Paul Goble
Staunton,
November 9 – Moscow media have played up poll results suggesting that only
three percent of Russians think that the Kremlin was behind the poisoning of
the Skripals in the United Kingdom. It
is entirely possible that that is what those polled said – Russians know the
answers the powers that be want – but it is clear that far more actually
believe the Kremlin did it.
That
is the conclusion Denis Volkov of the Moscow Carnegie Center draws in an
article today recounting his conversations with Russians in informal
settings. “Publicly,” he notes, “the majority
of Russians aren’t ready to acknowledge Russian interference in the affairs of
other countries” (carnegie.ru/commentary/77678).
“But in less
official conversations, many more people allow that such interference has
occurred.” This difference reflects not only the knowledge Russians have of
what the Kremlin wants to hear but also their sense that they are “not
observers on the side but participants in the information clash between Russia
and the West.”
It
is those calculations rather than the success of Russian government propaganda
that explains these differences, Volkov continues; and it is “indicative” that
large shares of those sampled refused to give a direct answer, an indication
not of the success of propaganda but of their personal understanding of what is
required regardless of the facts.
Focus
groups confirm this in the Skripal case and others. Initially Russian
participants are reluctant to answer; but as they become more comfortable, they
are quite willing first to allow that Moscow may have been behind this or that
action in a foreign country and then to suggest that there is no other reasonable
explanation.
Such
differences between what Russians will say to pollsters and what they actually
believe “can hardly be explained only by the fact that people conceal their
opinions because they are afraid of being punished by their superiors,” the Moscow
Carnegie Center expert suggests. As this
gap comes out, many Russians respond by laughing at the situation.
“In
other words,” Volkov continues, “a significant number of Russians although they
do not want to publicly acknowledge the responsibility of Russia for interference
in the affairs of other countries, do not doubt that such interfere really has
occurred and do not see any problems with it.
“Ever
more [Russians] today are certain that Russia has again become ‘a great power,’”
and they believe that this status must be “periodically confirmed” by actions
that would be inappropriate if undertaken by a country lacking that status. Russia
must take tough actions, they say, because otherwise the West won’t recognize
Russia’s power.
Moreover, he adds, “by violating
international norms, [their] country in the opinion of a significant number of people
is doing nothing different than what other great powers do: ‘All do these
things,’” Russians say. They also
believe that if challenged, Moscow must not back down because to do so would be
to show weakness and thus be less than the great power Russia is.
As a result of this mix of feelings
and calculations, “a quite bizarre picture” emerges. “Pubicly the majority of
Russians are not ready to admit the interference of hteir country in the
affairs of other countries. Formally they share the position which government
propaganda adopts” on such things.
“But in more precise and less
official conversations, a much larger number of people allow that such interference
has occurred than the polls show.” At the
same time, Volkov says, “this doesn’t mean that they agree with Western
evaluations of these events and simply are afraid to declare this publicly.”
And Volkov concludes: “the majority
of Russians consciously reproduce the official version from government
propaganda even if they themselves do not believe it is genuine because they
feel themselves not as outside observers but as participants” in the battle
their country is engaged in with the outside world.
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