Kadyrov’s Man New Head of Coordinating Center of the Muslims of the North Caucasus

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 2 – On September 28, Salakh Mezhiyev, the mufti of Chechnya and first deputy head of the Coordinating Center of Muslims of the North Caucasus, was unanimously elected head of the latter body two months after the death of its longtime leader, Ismail Berdiyev (kcmsk.ru/novosti/sostojalos-zasedanie-soveta-muftiev-kcmsk-izbran-predsedatel-kcmsk/).

            Some Moscow analysts argue that Mezhiyev’s rise will make the Coordinating Center one of the two most important “poles” of the Russian umma (ng.ru/ng_religii/2024-10-01/9_581_centers.html), but regional experts point out that the Center has never played that role but remains “a club of muftis” with little influence (kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/404182).

            These latter experts, speaking on condition of anonymity given the danger that Kadyrov might take revenge against them, say the advancement of Mezhiyev reflects the Chechen leader’s “grandiosity” and his desire to have his people in all nominally key positions regardless lest others gain a march on him.

            Both the nature of the Coordinating Center and the biography of Mezhiyev suggest that their view is more likely to be correct and that the new head of the Center is unlikely to make it more significant for the North Caucasus as a whole and may even reduce its role given tensions between Chechnya and other republics there.

            The Coordinating Center was created at the end of the 1990s by Kadyrov’s father. Unlike the other super Muslim Spiritual Directorates (MSDs) in the Russian Federation, it has never controlled its members; and some of them have ignored its rulings or even left altogether when it suited them. Chechnya did that a decade ago but later returned.

            To expect that Mezhiyev will change that is almost certainly a mistake. The tradition of the independence of muftiates in the North Caucasus from muftiates elsewhere and from each other is simply too strong; and Mezhiyev has shown himself more Kadyrov’s “pocket mufti” than a religious leader in his own right, something that will do little to unite these muftiates and may make them even more skeptical of the center and its leader.

            Mezhiyev, 47, was born in Grozny in the influential Chinkhoy teip. He studied Arabic and Islam with local imams and at age 10 became director of a local medrassah even though unlike most such people he had never taken instruction from Muslim leaders abroad, almost a requirement for most muftis in post-Soviet Russia.

            In 2004, Mezhiyev became the deputy mufti of Chechnya and simultaneously an advisor to the Kadyrovs; and ten years later, he became mufti after Ramzan Kadyrov in violation of the rules pushed out his predecessor and installed his own man as mufti. Mezhiyev then in 2024 defended a dissertation at Cairo’s Al-Alzhar University giving him the veneer of foreign training.

            As mufti of Chechnya, a position he will retain, Mezhiyev issued a variety of notorious fetwas, all of which were consistent with the positions of Ramzan Kadyrov even though they outraged many Muslims and others. Consequently he became known as Kadyrov’s “pocket mufti,” a role he is likely to continue in his additional new post.

            That may please Kadyrov but it won’t do anything to win Mezhiyev friends with most of the other muftis in the Coordinating Center. Instead, they are likely to be offended and continue to go their own way. (For more details on Mezhiyev and his close links to Kadyrov, see kavkazr.com/a/karmannyy-muftiy-kadyrova-novyy-glava-koordinatsionnogo-tsentra-musuljman-severnogo-kavkaza/33143123.html.)