Paul
Goble
Staunton, September 16 – Two
analyses published today, one about last Sunday’s regional elections and
another about postings on the Internet, suggest that the wave of Russian patriotism
set in motion by Vladimir Putin’s Anschluss of Crimea may have crested and continues
only on the basis of routinized inertia.
The first of these is somewhat more
ambiguous but nonetheless telling. Ura.ru’s Mikhail Vyugin compares two
rankings of Russia’s political parties, one before last Sunday’s elections and
the second in their wake, prepared by the Moscow Foundation for the Development
of Civil Society, a group closely tied to the Kremlin (ura.ru/articles/1036265865).
Vyugin says that a comparison of the
two shows that parties like “Rodina and patriots in quotation marks” fell
dramatically, an indication at least that non-parliamentary parties seeking to
play on patriotic feelings did significantly less well in the voting than did
others like Yabloko which did not.
On the one hand, he says, this
suggests that “the patriotic trend in Russian society” has reached its
culmination. But on the other, it reflects the fact that “the leaders of the
[four systemic) parliamentary parties have frequently made it clear that they
will not allow Rodina or Patriots of Russia to privatize the patriotic theme.”
Although the URA.ru commentator does
not say so, that would appear to suggest that patriotic themes are now so
broadly included in the agendas of the systemic parties and the unsystemic ones
that any effort by the latter to play on patriotic themes in the upcoming Duma
races will be less successful than many commentators have been expecting.
The second article, by Vitaly
Slovetsky in “Novyye izvestiya” today, discusses the conclusion of Russian
political scientists and bloggers that “posts of a patriotic character on the
Internet” have dramatically declined in recent months (newizv.ru/politics/2015-09-16/227330-uvjadajushij-patriotizm.html).
“The number of commentaries of a
patriotic character began to wane in the middle of summer,” he writes, after
unemployment increased and the ruble fell. In their place, the number of posts
reflecting popular anger “sharply increased” and all this despite the appearance
of new pro-Kremlin patriotic online outlets.
Andrey Piontkovsky of the Moscow
Institute for Systems Analysis, says that this reflects a reduction in the
intensity of state propaganda on patriotic themes, Slovetsky reports. Piontkovsky says that the Kremlin has “finally
recognized” the depth of the crisis in Russia and the ways in which patriotic
propaganda in that situation can backfire.
Anton Nosik, a popular Russian
blogger, however, disagrees. He says that the fall off in such patriotic
articles is a seasonal phenomenon. Many pro-Kremlin bloggers have been on
vacation. Now, that they are back, he suggests, the number of patriotism-themed
posts will certainly increase.
Andrey Makarkin of the Moscow Center
for Political Technologies says that may be true for government-paid bloggers in
Moscow and St. Petersburg, but elsewhere, what is posted online reflects the
feelings of the population – and the population is beginning to recover from
its patriotic swoon.
“Enthusiasm arose in the spring of last year after the appearance of Crimea within the Russian Federation: we rose from our knees, the sanctions of the West and the US showed their weakness and we showed them our strength.” But after the collapse of the ruble, “optimism was sharply reduced.” Then when the situation stabilized, “pride in Russia again took off.
“Enthusiasm arose in the spring of last year after the appearance of Crimea within the Russian Federation: we rose from our knees, the sanctions of the West and the US showed their weakness and we showed them our strength.” But after the collapse of the ruble, “optimism was sharply reduced.” Then when the situation stabilized, “pride in Russia again took off.
“However, already after three
months,” it fell again, Makarkin argues. “Now what is taking place with people
is a process of reducing emotions. They are fighting with it; they want to
believe that things will get better; but reality clearly shows that this will
not occur anytime soon.”
Finally, according to Valery
Borshchev, a rights activist who early served in the Duma, “patriotism” in the
words of Slovetsky is “a temporary phenomenon.” It rose when Crimea was
annexed; it fell when the ruble did. And however much the authorities try to
convince people that things are still getting better, “citizens feel the worsening
of the economic situation.”
They are “beginning to understand,”
Borshchev says, “that the authorities provided them with untrue information
about the causes of the crisis and its length.”
Adding new people to “the army of patriotic media” may be able to “extend
the remnants of trust in the rulers for a certain time. But this extension will
not be long.”
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