Paul
Goble
Staunton, October 30 – Deep background
sociological research is showing that Russia is at the beginning of “a
significant transformation of mass consciousness” that will eliminate much of
the loyalty to the regime that the populace now shows in a way tht will recall
what happened at the end of Soviet times, Valery Solovey says.
And this shift, the MGIMO professor
continues, “will take plece [first] in the heads” will involve less a
willingness of people “to come out against the authorities” but rather to
consider them as not “deserving obedience and respect” and thus causing them to
loose whatever legitimacy they have (gazeta.ru/comments/2016/10/30_a_10293293.shtml).
That does not mean, Solovey says, that
there will be a violent revolution – the end of the Soviet Union wasn’t violent
either and the Russian people don’t want it – but rather that the situation will
change in such a way that the current rulers will likely have to exit the scene
if they cannot radically change their own policies and approaches to the
population at large.
In an interview with the Moscow newspaper “Gazeta,”
Solovey discusses a wide variety of themes he has addressed in his new book, “Revolution!
The Bases of Revolutionary Struggle in the Contemporary Era,” that will be
released in the coming month.
He argues that the events of five years
ago failed to lead to this kind of change because they were a moral rather than
an economic protest, because the opposition parties were so weak, and because
they were the work of a middle class not yet radicalized by its loss of its
economic as well as its political position.
Now the members of the middle class have
suffered and are ready for harsher action, and the lower classes are angry as
well, although most of them are satisfying their anger with “deviant behavior
like alcoholism and petty hooliganism.” But over time, the two groups are
coming together with regard to the regime.
“Five years ago,” Solovey says, “Russia
was close to a so-called velvet revolution in which the authorities most
probably would preserve part of their positions.” But the events of the intervening
period mean that “now the development of events in the case of a revolution
will proceed according to a harsher scenario,” albeit not necessarily a “bloody”
one.
What needs to be recognized, however “paradoxical”
this may sound, is that “in Russia there are no forces which are interested in
the defense of the powers that be,” just like in 1991 with regard to the Soviet
hierarchy. The current powers look
strong as a result of their brutality, but in fact, they are incredibly weak,
Solovey argues.
The bureaucracy and the middle class don’t
like the current regime and know that any succeeding regime will have to make
use of their talents. The siloviki are not best pleased either and they will be
concerned during a crisis in the first instance to save themselves rather than
save the system that elevated them.
The regime could save itself by making
reforms and reaching out to the population, but once again as so often in
Russian history, it is a case of “’too little too late.’” That doesn’t mean there will be an
apocalyptic destruction of the regime or the country, but it does mean that it
is at risk of imploding as the Soviet system did.
And because the authorities continue to
make “mistake after mistake,” the situation is only getting worse and something
will almost certainly happen in the next year or two, and not 20 years from now
as some in the Kremlin think, especially because ever more groups will conclude
that they have nothing to lose by ignoring those in power if not actually fighting
them.
Russians don’t want another violent revolution,
and they don’t have the youth-dominated demographic structure that such
transformations usualy have. But they are being pushed in a revoltutionary
direction by their common demands for justice whether they believe that “Crimea
is ours” or not.
If protests do break out, the likeliest
scenario is that the supporters of the regime will stay at home, even as its
opponents take to the streets. The forces on which the regime relies will see
this and act accordingly because they will want to protect themselves in the future,
the MGIMO professor continues.
Had the last 15 years been used
constructively, he concludes, all of this might have been avoided. But they
weren’t. The issues of justice have reemerged. And the regime is rapidly losing
its legitimacy even though most people out of fear or indifference or inertia
are prepared to tell poll takers otherwise.
And in a country that has not engaged in
lustration or build real institutions, the consequences for radical change,
call it revolution or not, should not be underrated, Solovey concludes.
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