Paul
Goble
Staunton, October 11 – Leaders, like
all other people, typically go through a process whenever confronted with a
radical change in the situation around them. The first stage is denial, an
effort to convince themselves and others that nothing has really changed and
that the approaches they had used can still work.
The second stage is a search for an
analogy, for some event or events in the past which can provide guidance on
what they should do. And only latter and
quite often after the crisis has crested do leaders and individuals move on to
an empirical approach, one in which they seek to find the specific features of
the new environment in which they find themselves.
In large measure, the challenges
Vladimir Putin has posed the world were initially met by denial, especially on
the part of those Western leaders who felt that if they admitted there was a
problem, they would have to come up with a solution – and not having an obvious
solution, they tried as best they could to deny there was a problem.
Now, they are in the time of the
search for analogies, with some viewing what Putin has done as like Hitler’s
actions in 1939 when he led a mobilized Germany to war against the rest of the
world, with only Stalin as his temporary ally and others arguing the world is
either going back to a new Cold War with its Cuban missile crisis or stumbling
toward a hot one a la 1914.
Obviously, the analogies leaders
choose matter because they will inevitably select from the flood of information
those “facts” which confirm their point of view; and consequently, it is
terribly important not only to consider the limits of the analogies on offer –
Putin isn’t Hitler, Russia isn’t the USSR, and no archduke is travelling to
Sarajevo – but to examine others as well.
Russian
commentator Andrey Piontkovsky suggests an analogy few appear to have
considered. He says “the situation is
very reminisccent of the last months of Stalin’s life (the winter of 1952-1953).
Then, Stalin was completely seriously preparing for a nuclear war” (rusmonitor.com/andrejj-piontkovskijj-krym-put-in-uchitsya-u-kim-chen-yna-yadernomu-shantazhu.html).
As in 1952-1953 with regard to
Stalin’s plans, most of Putin’s entourage are “disappointed in Putin” and in
his break with the West which undermines their personal wealth and goals, he
continues. There are exceptions, of
course, like Nikolay Patrushev who has called for making use of nuclear weapons
as a threat, something Putin has accepted.
There is thus an objective basis for
an elite move against Putin, “but there is no institutional mechanism or
decisive group of people capable of taking a step so needed for the survival of
Russia and possibly the entire world,” Piontkovsky says.
At least at the end of Stalin’s
time, there was a Politburo whose “task above all was putting limits on the
possibilities of the power of the first person.” Its members pushed out Lenin, dispatched
Stalin, and removed Khrushchev. In short, it “was a defense mechanism against the
insanity of the top man.”
Tragically, in Putin’s Russia, “there
is no such mechanism.”
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