‘Embassies’ of Non-Russian Republics Quietly Continue Their Work Apparently under Moscow’s Radar Screen

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 2 – Despite Vladimir Putin’s attacks on the remnants of federalism within the Russian Federation, he has not suppressed institutions representing the non-Russian republics (and some other federal subjects) in Moscow, in each other and in the country’s oblasts and krays, or even in foreign countries.

            These institutions, known as permanent representations, arose at the dawn of Soviet times when communications between Moscow and the periphery were problematic. They continued to exist, although their roles evolved, with many being little more than agencies serving the needs of the political elite and the main businesses of the republics.

            But they were always important for the union republics – indeed, after 1991, the permanent representations of the union republics in Moscow became the embassies of the non-Russian republics – and they were important as well for autonomous republics as symbols of what some of their leaders hoped to obtain.

            (For background on these institutions, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/01/non-russian-republic-embassies-in.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2016/11/not-just-facade-federalism-russias.html, windowoneurasia.blogspot.com/2009/05/window-on-eurasia-daghestan-now-has-50.html,windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/12/38-of-ingushetias-permanent.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2013/03/window-on-eurasia-tuva-opens.html.)

            These offices in Moscow and in the regions continue to work, albeit below almost anyone’s radar screen; and because that is so, they provide various kinds of assistance to people from the republics who come to Moscow as officials, visitors or students and to republic businesses needing to make contact with Russian ministries.

            That even Putin’s Kremlin would have no problem with that is not surprising. But what is is that some republics have opened and maintained permanent representations beyond the borders of the former Soviet space in various countries. Tuva, for example, has such an office in Mongolia (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2013/03/window-on-eurasia-tuva-opens.html).

                        The most active republic in this regard is Tatarstan, which currently maintains such offices in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Germany, and Turkey. In the case of the last, Kazan has just reappointed its “ambassador” there (milliard.tatar/news/rustam-minnixanov-prodlil-polnomociya-airata-gataullina-v-dolznosti-polpreda-tatarstana-v-turcii-2170).

            That Putin has not suppressed them may reflect either a judgment that these are irrelevant as far as Moscow is concerned or even a useful adjunct to Russia’s diplomatic and other activities abroad. But for an increasing number of non-Russian republics, including Tatarstan, they may appear to be not only useful but symbolic of hopes for independence.