Paul
Goble
Staunton, October 5 – The continuing
“trauma” Russians feel from Afghanistan “stopped” the Kremlin from further military
action in Ukraine and is limiting Moscow’s moves in Syria as well because however
much Russians want to see displays of their country’s power, they don’t want to see bodies returning from
conflicts abroad, Yekaterina Schulmann argues.
In an interview published in today’s
“Novaya gazeta” concerning the prospects for protest in Russia, the Moscow
commentator suggests that many are inclined to exaggerate the extent to which
government actions abroad can compensate for economic problems at home or
become the basis for protests (novayagazeta.ru/politics/70205.html).
Despite the
attention they inevitably get and the expectations of the Kremlin that foreign
policy triumphs will trump domestic difficulties, she points out, polls over
the last two decades consistently show that Russians are most concerned about
inflation, incomes, and housing prices and that those are the real drivers of
protest, albeit typically with “a lag time” of about a year.
At the same time, Schulmann
continues, it is a misconception to think that protests will come from people
driven to despair. In fact, as research shows, those who are the greatest
victims are not the most likely to protest. Instead, protesters come from those
who have finally understood the far-from-simple link between their lives and
the decisions of the authorities.
The Moscow commentator suggests that
three “vectors” will be coming together next year: it will have been about a
year after the onset of the crisis, any “’post-Crimea’ enthusiasm’ will have “finally
died,” and the election season for 2016-2018 will be opening, with various
candidates seeking to define and exploit the situation.
It is striking, Schulmann says, how
rapidly “the wave of Crimean enthusiasm” has crested and fallen off. Its peak
was in May 2014. Now, hyper-patriotic parties like Rodina and the Patriots of
Russia still talk about it but do not gain much traction from doing so.
Mainstream parties increasingly abstain from talking about it at all.
This is evidence of the fact that
the effect of foreign policy actions is “less than people are accustomed to
think,” she says. “We exaggerate the effect of propaganda and confuse it with
TV ratings: if people like and with interest watch specific programs, that does
not mean that their political behavior is changed” as a result.
That behavior reflects in the first
instance the underlying interests of people in inflation, food price, and
communal services. All polls for the last two decades show that these occupy
the first three places in the concerns of Russians. Foreign policy doesn’t
challenge any of these for the top spot and is unlikely to.
“Judging from the first polls” about
Russian involvement in Syria, Russians “do not much approve out participation
in this war because the Afghan trauma still exists and the idea that we are
fighting somewhere is viewed in a negative way.”
In fact, Schulmann argues, “precisely
this attitude at one time stopped us from further involvement in Ukraine: when
the first caskets came back, people didn’t like it. They liked Crimea, they
liked talk on TV about the struggle with America, but they didn’t like tha tour
soldiers are fighting somewhere.”
Consequently, Schulmann says, Moscow
is unlikely to do anything more than engage in airstrikes. Starting a ground
campaign would mean victims, and that would have an effect at home.”
At the same time, the Kremlin will
seek to use this campaign to strengthen its position among Russians. “The
authorities can sell society our military victories or even not victories but
simply participation in some world processes as for example in Syria” And they
can argue successfully that Moscow’s actions in Syria have ended its isolation
following Ukraine.
In coping with the problems at home,
the Russian powers that be may seek to “sell Russian austerity, the ideology
that now are difficult times, one must economize and spend less” as long as
they say that they “are trying as much as possible that these will not be so
difficult for [Russians].” That can sustain them for some time.
And the authorities have a third
means of trying to distract Russians from problems at home: engaging in “the
struggle with corruption.” While such actions are typically more part of
intra-elite competition and conflict, they do win support from at least some
Russians by suggesting that those on top are paying attention to the crimes of
those below them.
Most Russians will express support
for the Kremlin’s foreign policy lest they appear “materialistic swine,”
Schulmann suggests. But if asked whether they are ready to do anything in
support of it or sacrifice their own well-being to those foreign policy ends,
their expressions of support will be far more muted.
Russians do not see a contradiction
in the fact that they will most likely say yes when asked if they approve the
decisions of the authorities. This is a “comfortable” answer: people want to be
good and correspond to what they consider to be the social norm and join with
the majority.” But that doesn’t speak to
the willingness of any of them to make sacrifices.
“In Russia it is difficult to find
out popular attitudes because [the country] doesn’t have free elections or a
free media marketplace, which typically serve as indicators,” Schulmann points
out. “And this is quite dangerous” because it deprives the country of early warning
signs that things are going in the wrong direction and must be changed.
And she concludes with this warning:
“An authoritarian system falls apart more rapidly and with greater force than a
democratic one because there is no advance warning about problems. The
worsening of the economic situation in Russia will generate changes in the
political behavior of people.”
But just what those changes will be
and when they will occur is “impossible to say.” Instead, Schulmann says, “protest
attitudes can break out where no one expects them.”
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