Paul
Goble
Staunton, July 8 – Blame for the increasing
re-Stalinization of Russian life is usually laid at the feet of Vladimir Putin
and his regime, Vladislav Inozemtsev says. They certainly bear a large share of
responsibility for it but so too do those who are using viewed as the most
consistent anti-Stalinists, Russian liberals.
That is because the ways they chose
to attack Stalin had the effect of separating the dictator from the horrific
reality he created and making him into a mythical figure that his epigones like
Putin could easily exploit by counting on the Russian people to be moved more
by myth than facts (echo.msk.ru/blog/v_inozemcev/2672945-echo).
The attacks on Stalin during
Perestroika were undertaken to legitimize the new regime and at least initially
to suggest that there really was a chance for “’socialism with a human face,’”
Inozemtsev continues. That meant that
the attacks on the past brought together both anti-Soviet and “completely
pro-socialist” actors.
That meant, he argues, that “the
condemnation of Stalin remained the condemnation of the Soviet past – and then
with the end of the Soviet Union, this theme it appeared passed from the agenda”
of the people and the powers, a process that set the stage for the ultimate
revival of support for the late dictator.
Here is what happened, Inozemtsev
says. First, Stalin was “separated from socialism (as a certain anomaly) and
then from Russia (as a purely Soviet phenomenon).” That was “the main mistake of the anti-Stalinists”
because it separated Stalin from Russian history and thus opened the way for
his return as “an effective manager, the man who strengthened the state, and a
major modernizer on the same level with Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great and
many other rulers.”
The liberals compounded their
initial mistake by the policies they put in place in the early 1990s, policies
that led to the de-industrialization of the country, the impoverishment of most
of the population, and illegitimate privatization and massive elite corruption,
all of which led to new demands for justice.
Moreover, this development “made radically
more difficult any mobilization against totalitarianism and the country began
to gradually to ‘slip back’ to the justification of its past, to a large extent
because no positive program of action besides the neo-Buikharinite ‘enrich
yourselves’ was offered.”
The worse economic conditions
became, the fewer “antibodies” remained to protect Russia “against the Soviet
dictatorship;” and the more often people began to say that the corrupt and the
oligarchs ought to be shot,” the easier it became for there to be a new
glorification of someone who did just that.
The anti-Stalinists also failed to
open the archives completely and to digitalize them so that everyone could see the
facts about the case. There was a chance for that in the early 1990s, but it
was missed; and now Russians form their views about the past on the basis of
selective quotations and myths that the regime offers.
That lack of access to the facts is
becoming ever more important, Inozemtsev says, because in contrast to the
period between Stalin’s death and the end of the USSR, there are far fewer
people who remember on the basis of their own experience or that of their
parents and relatives the crimes Stalin committed.
As a result, and with a powerful
assist from Putin, “Stalin today has been transformed from a real individual
into a myth, and the struggle with myths never was effective and therefore now
is practically senseless,” Inozemtsev says.
And this means, he continues, “that the
path to the revival of the Russian state as a insensible and greedy monster is
open – and most likely will again be trodden until that moment when new
generations feel on themselves all the force of that terror which always was
the chief function of their rulers.”
As that tragic repetition of the past
unfolds, Inozemtsev says, everyone needs to remember that they must hold
accountable “not only those who carry out this terror but also those who by
their own lack of understanding or some greedy reasons made possible the return
of Russian autocracy.”
In this essay, Inozemtsev does not mention another contributor to this horrific rebirth: Western governments who despite their constant celebration of the positive role they played in 1991 and thereafter encouraged all involved not to focus on the past but to forget it and move forward. That too played a most negative role and helps explain the rise of Putin and Stalin too.
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