Paul
Goble
Staunton, September 11 – In an
effort to get the West to end its sanctions on Russia, Vladimir Putin will continue
to sharply reduce pro-Moscow military actions in the Donbas over the next
month, Vitaly Portnikov says; but even as he does so, the Kremlin leader will
do everything he can to destabilize and thus discredit Ukraine from the inside.
This combination, Portnikov argues,
suggests that Putin is preparing for a “Minsk 3” agreement when he meets with the
leaders of France, Germany and Ukraine in Paris on October 3, an agreement that
will require “joint guarantees.” Otherwise, the four could have met on the sidelines
of the UN General Assembly (liga.net/opinion/249844_minsk-3-o-chem-budet-dogovarivatsya-normandskaya-chetverka-v-parizhe.htm).
It appears, the
Ukrainian analyst says, that “if it isn’t seeking a way out of the dead end it
finds itself in the Donbas, Russia will attempt to imitate this exit” in order
to extract as much as possible from the West.
Indeed, since August 29 when Hollande, Merkel and Putin spoke on the telephone,
“the intensity of fire from the side of Russian forces … has fallen sharply.”
That fall-off, Portnikov continues,
has prompted the French president to speak “even about the possibility of
lifting sanctions against Russia” if the Minsk accords are fulfilled. It is unlikely that Holland would have said
that “if he did not feel that the Kremlin beast was not really close to
withdrawal and needed support from the civilized world.”
Putin “really is in a very
complicated situation, perhaps the most complex from the moment power was
transferred to him by Yeltsin,” Portnikov says. The Russian economy is
collapsing, and even his advisors are talking about the lack of sufficient gold
reserves to support the ruble.
The Kremlin leader may soon not have
the money needed to pay its social security obligations, and Putin and his
entourage “remember what happens with Russians when bravura television hysterics
are not accompanied by the payment of their accustomed subsidies, pensions and
salaries.”
This means, he suggests, that “Russia
is again in the customary fog of revolt and destabilization” itself. Putin has
to do what he can to avoid that, and one important step in that direction is to
eliminate sanctions or at least ensure that there won’t be new and more serious
ones imposed.
Putin always faces a serious problem
in the Middle East, Portnikov argues, primarily because he wants to show that
he can support a totalitarian regime that has loyally supported Moscow. If he
doesn’t back Syria’s Asad, he will have shown that he won’t or can’t support
even his allies, not a message the Kremlin leader wants to send.
“But the resources of the Kremlin
adventurist are really limited, and for sending forces to Syria, Putin needs relief
in the Donbas,” and hence the current reduction in violence there. In this
situation, what concessions is Putin prepared to make, given his own goals and
given the attitudes of the West?
According to Portnikov, it is quite
likely that even Putin hasn’t decided yet and that he realizes that what will
happen in Paris on October 2 will depend to a large extent on what happens over
the next three weeks.
Putin may very well keep violence in
the Donbas at a low level: that will help him with his Western interlocutors.
But he will beyond any doubt “rock the boat” of Ukraine “because it is
important to him that [Ukrainian President] Poroshenko will arrive in Paris
without any sense of prospects and be ready for new concessions” of his own.”
Moreover, over this period, the
Ukrainian analyst suggests, Putin may also take actions in the Middle East
designed to drive up the price of oil, something that will give him more
leverage and reduce that of the West on Russian behavior.
With regard to Ukraine, it seems
clear that Putin will now “throw all his reserves into the destabilization of
the situation” there, making use of everyone from “the most anti-Ukrainian
chauvinists to the most patriotic patriots” to embarrass and weaken Ukraine
both in reality and even more in the eyes of the West.
Thus, Portnikov says, the next few
weeks are critical because “the stakes in October are really high.”
No comments:
Post a Comment