Paul
Goble
Staunton, June 12 – Vladimir Putin’s
creation of a national guard is, as Andrey Piontkovsky observed at the time (kasparov.ru/material.php?id=57160D978DF75),
an effort by the Kremlin leader to create a force totally loyal to himself and
to escape the influence of the FSB out of which he sprung but in which he has
lost confidence.
Several recent Putin moves, as
US-based Russian commentator Kseniya Kirillova points out in a new commentary, not
only confirm Piontkovsky’s observation but strongly suggest that tensions among
the various Russian security services are rising fast and likely to intensify
further with unpredictable political consequences (ru.krymr.com/content/article/27791924.html).
A few days ago, the head of the new
National Guard demanded that everyone working in the new force declare whether they
have relatives in other force structures, a requirement nominally intended to
fight corruption but one that in fact suggests the Kremlin wants this structure
to become as independent of FSB and the others as possible (life.ru/t/%D1%8D%D0%BA%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BB%D1%8E%D0%B7%D0%B8%D0%B2%D1%8B/415662/v_natsghvardii_nachalsia_obriad_ochishchieniia).
Yet another sign of Putin’s
intentions in this regard that is certain to spark problems in relations
between the National Guard and the other siloviki and intelligence services is
the broadening of the new force’s responsibilities to include powers over the
private ownership and sale of guns (rbc.ru/politics/05/04/2016/5703ed1d9a794798356bbca1).
That takes powers away from the
interior ministry as well as the FSB and suggests that this new palace guard
will not only defend the existing regime and social order but spread its
activities into areas that other force structures have traditionally viewed as
their own. Indeed, its involvement in gun control likely presages even more
expansion of its authority in the future.
Putin’s press spokesman, Dmitry
Peshkov, admitted as much when he observed that “the authority of the National
Guard intersects with the Interior Ministry and the FSB and that possibly this
will require the introduction of changes in existing legislation” to clarify
who is responsible for what (rbc.ru/politics/05/04/2016/5703ed1d9a794798356bbca1).
As a result of all this, Kirillova
observes, “the FSB is losing not only the Kremlin’s trust but also its
reputation as the chief repressive organ within the country.” More than that, it may soon lose its role as
the chief battler against organized crime, if a Duma deputy’s comments are to be
believed (rbc.ru/politics/05/04/2016/5703ed1d9a794798356bbca1).
Competition among
the siloviki is also intensifying because the anti-narcotics agency and the
Federal Migration Service have now been disbanded and their roles assigned to
interior ministry agencies, thus bringing yet another player into such
conflicts, Kirillova argues. And it is also angering many who may lose jobs as
well as duties (remmix.livejournal.com/194937.html).
Thus, she concludes, what began as a
fight between Putin’s people and Ramzan Kadyrov against the FSB months ago now “threatens
to grow into ‘a war under the rug’ which will take place on the basis of the principle:
all against all,” one in which the National Guard will be pitted against traditional
players like the FSB, the GRU, and the interior ministry.
In this battle which Putin has
triggered in order to defend himself, the players will be fighting not only for
resources and jobs but also for influence – and that means for political power
as well, something that could make the next round of elite conflict in Russia
still nastier and perhaps shorter as well.
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