Putin’s New Governor General in the Urals Faces Fateful Political Choices, Shaburov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 3 – Vladimir Putin has named Artyom Zhoga, a former military man in the DNR to be the plenipotentiary for the Urals federal district, an origin that has led many Russian observers to conclude the new appointee will serve as a kind of governor general and thus the harbinger of fundamental changes in the way the plenipotentiary system works.

            Aleksey Shaburov, the editor of Yekatrinburg’s Politsovet portal, argues that while it is clear that Putin wanted to send a message that those connected with the fighting in Ukraine will have unlimited political possibilities in Russia, it is far from certain what Zhoga’s reign will mean (politsovet.ru/82154-polpred-soldat-chto-zhdat-uralu-ot-artema-zhogi.html).

            “Commenting on his assignment,” the editor said, “Zhoga called himself ‘a soldier,’ giving everyone to understand that in his new post, he will in the first instance execute the orders of the president. But in the political plane, such a formulation is clearly insufficient: the position of plenipotentiary allows for a wider range of actions.”

Zhoga will have to decide what he wants and can do. For many, “the institute of plenipotentiaries is an unnecessary one” and those who lead them “in fact have no real power” over budgets and that power is the essential one in the regions. “But at the same time, one must not underrate the plenipotentiaries,” Shaburov says.

They control the channels of communication between the governors, on the one hand, and the Presidential Administration and force structures, on the other. Moreover, they oversee the collection and analysis of information about how well the governors implement central policies and thus play a key role in cadres selection and elections.

The plenipotentiaries also have the ability to intervene in conflicts between governors and mayors; and in the Urals FD, they have often gotten between the governors and the mayors of Yekaterinbur, where their intervention has proven “decisive” and determined “the new balance of forces” after the dust settled.

What that means is this, Shaburov continues. “In general, the plenipotentiary has enough leverage to either ruin the life of this or that governor or to make that life easier. And that is why officials in the Urals liked Zhoga’s predecessor, Vladimir Yakushev, so much. He didn’t get into conflicts with the governors but acted as ‘a senior comrade.’” That time is likely past.

In discussing Zhoga’s appointment, many in the Urals have recalled another of his predecessors, Igor Kholmanskikh who occupied that position between 2012 and 2018. “The parallels are obvious. The Uralvagonzadod official was installed to put down protests and that is what he did.

Zhoga is also about sending a message but a different one – the future veterans of the Ukraine war can have on their return. And there are other differences as well. Kholmanskikh had local support before his appointment; Zhoga doesn’t – although of course he could gain it over time. But until then, he will face a suspicious group of local grandees.

Although he served a full six-year term, Kholmanskikh was ultimately a failure. He antagonized so many regional officials that he lost rather than gained power over the course of his tenure. His successor, Nikolay Tsukanov, viewed as an arriviste from Kaliningrad, lasted only two years and then “his political career ended.”

While it is uncertain whether anyone has told Zhoga about the experiences of his predecessors, Shaburov says, their careers do suggest three scenarios for how the new plenipotentiary’s time in the Urals may develop.

First, there is the possibility that it will be “ideal and constructive” like that of Yakushev. “Theoretically, this variant would satisfy everyone. But realizing such a scenario will be difficult for several reasons.” Zhoga doesn’t have the local background he would need and can’t be certain of support for such an approach from either Moscow or his own staff.

The second scenario would be one in which Zhoga “will not aspire to the role of ‘the patriarch of Urals politics’ and ‘the all-seeing eye,’ but rather involve himself with his own political projects along the ‘military-patriotic line.” That may even be what he and Putin want, but the job makes this very difficult to sustain.

And the third possible scenario is that Zhoga will actively get into conflict with the governors to show who is boss. If he does that, he will have Moscow on his side perhaps but he will certainly face a regional political elite ready and able to resist what he might try to do. For a few weeks, Zhoga and that elite may experience a honeymoon but no longer than that.