Kremlin Wants a Much-Weakened Lukashenka to Remain Head of Belarus, Inozemtsev Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 6 – Vladimir Putin prefers to deal with “weak ‘partners’ on the post-Soviet space rather than strong allies, Vladislav Inozemtsesv says; and he wants Alyaksandr Lukashenka to remain Belarusian president by falsifying the elections, suppressing the inevitable protests, and becoming a complete international outcast with nowhere to turn except Moscow.

            Indeed, there is every reason to believe, the Russian economist and commentator says, thatthe Kremlin leader believes this high-risk strategy will allow him to use a provision, newly inserted into the Russian Constitution, and absorb what is now the Republic of Belarus into the Russian Federation as “a federal territory” (dp.ru/a/2020/07/06/Samaja_blizkaja_revoljuci).

            Inozemtsev reaches these conclusions on the basis of recent changes in Minsk and Moscow. Six months ago, he says, he had “no doubt” that Lukashenka would win reelection to his sixth term give that many Belarusians who opposed him were nonetheless pleased that he had begun to stand up to Putin and put out more feelers to the West.

            But three intervening developments have changed the calculus: First, Putin devalued the importance of Belarus to himself by changing the Russian constitution rather than choosing instead to head a new Union state. Second, the pandemic and Lukashenka’s dismissive approach to it have discredited him with many in his own country and elsewhere.

            And third, economic changes beginning with Moscow’s “’tax maneuver’” and including the collapse of oil prices and demand for Belarusian oil products hit the Belarusian economy and the standard of living of Belarusians and with it Lukashenka’s standing. As a result, Belarusians have turned on him, calling him “the cockroach,” and come out in support of alternatives.

            Lukashenka has responded classically by using criminal charges and other legal maneuvers to eliminate these challenges; but he has not succeeded. And now he is in trouble. In a democracy, he would lose; but in his dictatorship, he may hold on by falsification and then suppression of protests.

            “Support for the opposition is especially strong in the major cities” and will be expressed at the ballot box if possible and in the streets after the vote if Lukashenka prevents that, Inozemtsev says.  A sizeable majority of the people are against him, and some of his siloviki are now sending signs that they won’t obey an order to crush demonstrations.

            According to the Russian analyst, “Lukashenka will not be able to win in the August 9 elections. Will he nonetheless be able to suppress the protests as he did in 2010? There is a chance of that,” but there are no guarantees. If he can, he will be an outcast more than ever in the past and thus seriously weakened. But if he can’t, he will be gone.

            Russia has a vested interest in what happens in Belarus, which is “the closest republic” to Russia on the post-Soviet space and one whose population is not anti-Russian. Neither is the opposition, and Inozemtsev argues that “Lukashenka is a greater threat for Russia” than those who are running against him.

            Indeed, it should be obvious to the Kremlin that “the opposition in the post-Soviet space is far from always anti-Russian” and thus lead it to work with such groups who could in fact be its allies. But the Kremlin doesn’t want allies: it wants clients. And so it hopes that Lukashenka will survive albeit in a much-weakened position.