the barrel of
Russian guns show that majorities and in some cases overwhelming majorities of
ethnic Russian or Russian-speaking Ukrainian citizens want to be part of
Ukraine not Russia.
Fourth, Russian forces in the North
Caucasus have engaged in torture and other crimes against humanity and in many
cases seem more interested in profiting from a continuation of the war than in
establishing peace. Ukrainian forces have
not, and Ukrainian leaders have consistently said that they want to use the
minimum amount of force possible.
Not surprisingly, given everything
else, all too many in the West act as if the situation were just the reverse.
And fifth, unlike the Russian
Federation, Ukraine is a functioning democracy where elections are not all
predictable in advance. In the North Caucasus, Moscow has taken steps that have
exacerbated conditions there; in eastern Ukraine, including Crimea, Kyiv has
done just the reverse.
This list could easily be expanded,
but even these five differences should be sufficient to call into question the
arguments of those in Moscow and elsewhere about Ukraine, given what the
Russian Federation has done in the North Caucasus.
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