Paul
Goble
Staunton, July 31 – Since 1991,
Kazakhstan has become more Kazakhs given that many non-Kazakhs have left and
the Kazakh growth rate is higher. At the same time, it has become more Muslim
with Kazakhs increasingly shifting from nominal allegiance to something more.
The question now is whether this can happen in a way precluding the rise of
extremist groups.
Some argue that the strengthening of
traditional Islamic identities serve as a bulwark against extremists because
those who are committed to their faith are less likely to be swayed by
radicals. Others say that as a population becomes more attached to Islam, the
more likely it is that this will open the door to fundamentalists and radicals.
That debate has now broken out in
Kazakhstan. Several months ago, Galym Zhusipbek, an independent investigator,
argued that Kazakhstan must promote a civil society and downplay religious
attachments, a position that has drawn fire from those who say that Islam is an
integral part of Kazakh nationhood (camonitor.kz/34923-kakoe-buduschee-zhdet-kazahstan-religioznoe-ili-svetskoe.html).
Now, historian Nurtay Mustafayev has
taken up the issue, arguing that Kazakhs are becoming more Islamic and that the
state should support that as a bulwark against extremism rather than continue
to view this development as a threat (camonitor.kz/35510-kazahstan-stanovitsya-vse-bolee-musulmanskoy-stranoy-chem-eto-chrevato.html).
According to Mustafayev, as recently
as 30 years ago, the majority of Kazakhs identified as atheists; but after
independence, they overwhelmingly declared they were Muslims, an identity
without a great deal of content besides its link to nationhood. Since then,
many of them have added content to the religious identity and insisted on its
application in the country.
At present, he says, expert surveys
suggest that from 20 to 25 percent of Kazakhs are religious in more than
name. They are overwhelmingly Sunni Muslims
of the Hanafi rite. But despite suggestions that interest in religion is ebbing
and atheism returning, Mustafayev says, in reality, ever more Kazakhs are
taking their religion seriously.
One sign of this is that they are
building more mosques. Between 2017 and 2020, he says, the number of mosques increased
from 3600 to 3796, a six percent increase over only three years. This means that in time more Kazakhs will
become religious and they will give a religious coloration to the country
regardless of its constitutionally defined secularism.
Mustafayev says that in the world
today, there are only “four theocratic states – the Vatican, Iran, Pakistan and
Afghanistan” but there are many more de facto. Chechnya, although within
the borders of the secular Russian Federation, has imposed the norms of shariat
on its residents.
What Kazakhs should be talking about
is not whether Islam will become more influential but what role it will play
and how greater religiosity in fact can serve to prevent any expansion of Islamist
radicalism, he argues. The Kazakh government can help if it supports Kazakh
Muslims in their aspirations rather than opposes them, thereby alienating them.
During the cold war, the historian
continues, liberal democracy was kept in tone by the challenge of communism;
but now that its opponent has disappeared, many liberal democrats have begun to
support ideas like single sex marriages that alienate many traditional people
not only from liberalism but also from democracy.
“The experience of many countries
shows that democracy is not a panacea,” Mustafayev concludes. “Having discredited itself, it in fact has
promoted the disintegration of Christianity, the growth of religious extremism,
and the migration crisis in Western Europe.” Kazakhstan needs to learn from
this and welcome the increasing influence of traditional Islam.
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