Even a New Perestroika after Putin Won’t Change Neo-Soviet Nature of Russian Regime, Savvin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 5 – The quasi-elite in Moscow is already planning for Russia after Putin, but their ideas fall into two categories: the continuation of the current system without change or “the creation for their rapid and successful restoration after a pseudo-democratic shift” or second perestroika, Dimmitry Savvin says.

            In its pure form, the editor of the Riga-based Russian conservative Harbin portal says, “only one preservationist model is being considered: an open military-police dictatorship” and only by a very narrow but influential group of those closest to Putin who would lose the most by any change (harbin.lv/kakim-budet-ukhod-putina).

            The slogan of this group is “After Putin, Putin!” and there is a chance that this approach could succeed for a time. But it is unlikely to succeed for long, Savvin says, because “the circle of its direct beneficiaries is too small and the costs for all the rest are too great.”

            Much more likely, he suggests, will be one of several “perestroika” models intended to get the regime through the transition but allow those neo-Soviet elements who control things now to restore their powers after a certain decent interval just as they were able to do after the disintegration of the USSR.

            The first of these can be designated “an FSB transition,” one in which the FSB would be “the most influential and most active” force in both politics and economics.  It would remain repressive but seek to win support by moderate criticism of Putin and his policies and a possible new “reset” of relations with the West at least for a time.

            The second can be called “the Uzbekistan transition.” In it, the FSB’s role would remain large but other force structures would increase in importance and the successor to Putin would likely be drawn now from any one of them but be “a compromise figure, possibly with the reputation of a systemic liberal and moderate reformer, like the Medvedev of 2007.”

            This variant would allow for “somewhat more widespread liberalization combined with quite harsh criticism of the Putin era. 

            The third of these “perestroika” transitions is the Chinese-Kazakhstan variant.  It presupposes the establishment of “stable institutions which provide for a comparatively peaceful transfer and even rotation of power within the framework of a regime of the neo-Soviet nomenklatura-oligarchic dictatorship.”

            “This model is the most logical from the point of view of the preservation of the existing regime,” Savvin argues, “but as the experience of Kazakhstan shows, it is no guarantee of the well-being and even security of the higher echelon of power going into retirement.” A successor may use his powers against them all too easily.

            Because of these problems, those planning for the transition may consider “an extreme variant,” the so-called “’Navalny revolution.’” It is appropriate to put this in quotation marks because one is not speaking about a real revolution but rather about “its effective imitation.” And it could have as its front man someone other than Aleksey Navalny.

            It would resemble the perestroika of the late 1980s and early 1990s and allow for the same outcome: the return of the siloviki to positions of power after an interval of a decade or so. It would not be the turning point that many in either Russia or the West hope for but one more game in which the powers win and the people lose.

            Which model is chosen depends on the state of the Russian economy and the time of Putin’s exit. If he leaves when the economy has recovered somewhat, then the harsher variants are more likely. If, however, he leaves when the economy is in trouble, then “’the Navalny revolution’” is more probable. (And of course, these aren’t mutually exclusive arrangements.)

            At the present time, the conservative commentator says, “the most comfortable one for the regime is the Uzbekistan model.” If the regime has to manage a transition in the next three to five years, that is the direction it will likely pursue. If Putin remains longer, then “the chances of a Chinese-Kazakhstan system will increase.”

            But as conditions deteriorate – and the Putin system ensures that – “’the Navalny revolution’” possibly in combination with the Uzbekistan model becomes the most probable. “And this means that with the departure of Putin, Putinism, or more precisely a regime of neo-Soviet nomenklatura-oligarchic dictatorship – will not die.”

            There is a simple and obvious reason for that conclusion, Savvin says, “the forces which gave birth to it not only will not disappear but will try to preserve for themselves the commanding heights.”