Putin No Longer Seeking Natural Growth of Russian Population, Will Rely on Immigration Instead, Chernyshov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 31 – In the new text of his national goals for Russia for the next decade (nakanune.ru/news/2020/07/21/22579126/), Vladimir Putin has dropped his earlier commitment to boosting the growth rate of the indigenous Russian population, an indication that he will rely on immigration alone for any rise in the total, Yevgeny Chernyshov says.

            Putin’s decision shows just how irresponsible Russian officials have been in suggesting that in a few years, the natural rate of increase of Russian citizens (births over deaths) will rise and points to dramatic changes in government policy and the conditions under which Russians will live, the commentator says (nakanune.ru/news/2020/7/31/22580091/).

            Apparently Putin has decided that neither pro-natalist policies nor improved conditions for Russian adults and the elderly designed to reduce the death rate are going to work or at least that he is not prepared or able to commit sufficient resources to them in order to ensure the fertility rate rises to replacement levels and mortality rates fall.

            That means, Chernyshov says, that programs now in place designed to do so are likely to be cut back or even eliminated in the coming years, something that will inflict serious hardships both on younger families and on older Russians who suffer disproportionately from alcohol-related accidents and illnesses associated with aging such as cancer.

            But Putin’s decision means something else that may matter even more to many Russians. If the Kremlin has decided to rely on immigrants alone to boost the population, that will mean that the share of such immigrants, most of whom will come from Muslim areas in Central Asia and the Caucasus, will inevitably rise.

            At present, such immigrants may form ten percent of the population; but if Putin’s policies are followed, that share will rise, both because the number of Russians will continue to decline and because the number of immigrants will rise. Given tensions between these communities, that trend by itself is likely to prove destabilizing.

            There is another consequence of this shift in policy, one that Chernyshov does not discuss, that may also matter a great deal. Moscow has counted on its pro-natalist policies to boost birthrates among ethnic Russians who today have fewer children than many non-Russian nations now within the borders of the Russian Federation.

            Without such programs as maternal capital, birthrates among ethnic Russians will likely fall still faster, making the relative advantage many non-Russian groups have that much larger. And as a result, the non-Russian share of the population will continue to increase at an accelerating rate.

            Chernyshov is the first to raise the alarm about this, but Russian nationalists are likely to add their voices soon as well, especially given the Kremlin leader’s constant talk about how he is promoting a Russian “world,” something that this shift in his policy will not only do nothing to promote but will make increasingly impossible.