Paul
Goble
Staunton, June 3 – The emergence of
a political party in Daghestan with close ties to the Muslim Spiritual
Directorate (MSD) of that republic is overturning the applecart there: taking
votes away from the ruling United Russia Party, exacerbating relations between
sufi and salafi Muslims, and raising new questions about whether officials
still control “traditional” Islam.
In a commentary on the Regnum
portal, Konstantin Kazenin, a researcher at the Russian Academy of Economics
and State Service, not only traces the way things have reached their current
point but considers the impact of this development not only in Daghestan and
its elite but across the North Caucasus (regnum.ru/news/polit/2139786.html).
The
current drama began when the federal party, People Against Corruption,
announced that it would take part in elections for the Daghestan legislature,
nominated Magomedrasul Saaduyev, the first deputy mufti of Daghestan, as on its
candidates, and declared itself to be in opposition to the republic government.
A
little later, the party announced that Zalimkhan Valiyev, the informal leader
of the Kumyks, would be another of its candidates, and that Abdula Atsayev, the
son of a well-known sufi sheikh, and Khasmurakhammad Abubakarov, the father of
the mufti of Daghestan, were party members.
The
Daghestani MSD has not publicly declared itself allied with the new party,
Kazenin points out, but these appointments “cannot leave any doubt that the
party views its electorate as close to the leadership of the Spiritual
Directorate” and even sends a signal to those loyal to the MSD as far as how to
vote.
Saaduyev’s
role is especially interesting, the Moscow researcher continues. “Being the imam of the Central Mosque of
Makhachkala, he has enjoyed authority both among supporters of sufism … and
among Muslims of other trends, including many salafis who are opposed to the
muftiate and consider sufism ‘an innovation’ not based on the Koran.”
Few
Moscow media outlets have picked up on this because it does not fit paradigms
they bring to the study of Islam in the North Caucasus, he says. Russian
journalists “are accustomed to view the MSDs in the North Caucasus regions as
defenders of ‘traditional’ Islam,’ a term [that in their minds is] a synonym
for Islam totally loyal to the authorities and controlled by them.”
But
the Daghestani media, which is aware that the Moscow model is far from
adequate, have been discussing this development in detail, Kazenin says, and he
points out that outlets in Makhachkala have raised four major questions,
provisional answers to which he proposes to provide.
First,
he says, people are asking whether any party close to the MSD can win seats in
the republic assembly. Kazenin says there is “a chance” because of the support
it can get from certain mountainous districts, from those who are followers of
Saadayev personally, and from those who believe sufism is under attack by the
salafis or who want to promote Islam as such.
Second,
Kazenin says, Daghestanis are discussing whether the new party will be able to
win enough seats to challenge United Russia. The chances of that are “not great,”
he suggests, not only because the latter party will use its administrative
resources but also because of the divisions within Daghestani Islam.
Within
Daghestani Islam, he points out, the MSD is “one of the players,” not the
arbiter among them. It is the chief
supporter of sufism, but even among Sufis, it is not the only player: among the
Kumyks, for example, there are other sufi authorities who are not allied with
the Sufis of the MSD.
For
that reason, Kazenin says, any party associated first and foremost with the MSD
will gain votes in some quarters but lose them in others. And that party will
also find it hard to attract support from those in Daghestani society – and
there are some – who oppose any expansion in the influence of Muslim leaders in
society and politics.
Third,
he says, Daghestanis are speculating about the ways in which the rise of this
party may intensify divisions among the Muslims of the republic and even spark
conflicts among them and thus open the way for a return of more terrorist
activity. That has been on the wane since 2010 but tensions between Sufis and
salafis have in no way lessened.
There
won’t be an explosion of such tensions during the election campaign, Kazenin
continues. That is because most salafis are opposed to any participation in
such elections believing that they should be focusing instead on the closing of
their mosques and the arrests of their most influential imams.
But after the vote, tensions could escalate if
the MSD pushes its influence in the parliament beyond a certain point. And this
could arise in the first instance in villages now already divided between Sufis
and salafis and having separate mosques for members of each trend to attend.
And
finally, Daghestanis are asking how dangerous the rise of this new party may be
for the authorities in Makhachkala. There are obvious dangers: the incumbents
didn’t see this coming, and their standing with Moscow depends in important
ways on keeping everything quiet and under control.
Moreover,
it is fairly clear that if the new party gains votes, these will be at the
expense of the party of power, which has gotten used to having overwhelming
super majorities in Daghestan and the North Caucasus. That could change, and it is entirely
possible that Moscow would react in some way.
This
is exacerbated in turn by the fact that Daghestanis have a long history of
taking elections seriously, especially in the real battles which now take place
only at the regional and local levels.
Mostly that has been in single-member districts, but the rise of this
new party means that conflicts could arise among parties as well.
Summing
up, Kazenin writes: “The politicization of North Caucasus Islam is not limited
to Daghestan. And everywhere where it is occurring, it is destroying long held
ideas about the Islam which is considered ‘traditional’ and controlled by the
official Muslim structures and regional governments.” Now that very Islam
appears be freeing itself with fateful results.
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