Paul
Goble
Staunton, August 15 – A week ago, Russian
historian Sergey Volkov attracted attention for declaring that he saw little or
no chance for democracy to emerge in Russia anytime soon because it lacks
important preconditions (newizv.ru/article/general/09-08-2019/istorik-narod-na-samom-dele-ne-vosstaet-nigde-i-nikogda).
If
Russia doesn’t disintegrate or somehow “radically softens,” he wrote, “within a
few years some new Putin will arrive on the scene” almost immediately. But if
it does break apart and remains much as it is, then it will remain under the
same kind of ruler for a long time to come at the very least “for decades.”
Not
surprisingly, Volkov’s pessimistic assessment of Russia’s chances for
democratization drawn fire; and in response, he has now explained the basis for
his assumptions in a new blogpost that Novyye izvestiya has reposted (salery.livejournal.com/172220.html
in newizv.ru/article/general/15-08-2019/istorik-volkov-esche-raz-ob-yasnil-pochemu-v-rossii-nevozmozhna-demokratiya).
He says that Russia could move toward
democracy only under conditions which do not now exist – “an establishment
which had been in place for sometime and was free from the fear that it would
lose its property,” something that would allow it make the kind of concessions
to the population that could allow democratic arrangements to arise.
Because of its history, Russia doesn’t
have such a group of people “and for a long time ahead won’t” either.
Consequently, some new Putin will appear, a development that may or may not be
disastrous depending on how he behaves. As Volkov points out, “the real Putin at
various times has behaved differently.”
There is a very simple reason why “our ‘democrats’”
can’t take power or remain democrats if they do. They don’t have anyone of their own who will
carry out their orders. They need “their own ‘police’ but don’t have anywhere
from which to get one. And if they came to power, the 1990s would return with
bandits in place of police and the population desirous of a new autocrat.
“’The force structures,’” the historian
says, “always stand at the advanced edge of the regime and even if they are not
its essence, their preservation or replacement always serves as an inerrant
indicator of ‘whether there was a revolution or not.’” When there is, they are replaced; when there
isn’t, they aren’t.
When the Bolsheviks came to power in
Russia and the ayatollahs in Iran, they cleaned house, replacing the siloviki of
the old order with their own. “It is completely impossible to imagine” that the
Bolsheviks would have been willing to count on the tsarist police to protect them
and enforce their wishes.
Any new power needs “a corresponding contingent
of people who are ready to kill and die for this power,” Volkov says. “The
Bolsheviks and the Iranian mullahs in the form of the Red Guard and the
Guardians of the Revolution had such a contingent, and there they did not have
any problems with staffing their own ‘police.’”
“The psychology of ‘the siloviki,’” he
continues, “by its nature means that they are prepared to subordinate
themselves to the accustomed authorities or their representatives … are ready
to subordinate themselves to some new ‘forceful people’ … but are not under any
circumstances ready to take orders from ‘the lousy democrats.’”
They might have been willing to take
orders from Aleksey Navalny, someone who has the reputation as “a secret nationalist
and populist.” Indeed, fears that they might explain why the Kremlin reacted to
him as it has, Volkov suggests. But
Navalny has faded and no one like him has arisen to take his place.
As a result, the historian concludes, “’a
new Putin’ will emerge out of that part of the elite which will organize a new
perestroika or out of the opposition which will take shape after the appearance”
of the results of such a development of events.
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