Moscow Fails to See Lukashenka Now is Where Yanukovich was in 2014 and Sargsyan in 2018, Inozemtsev Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 7 – Official Moscow has failed to see that Belarusian leader Alyaksandr Lukashenka now is in a position much like Ukraine’s Viktor Yanukovich was in 2014 and Armenia’s Serzh Sargsyan was in 2018, someone who will be ousted by popular vote if he allows it or by a revolution if he tries to block it, Vladislav Inozemtsev says.

            “Events in Belarus are being underrated now in Russia,” the Russian economist says, because they highlight a more general problem: the leaders in many parts of the post-Soviet space are increasingly at risk of losing their jobs and Moscow’s ability to prevent that is small (mk.ru/politics/2020/06/07/lukashenko-prevratilsya-dlya-rossii-iz-aktiva-v-ballast.html).

            Inozemtsev says Moscow must recognize what is happening in Belarus especially in the days since the onset of the pandemic which Lukashenka has dismissed as something marginal and as a result has lost whatever standing he had in Belarus.  As a result of his actions, in fact, “Lukashenka has been transformed” from a useful player in Moscow’s games to “a burden” it can’t profit from any more.

And once it fully recognizes that, the commentator continues, the Russian government “must revise its approach to relations with Minsk.”

It isis now obvious that the only people supporting Lukashenka are those in his pay as officials and that he is afraid to crack down hard against Belarusians organizing against him.  “This very much recalls the early period of both Ukrainian mobilizations and the beginning of the Armenian protest movement.”

“The most important thing,” Inozemtsev says, “is that citizens are acting in full correspondence with the rules established by the powers. But at the same time, in order to remain head of the republic, Lukashenka will have to change these rules: either reject three popular candidates from being registered … or totally distort the results of the August 9 elections.”

“In my view,” the Russian observer says, “today everything suggests that either of these attempts will lead to a revolution,” just as they did in Ukraine and Armenia.  Belarus resembles both of them in many ways, but it is also important to keep in mind that it has some significant differences as well.

The most important is the way in which over the last 30 years, Belarus and the Russian Federation have been so intertwined. “For a long time, Belarus was for Russia a kind of instructor in politics, economics, and ideology.” Belarus shifted to a permanent president long before Russia did. It also led in reviving Soviet symbols and in “cleansing” the political scene of opposition.

And it was in Belarus where talk about “foreign agents” and undesirable organizations” sounded first, as well as a long line of other “innovations” Vladimir Putin has adopted for the Russian Federation, including his latest moves against the constitution and the meaning of elections.

Because of this, Inozemtsev says, the departure of Lukashenka from power and his replacement by someone outside of his power vertical “could have for Russia much more serious consequences than both Kyiv Maidans taken together” and inflict “an unthinkable shock to the current Russian regime.”

“The Kremlin hates ‘color revolutions’ largely because it does not have the intelligence and willingness to take risks that would be involved in exploiting them.”  One in Belarus would be especially disturbing because “in Minsk now, there are no pro-Russian politicians who have Russian passports in their pockets.”

And in contrast to Ukraine, Belarus is small enough to be quickly integrated into a West that has made no secret of its desire to see Lukashenka leave the scene.  Belarus is also more civic and less ethnic than Ukraine and therefore could make that transition with far less difficulty or opposition.

Such a shift by Belarus would not only destroy Putin’s “Union State” but also the Eurasian Union and leave Moscow’s relations with the rest of the former Soviet space in tatters. Given all this, Inozemtsev argues, “the optimal position for Moscow2 would be one way or another to support the Belarusian democratic movement.”

“Even if Lukashenka is able to ‘win’ in August, his political life is close to the end and to bet on him is senseless,” the analyst suggests.  And so Moscow should reorient itself to the Belarusian opposition, something that would promote Russian national interests by showing that Moscow has enough self-confidence to take suich a step.

According to Inozemtsev, “if the Russian political system wants to preserve itself in a relatively unchanged form for a long period of time, its leaders should draw the conclusion that Lukashenka long ago ceased to be useful and became a burden.” If they do, they should find it easier to “draw the corresponding conclusions.”