Moscow’s Increasingly Imperialist Rhetoric Alienating Former Soviet Republics Ever More Completely, Kazakhstan Commentator Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Jan. 30 – To compensate at home for its failure to achieve victory over Ukraine, Moscow propagandists like Aleksandr Dugin have adopted increasingly imperialist rhetoric with regard to the other countries in the region which emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union, Serik Maleyev says.

            But the editor of Kazakhstan’s Altyn-Orda portal says that this is backfiring and convincing these countries that that the only way they can have a secure future is for Russia to suffer a crushing defeat and disintegrate further (altyn-orda.kz/rossijskaya-ugroza-respublikam-tsentralnoj-azii-zachem-ideologi-kremlya-otmenyayut-suverenitet-sosedej/ reposted at region.expert/central-asia/).

             Dugin, the chief megaphone for this rhetoric, Maleyev says, is not just some odious excentric. Rather, his words about the former Soviet republics not having the right to exist except as Russian client states is “the concentrated expression of imperial revanchism which long ago became part of the Russian propaganda mainstream.”

            Moreover, Maleyev continues, “the louder that these imperial fantasies are sounded, the more obvious their compensatory character is” and the more the residents of neighboring countries see this language “not as an argument in favor of coming together but rather as a direct warning” and as a reason “to see Russia’s total defeat not as something radical but sensible.”

            “The more insistently the ideologues of ‘the Russian world’ deny the right of that country’s neighbors to have an independent existence,” the Kazakhstan writer says, “the more quickly these neighbors will come to the simple conclusion that the source of the threat to them must be stripped of the possibility of carrying it out.”

            And what this means, the editor continues, is that the words of Dugin and others like him “are not strengthening Russia and not broadening its influence but only stresses the difference imperial rhetoric and the real possibilities of a weakening state.”

Fewer Russians Vaccinated against Childhood Diseases in 2025 than in Any Year of the Last Decade, Increasing Risks of Epidemics, ‘Takiye Dela’ Reports

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Jan. 30 – “The numbers of Russian children being vaccinated against diphtheria, tetanus, viral hepatitis and pneumococcal infections in 2025 were the lowest in the last decade,” according to Rosstat data investigated by Aleksey Semyonov of the Takiye Dela portal; and that increases the risk of future epidemics of these diseases.

            According to Russian government figures, the declines have been very small, the journalist says; but if one bases the declines on the total numbers of children not being vaccinated, then these falloffs have been much larger, not one percent or less but two or three times that figure (takiedela.ru/notes/detey-plokho-privivayut/).

            The actual declines, Semyonov says, reflect the decision of parents who missed such shots during the covid epidemic not to get them, the unavailability of vaccines produced in the west and distrust among Russians for domestic ones, and the rise of anti-vaxxer sentiments not only among the population as a whole but among doctors in particular.

            Anti-vaxxer sentiment is playing an especially harmful role. Approximately a third of all Russian doctors say they have colleagues who oppose giving vaccinations; and a VTsIOM poll found that 54 percent of Russian parents are prepared to have their children receive “only ‘the most necessary’” vaccines.

            In general, they judge those to be about diseases that still circulate like measles rather than polio which is largely under control. As a result, explosive growth in measles is probably unlikely; but there is a real danger that diseases like polio could return and spread like wildfire through a population that could have been vaccinated but chose not to.

            Medical experts with whom Semyonov spoke were unanimous in agreeing that declines in the number of young people being vaccinated represent a serious threat to the health of Russia in the future. 

Russian Soldiers Injured in Combat in Ukraine Far More Likely to Die than Their Predecessors or Combatants Elsewhere, Kyiv’s ‘Come Back Alive Initiative’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Jan. 30 – The ration of killed to wounded has always been “a key indicator of an army’s viability,” Ukrainian commentator Yury Fedorenko says. In the distant past, armies typically suffered far more wounded than dead; in World War II, the ratio was three wounded to every death; and in Afghanistan, ten wounded for each death.

            And because of this trend, the Ukrainian writer says, most people assumed that in modern war, with advances in medicine, better transportation an logistics, even more of the wounded would survive and fight again. But in the case of Putin’s war in Ukraine, that has not been happening (charter97.org/ru/news/2026/1/30/671817/).

            Instead, he says, as Ukraine’s “Come Back Alive Initiative” has documented, slightly more than half of all Russians wounded in combat in Ukraine are dying, the result of the strategy and tactics of both armies and the failure of the Russian command to evacuate and provide medical treatment to the wounded in an effective way.

            “More than half” of Russian losses are thus “irreversible;” and Moscow has to send a disproportionately larger number of men to the front each month just to keep the size of its forces at the current level. “Every month,” this task gets “harder and harder,” the Ukrainian commentator says.

More than half of the losses are irreversible. This can only mean one thing: the human resource of the enemy is being wiped out at an unprecedented speed. Russia needs to bring more than 35,000 new creatures to the frontline just to keep the numbers on the frontline every month. Every month it gets harder and harder.

            That Russian losses are mounting has been frequently and well documented (e.g., bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-01-30/russia-s-war-death-tally-spurs-european-scrutiny-on-recruitment), but there is as yet no independent confirmation of the Return Alive figures, although they are quite plausible given reports of rising deaths among Russian troops.

            Kyiv, of course, has a vested interest in promoting such statistics given that they will only add to fears among Russians that being called or bribed into service in Ukraine is likely to be a death sentence; but Moscow has if anything even more compelling reasons for not releasing such data lest it face even more difficulties in meeting its military manpower needs.

Moscow Patriarchate Diverges from Kremlin on Traditional Values, ‘Nezavisimaya Gazeta’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Jan. 29 – The Moscow Patriarchate so often slavishly follows the Kremlin line on issues like Putin’s war in Ukraine that it is sometimes ignored that the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church diverges from the Putin regime on key issues – and that this divergence may even lead to heightened tensions between the two.

            According to the editors of Nezavimaya Gazeta, “the Russian Orthodox Church and the state do not fully agree on the issue of traditional values,” with the Moscow Patriarchate insisting that Orthodoxy must dominate them while Putin insists on a much broader and more secular approach (ng.ru/editorial/2026-01-29/2_9426_red.html).

            This difference has been thrown into high relief at a conference of religious leaders where Patriarch Kirill spoke and where a message from President Putin was read out to the delegates, the editors say. Kirill said any efforts to “introduce young people to traditional Russian spiritual and moral values without recourse to the Orthodox faith and culture are untenable.”

            And he called for Russian priests to play a more active role at all levels of the Russian educational pyramid from pre-schools to universities. For Kirill, the paper said, Russian traditional values come from “only one Christian denomination” – Orthodoxy – which although the largest is not the only “traditional” religion in Russia.

            Putin in contrast emphasized that “Russian traditions are formed at the intersection of these spiritual systems” and that the worldview he and his government want to promote is “crowned by civic virtues, primarily patriotism,” rather than coming from a single religious center.

            “The country’s leadership and its multi-ethnic society are interested in maintaining interreligious harmony,” the editors write. The ROC MP “takes part in this dialogue of religions, but recently, they continue, the Patriarchate like some in the government and society have exhibited “a certain bias towards promoting the hegemony of the main confession.”

            The ROC MP wants to go further than the regime in this regard and clearly hopes that by taking a tough line on this issue while remaining loyal on almost all others it will be able to push Putin into adopting an even more Russian nationalist position, something that have serious consequences given the rising share of non-Russians and non-Orthodox in the population.

Kremlin Advisor Says Russians Quite Happy to Trade Freedom for Effective Rule

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Jan. 29 – The third issue of Gosudarstvo, which is rapidly assuming the role that Kommunist performed in Soviet times, carries an article by Kremlin advisor Gleb Kuznetsov which argues that Russians are quite prepared to give up privacy, competitive elections and other freedoms that would prevent the state from ruling effectively.

            (The article is available online at https://runivers.ru/bookreader/book164337, pp. 14-18 and has been reviewed by Andrey Pertsev at meduza.io/feature/2026/01/28/konsultant-kremlya-gleb-kuznetsov-v-novoy-statie-otkryto-hvalit-rossiyu-i-kitay-za-totalnyy-kontrol-nad-zhiznyu-lyudey.)

            By “illiberal” systems which he says have advantages, Kuznetsov identifies cities in Russia and in China. He doesn’t list countries in the West where legitimacy is “based on procedures like competitive elections, separation of powers and the illusion of public ‘oversight.’”

            According to him as summarized by Pertsev, “’illiberal’ regimes outperform their “liberal” counterparts. In such systems, power is legitimate ‘not because it’s reelected every four years by promising everything to everyone amid real political competition, but because it works for voters on a daily basis.’”

            The digitalization of life, Kuznetsov continues, means that actions by the government as far as citizens are concerned are “visible and measurable,” something that is far more important for the populace than are “abstract discussions of procedural democracy’” because they deliver what people need and don’t need to “manipulate public opinion.”

            That is, these illiberal states work “thanks to rather than in spite of the concentration of power;” and that is why people welcome them and are ready to put up with things like state oversight because it gives them what they want most immediately and is something they would miss were it to disappear.

            Not only does these features of “illiberal” regimes allow them to respond to problems more quickly, but they free these societies from electoral cycles, allowing for the carrying out of long-term projects without the risk that these will be reversed or at least interrupted after the next round of voting.

            According to Kuznetsov, “modern illiberal systems know how to create institutional stability without liberal procedures — through elite rotation, meritocratic selection, and built-in feedback mechanisms – and they thus represent a new type of political order, in which traditional liberal procedures are replaced by technocratic governance legitimized by effectiveness.”

Traditional Way of Life No Longer Ensures Survival of Native Language for Non-Russians Living Outside Their National Republics, New Study Finds

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Jan. 29 – New field research reported by Marina Kutsayeva of the Moscow Institute of Linguistics challenges the widely held view that members of nations who maintain a traditional way of life are far more likely to retain their native language even if they reside outside their non-Russian federal subjects.

            In a new article, she summarizes socio-linguistic studies of members of the Mari nation who live outside Mari El (mariuver.eu/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Kucajeva_M_V-Marijcy_i_ih_jazyk_za_predelami_Respubliki_Marij_El_2024-2025.pdf, discussed at https://mariuver.eu/2026/01/28/kak-zhivet-mariiskj-jazyk-za-predelami-marij-el/).

            This is a critical issue for the Mari because almost half of that Finno-Ugric people live outside the borders of their titular republic. What the latest studies show, she says is that “assimilation is occurring in various federal subjects in an extremely uneven manner and that “a traditional way of life no longer guarantees the preservation of the language.”

            Globalization and digitalization, Kutsayeva says, “are penetrating into the most distance villages through smartphones and the internet, and as a result, native language is beginning to be viewed by the young as an instrument exclusively for communicating with elderly relatives” than as a language of common use.

            She organizes her report around the situation in the federal subjects where Maris are most numerous. Their situation is “most favorable” in Bashkortostan, she says, because the diaspora is large and concentrated in a few regions. And the Mari language continues to be used by middle aged and older Maris.

            But younger Maris have largely stopped using their native language, and in most rural schools, even in kindergartens, it is ceasing to be the language of instruction. The only factor keeping young Maris in their national linguistic fold is religion. Those who follow the Mari traditional faith retain the language far more than do others.

            In Tatarstan, the situation of the Maris and their language is relatively good. In contrast to most other federal subjects, Mari remains a language of instruction and in others, it is taught up to three hours a week, not a lot it would seem but more than most places and something that is helping to keep the language alive.

            Indeed, Kutsayeva says, schools in Tatarstan are helping the Maris in many ways, even becoming centers of cultural “revitalization.” One result of this is that Mari parents when given the choice as to the language of instruction for their children choose Mari rather than Russian, a sharp contrast with what happens elsewhere.

            In Sverdlovsk Oblast, a primarily ethnic Russian region, the situation of the Mari language is generating “serious concern.” Most Maris under 35 do not use their native language regularly except in conversations with older relatives. The treatment of the Mari language in schools depends heavily on the attitudes of the local school directors.

            But in another predominantly ethnic Russian region, Kirov Oblast, the situation of the Mari language has become “most critical.” There, Maris under the age of 50 to 55 do not use it, most Maris have fled to the cities where they speak Russian exclusively, and young Maris have a tendency to view the Mari language as “foreign.”

            In that predominantly ethnic Russian region, Kutsayeva says, Mari is treated by many as “a secret language” spoken only by the elderly. This situation is so dire that linguists are now calling for the documentation of Mari dialects before they completely disappear and cannot be recorded.

Kyrgyzstan Requires Countries Receiving Its Water to Pay for It

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Jan. 29 – For more than two decades, Bishkek has urged the countries of Central Asia to pay for water entering their territories as the best means of promoting conservation and eliminating negotiations about amounts or balancing these amounts with deals for electric power.

            But while all the Central Asian countries have moved away from the Soviet-era practice that water is free good, none of the other has gone as far as Kyrgyzstan in seeking to extend that principle to water flowing from one country to another, declaring that from now on, those who get its water will have to pay (asia24.media/news/besplatno-bolshe-ne-budet-s-1-yanvarya-2026-goda-kyrgyzstan-vystavlyaet-scheta-stranam-tsentralnoy-a/).

            Kyrgyzstan, which along with Tajikistan, has long been considered a water surplus region which supplies water to the other countries of the region which are all downstream, understandably is more prepared to make that demand; but now the question arise as to how prices will be set and how they will be collected.

            With regard to the first, there are likely to be lively diplomatic debates regarding price and even the possibility that other countries will respond to Kyrgyzstan’s action by raising prices on goods they export to Bishkek. And with regard to the second, Kyrgyzstan is likely to find it difficult to block water from flowing downstream and thus not able to force others to pay.

            But despite that, what Kyrgyzstan has done appears likely to transform water debates in Central Asia from being about amounts of water to be shared to being about what prices those who have water will charge and how they will collect it. Given the impact that has had within these countries, Bishkek’s decision may prove a real turning point in the region. 

Declines in Number of Repressive Cases in Belarus Should Not Fool Anyone, Sociologist Says; They Reflect that Lukashenka has Already Repressed Most Possible Targets

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Jan. 29 – Some observers and foreign governments have been encouraged by the fact that the number of political cases the Lukashenka regime brought against its opponents this year is smaller than the number brought a year ago. But they shouldn’t be, Genadz Korshunau says.

            The head of the Belarusian Sociological Group and former director of the Minsk Institute of Sociology says that this trend does not represent anything positive but rather shows that the Belarusian dictator has been so effective at repression that there simply aren’t that many structures left the country to oppress (ng.ru/cis/2026-01-29/1_9426_belorussia.html).

            The supposedly “positive” figures from Belarus include the fact that the number of political prisoners fell from 593 in 2024 to 448 in 2025 and that the number of NGOs newly banned from 385 in 2024 to 107 in 2025 and that most of the NGOs banned in the more recent year were branches of NGOs earlier.

            By his repressive moves over many years, Genadz Korshunau says, Lukashenka has “exhausted the possibilities” for growth in repression because those opposed to his rule have either fled abroad, are already behind bars, or are too cowed by his repressive machine to take action. Thus, these supposedly encouraging figures in fact are very discouraging indeed.

Rosstat Releases More Data Highlighting Russia’s Continuing Demographic Decline

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Jan. 29 – Rosstat, the Russian government’s statistical arm which has in recent years cut back dramatically on the amount of demographic data is releases, has prepared a report showing that the situation there may be even more dire than critics have suggested up to now, Vedomosti journalists who have seen the report say.

            Among the developments the Moscow newspaper relates from that Rosstat study (edomosti.ru/society/articles/2026/01/29/1172461-rosstat-chislo-statsionarnih-mest-dlya-rozhenits-dostiglo-minimuma), the following are especially important because they point to a continuing and long term demographic decline:

·       The number of maternity beds in medical institutions has fallen to the lowest level in the post-Soviet period, with 14.2 beds per 10,000 women compared to 34.1 in 1990, a falloff that has accelerated in the last several years when the number of such beds fell from 52,300 in 2022 to 48,700 in 2024, the last year for which statistics have been released.

·       The number of women giving birth has also been falling. In 1990, 1.89 million Russian women gave birth; in 2024, that figure was 1.12 million, a decline of 40.8 percent.

·       As is happening in many countries, the length of time women are kept in hospital after giving birth has fallen from seven to ten days to only two to three, reflecting a more efficient handling of birthing.

·       Maternity wars and hospitals are being closed in remote and underpopulated areas and being sent instead to regional state hospitals, often 90 minutes of more from their homes. According to one observer, this trend however economically justified means that “healthcare has moved further away from the population.”

A Corrupt Colonial System: Russia’s Northern Regions Not Allowed to Develop Their Own Resources or Get Them from Neighbors but Forced by Moscow to Bring Them from Far Away

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Jan. 29 – Officials in Moscow and in the regions regularly celebrate the Northern Supply Operation which brings food and supplies to the people along Russia’s Arctic littoral, something that is essential if the Northern Sea Route is to become truly effective, Dmitry Verkhoturov says.

            But Siberian economist Dmitry Verkhoturov says that the way in which the Northern Supply Operation functions is a waste of money, with the federal subjects there compelled by Moscow to purchase raw materials like coal and timber from distant parts of the Russian Federation or even abroad rather than using resources of their own or neighboring regions (sibmix.com/?doc=19659).

            He gives as an example what has been happening in the Yamalo-Nenets AD. There. Moscow has compelled the region to import coal from as far away as Kazakhstan when in fact the region could provide as much energy and heat by harvesting its forests. But if it did, then Moscow’s profits and leverage would be less.

            The regions on the Arctic littoral, he continues, are forced to spend an enormous share of their resources and as a result constantly seek loans from Moscow to do what Moscow wants, something that gives enormous profits to people in the capital but prevents the northern regions from developing as they should.

              Verkhoturov does not use the words “corrupt” or “neo-colonial” to characterize this situation; but they certainly apply and help to explain why Moscow does what it does and why so many people in the Russian North suffer even as Moscow pockets the profits and drives their regions deeper into debt and dependency. 

Putin’s ‘Hero Mother’ Program Highlights Russia’s Demographic Problems Rather than Solving Them

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Jan. 29 – In 2022, Vladimir Putin restored the Soviet practice of awarding mothers with ten or more children the title of Hero Mother and paid each woman so identified a price of one million rubles, something that he clearly expected would lead women across the country to have more children and help Russia compensate for losses in his war in Ukraine

            (For background on this award that some Russian deputies have long called for and Putin’s expectations about its impact, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/06/putin-wants-to-restore-hero-mother.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/07/seventy-five-years-ago-today-moscow.html.)

             But things have not worked out as Putin intended. On the one hand, fertility rates especially in predominantly ethnic Russian cities have continued to fall. And on the other, the women most likely to have ten or more children and qualify for the award are women from Muslim nations in the Caucasus, hardly the pattern Putin wants to see.

            But in order to keep the award going and to suggest that there are at least some women who have given birth to and are raising ten or more children, Putin has had not choice but to give Hero Mother awards to women from those nationalities, even though it calls attention to Russia’s demographic problems rather than serving as a means to solve them.

            This week, for example, Putin named three new hero mothers. All three are from the Muslim republics of the North Caucasus. As has been largely true in the past, he did not find any Orthodox Russians to qualify, something that he almost certainly would have liked to be able to do (etokavkaz.ru/news/247394).

Aesopian Language Lives – Baikal Portal Carries Major Article on How Another Russian War to Annex Foreign Territory Sparked a Revolution at Home

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Jan. 29 – When a government makes it impossible for people to talk about actions of the government that the population rejects, as often happened in Soviet times, those who still want to talk about such things and to bring to the attention of others their thoughts routinely turn to Aesopian language.

            As the Putin regime has tightened the screws on Russia especially since the Kremlin leader launched his expanded war in Ukraine, authors in the Russian Federation have expanded their use of this technique to discuss the baleful consequences of that action not directly but rather by talking about other close analogies.

            A remarkable example of this is the publication today by the People of Baikal portal about “how a war for the annexation of new territories led to the overthrow of the state system in Russia 120 years ago” when Nicholas II launched what he expected to be “a good little war” to solve domestic problems.

In a 3,000-word essay, commentator Asya Gay describes how tsar’s plans after initially enjoying massive support backfired, led to general trikes and then to revolution in Irkutsk and ultimately the Russian Empire as a whole (baikal-stories.media/2026/01/29/polozhenie-otchayannoe-bunt-polnyj-vseobshhij/).

Gai’s detailed description of what happened in Irkutsk and her use of photographs from that time are fascinating in and of themselves, but it is unlikely that any Russian reading her article would fail to draw the possible and likely intended parallels to what is happening in Russia today and what may happen if Putin’s war continues.

 

Low Pay, Attitudes of Commanders Why Russian Policemen are Ever More Frequently Quitting, Pashkin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Jan. 28 – Low pay and the attitudes of senior officers explain why vacancies in Russia’s police force have risen from 30 percent three years ago to 40 percent now and will in a couple of months reach 50 percent when one could shut down the interior ministry entirely, Mikahil Pashkin, head of Russia’s police union (nakanune.ru/news/2026/1/28/22856417/).

            He did not mention two other causes that have also played a role: the higher salaries policemen can earn by quitting the force and joining the Russian army to fight in Ukraine and the increasingly negative attitudes of Russians. (For background, see jamestown.org/war-against-ukraine-leaving-russian-police-state-without-enough-police/.)

            Pashkin argues that the police force is destroying itself because all senior officers care about is meeting quotas and other targets set by their political masters rather that enforcing the law in a fair and equitable manner.  The union leader’s comments came on the heels of Duma testimony by deputy interior minister Igor Zubov.

            Zubov admitted that salaries were too long and would be raised, although likely not by enough to solve the problem and that the reputation of the police was now in tatters, something that needs to be rectified (ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/01/28/v-mvd-zayavili-o-massovih-uvolneniyah-i-padenii-prestizha-sluzhbi-a185641).

 

Russians Don’t View Putin as Sacral but Rather as Eternal, Belkovsky Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Jan. 27 – In Soviet times, Stanislav Belkovsky says, jokes about the rulers was “a powerful channel of popular satire,” one especially powerful because no one knew who the author of this or that joke was and therefore the anecdotes told at that time “expressed not an individual opinion but a collective point of view.”

            A true political joke, the opposition commentator says, is “a classic example of a subject-less statement.” Such jokes exist “in present-day Russia,” but “they don’t take root or develop” because their authorship is always known because it consists mostly of comics who are working for the regime” (pointmedia.io/story/697898f0e657f59b666dceb0).

            According to Belkovsky, “this shows the qualitative difference between Soviet totalitarianism of the past and Russian totalitarianism now. The former was collectivist and retained the romantic idea of a joint movement and the feeling that even bad power was still ‘ours’ and something that could and should be changed including via satire and humor.”

            Russia today, however, is very different. It is “extremely atomized with everyone playing for himself. There is no collective effort or even collective thought. Instead, the powers are alienated from the people just as the people a re from each other. And that means those in power now aren’t so much sacralized as perceived as eternal.”

“Because Putin is eternal,” Belkovsky says, “there is no point in emotionally reacting to his presence or absence. One need only correlate one's behavior with the demands of the regime so as not to suffer, and try to live in a space as independent from it as possible. Those who succeed in this are in a sense free—just as individual people were free in the late USSR.”

And he concludes: “humor, in order to truly work as a tool of desacralization, must be based on inner optimism and an unconscious hope for change. In Soviet society, such hope existed [but] in modern Russia, this hope does not exist: the ruling elite gives no grounds for it and change itself is Vladimir Putin’s worst nightmare.”

Belkovsky’s words recall to this reader of his remarks an anecdote from the last days of the Soviet Union. In it, two Russian meet in Red Square. The first asks “have you heard any good political anecdotes recently?” to which the second responds, “you know, not a one; but my Polish friend has an explanation.”

“What is it?” the first asks. That’s simple, says the second. “When times are bad, people tell political jokes but when they get worse, people stop.”

Women in North Caucasus Even More Likely to be Mistreated after Ukraine War Ends because Judicial System Sides with the Men in Their Lives Against Them, ‘Ad Rem’ Investigation Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Jan. 27 – Women in the North Caucasus routinely are mistreated, wounded and even killed when they seek to free themselves from some of the most archaic traditions of that region. But new research by Ad Rem, a lawyers’ organization that offers them defense, says their situation is likely to get much worse.

            That is because, the group says, they will not only have to deal with veterans returning from Putin’s war in Ukraine who are often traumatized but with a judicial system that has shown itself prepared to let them off with only a slap on the wrist for the most heinous crimes directed against women.

            In a 39-page study detailing the problems women in the North Caucasus now face, the Ad Rem organization says that it regretfully concludes that they will face “persecution instead of defense” when veterans from Ukraine return home (adrem.help/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Преследование-вместо-защиты-1.pdf).

            That may not be the largest problem Russia will face after the war Putin started ends, but it is one that should attract the attention of everyone concerned about human rights and be denounced as yet another way in which Moscow for all its talk about overcoming problems of this kind is in fact making them worse.

            The Ad Rem study has been reviewed by the Daptar portal which on a daily basis provides some of the most comprehensive coverage of the abuses women in the North Caucasus suffer (daptar.ru/2026/01/27/presledovanie-vmesto-zashchity-kak-na-severnom-kavkaze-gosudarstvo-rabotaet-protiv-zhertv-nasiliya/).

Ethnic Russians Overwhelmingly Fear the Disintegration of Their Country, Gallyamov Says, and That Helps the Kremlin Retain Power

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Jan. 26 – Ethnic Russians “are afraid of the collapse of the country,” Abbas Gallyamov says. “They are no longer afraid of losing Putin, the Donbass, or Crimea. They couldn’t care less about them. But they are afraid of events like those which accompanied the collapse of the Soviet Union, from numerous inter-ethnic conflicts to mass impoverishment.”

            Because that is so, the commentator who earlier served as a Putin speechwriter and retains close contacts with the ruling stratum, says, the Kremlin will be able to exploit the presence of non-Russians on the PACE group representing the peoples of Russia to rally ethnic Russians around the regime (echofm.online/opinions/razvala-strany-rossiyane-boyatsya).

            That is not what the non-Russians want or even what many of the ethnic Russians on the PACE group would prefer, but “the presence of representatives of the indigenous peoples of Russia will clearly be interpreted by the Kremlin as an attempt to break up Russia; and the first result of this will bee the consolidation of the ethnic Russian majority around the regime.”

            “Perhaps in the future, the activities of the representatives of the indigenous people will play a positive role,” the commentator continues.” That can’t be excluded; “but at this stage, their presence will be used effectively by Kremlin propaganda because “Russians are afraid of the collapse of their country.”

            “Of course, this is not what the ethnic Russian opposition needs,” especially now when it can do little but issue appeals of one kind or another. But it is the reality that they too must work with given the ethnic Russian majority in the Russian Federation is so afraid of collapse that the Kremlin retains at least for now that powerful lever to use against its opponents.

 

Whom are Russians Going to Believe about Murmansk -- Kremlin Media or Their Own Eyes?

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Jan. 26 – Governments around the world routinely try to control the narratives about problems lest their populations draw conclusions based on what they can see and hear. But few regimes have gone as far as the Kremlin in doing so, a pattern highlighted this week by how it is trying to control the reactions of Russians to the dark and freezing city of Murmansk.

            At a time when Russian aggression has turned out the lights in Kyiv and many other Ukrainian cities, the Putin regime is especially interested in preventing Russians from drawing parallels between what is happening in Ukraine and what is happening inside Russia given that the two things have their roots in the same place – the Kremlin and its contempt for people.

            Many Russian population points have suffered this winter but no large city more and for a longer period that Murmansk in the Russian north where there has been no heat, light or water for days (thebarentsobserver.com/news/darkness-descended-on-murmansk/444153, meduza.io/feature/2026/01/26/v-murmanske-treti-sutki-pereboi-s-elektrichestvom-i-podachey-tepla-eto-krupneyshiy-gorod-za-polyarnym-krugom-i-seychas-tam-moroz and krizis-kopilka.ru/archives/105279).

            Despite or more precisely because of the scope of this tragedy, Kremlin-controlled media have devoted little attention to it, clearly reflecting the hopes of Russia’s rulers that what these outlets don’t report, the Russian people won’t pay attention to (t.me/agentstvonews/13673 and nemoskva.net/2026/01/26/federalnye-telekanaly-otkazalis-ot-polnoczennogo-osveshheniya-blekauta-v-murmanskoj-oblasti/).

            And to reenforce this message, the Kremlin has used bots to push its message that the disaster in Murmansk was the result of something other than the failures of officials to live up to their responsibilities to maintain the infrastructure needed to keep people warm and safe (t.me/botnadzor_org/1910).

            But as independent social anthropologist Aleksandr Arkhipova points out, Kremlin messengers have gone even further and introduced a new term of art for what is happening in Murmansk (t.me/anthro_fun/3853 and nemoskva.net/2026/01/26/ne-otklyuchenie-a-rotacziya-elektrichestva-murmanskie-energetiki-izobreli-novoe-slovosochetanie-chtoby-skryt-masshtab-avarii/).

            “It will become clear to anyone who thinks about this for a second that what is going on are rolling blackouts,” Arkhipova says, especially as these words “say nothing about a major a ccident or about people being without eating. In short and as usual, we have our lovely euphemisms, a product of a world where nothing bad ever happens.”

            Residents of Murmansk posted comments on Arkhipova’s article and said that what electricity there is comes on mostly at night but that in some apartment blocks, heating and water have been cut off, with some of the city’s shops closed as well. They also say that bread has disappeared from the shelves because the city’s bakeries have been affected by power outages.

            As so often happens in such situations, the Russian government’s effort to control the popular reaction is backfiring with its efforts transparently obvious, thus leading the population to conclude or even report that the situation is far worse than people would have assumed if they had been told the truth to begin with. 

For Fifth Year Running, Russians Bought More Anti-Depressants than the Year Before

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Jan. 26 – For the fifth year in a row, Russians set a record with their purchases of anti-depressants; but what is the most important factor in leading them to do so has changed. In 2022, they were afraid of being drafted and sent to fight in Ukraine; now, they are more worried about losing their jobs.

            In 2021, Russians bought 9.2 million anti-depressant pills; in 2025, they bought 22.3 million, more than 2.4 times more, the DSM Group reports (ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/01/26/ktk-zavershil-remont-vpu-3-i-otgruzhaet-neft-v-shtatnom-rezhime-konsortsium-a185413).

            Some of this increase likely reflects the fact that Russians appear to be increasingly willing to turn to their doctors with problems like depression and doctors are ready to prescribe drugs like Zoloft. But some of it almost certainly reflects the spread of depression among Russians, who are now worried more about losing their jobs than about the war in Ukraine.

Russians Will Likely Stop Hating Groups if Kremlin Stops Whipping Up Popular Attitudes Against Them, Analysts Tell ‘Novaya Gazeta’

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Jan. 21 – An analysis conducted by Nezavisimaya Gazeta Europe and the Cedar Research Center suggests that over the last six years, hatred has spread among Russians against this or that group when the government adopts laws attacking the groups involved and then uses its media to whip up public sentiment against them.

            That has had unfortunate consequences for the groups involved, Alesya Sokolova, who coordinated the study of hatred in Russia since 2020;  but it contains one silver lining: It is almost certain, she and the experts she spoke with say, that if the powers stop promoting hatred, the amount of it will fall (novayagazeta.eu/articles/2026/01/21/kratkaia-istoriia-nenavisti).

            That is an optimistic assessment, of course; but it means that the Russian government must be held responsible in the first instance for hatred against various groups, a hatred the Kremlin is promoting to create a sense of unity against some common and invented enemy group.

            One can only hope that judgment is correct. But it raises another possibility which may be just as disturbing: What if it is the case among Russians – or indeed some other peoples – that the only way to promote unity is to hate someone else rather than to love one’s own group and thus recognize the right of others to love theirs?

            Clearly making what would be a welcome transition from unity based on hatred to unity based on affection will not be easy, especially in countries where the rulers have found it easier and more useful to themselves to generate and then rely on hatred rather than to take the chance on affection and even love. 

Ukrainian Soldiers Not Surrendering the Way Germans Did in World War II, a Sign that End of War is Still Far Away, Panov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Jan. 22 – In the final months of Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union, entire German units surrendered to the Red Army, a sign that the war was near its end. But now, while some Ukrainian soldiers who have surrendered to the Russian military in Ukraine, there have been almost no instances of units doing so, Valery Panov says.

            That means, the Russian commentator says in a post on the Russian nationalist Stoletiye portal that the war in Ukraine is far from over and that Moscow must at last recognize that it isn’t fighting a branch of the Russian nation but rather NATO “mercenaries” who will continue to fight (stoletie.ru/vzglyad/russkije_protiv_russkih_675.htm).

            Panov insists that Ukrainians are not deserting in unit-sized batches out of fear of being hunted down by Kyiv or being killed by the Russians if they go over the line but rather because they still have enough confidence that they can defeat Putin’s invasion force and a strong enough sense that they are Ukrainians and not a triune branch of the Russians as the Kremlin says. 

            For a Russian nationalist portal to deliver these two messages is to challenge two of Putin’s most cherished and widely ballyhooed notions by suggesting that the war is far from over whatever advances Moscow has made and that Ukrainians aren’t just Russians who have been misled but a completely separate people.

            Acknowledging that there haven’t been the unit-sized surrenders is perhaps the more important concession as far as a Russian audience is concerned given that government media in the Russian Federation can’t stop running stories about this or that Ukrainian deserter. But as Panov makes clear, individual desertions are one thing but mass desertions are quite another.

            That and his comments about the nature of Ukrainians as a national community throw cold water on much that residents of the Russian Federation have been encouraged to believe. That such a dose of reality should come from a Russian nationalist instead of someone else is telling. 

Like Stalin, Putin Views His Soldiers and His People as a Threat to His Rule, Lea and Taskin Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Jan. 24 – Putin’s escalation of repression with the creation of the Military Counterintelligence Directorate is the result of the same “systemic dynamics” that drove Stalin to set up the Smersh [“Death to Spies”] organization during World War II rather than some “evil decision” by either Kremlin ruler, Aaron Lea and Borukh Tashkin say.

            The two Israeli analysts of Russian background argue that the actions of both dictators “perform the same function of compensating for the lack of voluntary motivation with coercion” and thus suggests that Putin will become more repressive not less just as Stalin did at the end and after World War II (region.expert/repressions/).

            Indeed, the two suggest, “Russia is now moving along the same path” Stalin tread and that “the longer the war drags on, the greater the role of structures engaged not in fighting the external enemy but in maintaining internal discipline and repression again is becoming not a side effect but a key mechanism for managing the war and the entire society.”

            When a regime “views its own army as a zone of risk rather than as a pillar of support,” Lea and Tashkin continue, it “inevitably builds a system of internal surveillance, filtering and coercion;” and in the current case represents “a transition to a model of a military state where the main threat is seen as coming not from the outside but from within.”

            Russia’s “soldiers and officers in ‘the special military operation’ are objects of suspicion rather than subjects of trust,” with the only difference from Stalin’s approach is that “today Russia has neither the ideological motivation of 1941 or Lend Lease” assistance from the Western powers.

            That means, the two Israeli analysts say, that in Putin’s Russia, there is now “only fear, violence and drones with missiles and bombs.” But “without a material base, this model is doomed not to victory but to self-destruction.” That will be clear to everyone when Muscovite state “again places executions behind the backs of soldiers” and threatens all who might retreat.

 

Russians ‘Repeating’ Worst Aspects of Soviet Behavior in World War II But Not the Most Valuable and Essential, Gallyamov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Jan. 26 – When today’s Russian “patriots’ talk about “repeating” what their grandfathers did, Abbas Gallyamov says, “they thought they would be repeating the raising of the victory banner over the Reichstag” in Kyiv. But “instead, they have repeated the overconfidence, self-aggrandizement, sloppiness and unprofessionalism” of their ancestors.

            Their grandfathers made all these mistakes and more but they won because they proved capable of learning from their mistakes, correcting what they had done, and then, because they had done so, achieved victory (t.me/abbasgallyamovpolitics/9581 reposted at https://echofm.online/opinions/oni-vzyali-ot-dedov-samoe-hudshee).

            Unfortunately for Russia, the Russian commentator says, the current generation of Russians and their leaders have proven incapable of that; and so as Putin’s war in Ukraine has lasted longer that the USSR’s Great Patriotic War did, today’s warriors have not already won as they expected but are far further from any victory than they imagine.

Had Soviets Not Used Force to Move People There, ‘Siberia would have been Left without People Long Before Now,’ Political Geographer Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Jan. 22 – The accelerating decline in the population of Siberia in recent decades has prompted many officials to propose taking steps to reverse that, but Russian political geographer Dmitry Oreshkin says such ideas are at a minimum utopian and that Siberia would have been depopulated long ago had the Soviets not used force to move people there. 

            The population of that enormous region has declined for more than a century, with the fall off being only briefly reversed when the tsarist regime promoted resettlement there and then in Soviet times when the state imprisoned and exiled individuals and whole peoples in that direction, he continues (sibreal.org/a/territoriya-sama-po-sebe-nikomu-ne-nuzhna-chto-ne-tak-s-kremlevskoy-ideey-sibirizatsii-rossii-/33649804.html).

            According to Oreshkin, the present-day Russian state has neither the money nor the capacity to move massive numbers of people to the region; and without these “resources,” Siberia will continue to lose people, declines that immigrants from other countries aren’t compensating for now and are unlikely to compensate for in the future.

            Oreshkin notes that because of this and because of Moscow’s policies, the region’s population remains relatively unconnected with its component parts both because there are few roads or rail lines and because Siberians mostly have to travel from one city to another via Moscow rather than directly.

            And he comments that most Russians “do not understand that territory by itself is not a divine gift and it is nothing for which one must struggle or fight. Instead, it is something we must invest in and develop,” steps that Moscow shows little sign of doing at least in the case of Siberia.

By Reducing the Number of Russians Classified as Handicapped, Moscow Frees Up Money for Other Uses, Including War, Experts Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Jan. 23 – Since 2014, the Russian government has been working to restrict the number of people classified as handicapped and thus entitled to government benefits. As a result, it has held that number constant despite two developments – the COVID pandemic and Putin’s war in Ukraine – that have almost certainly boosted the number deserving that status.

            The primary reason, Russian experts say, is that the Kremlin wants to save money on the handicapped and use it for other purposes given that under current rules, the government spends a minimum of 120 billion rubles (1.53 billion US dollars) for each million people given handicapped status (https://www.svoboda.org/a/systema-invalidy/33657480.html).

            That means that if Moscow can prevent a rise in the number of those registered as handicapped by the government by two million or reduce the number of those already classified, it can save as much as 240 billion rubles (3.06 billion US dollars), it frees up funds for other purposes at a time of budgetary stringency – even though the handicapped will suffer.

Russian Urbanization Following Third World Model of the Rise of a Few Large Megacities and the Collapse of Smaller Urban Spaces, Krupnov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Jan. 25 – “There are various kinds of urbanization,” Yury Krupnov says, some of which help a country to develop and others of which lead to its degradation. Unfortunately, Russia has followed “the kind characteristic of third-world countries – an ugly megacity urbanization” which suck the life out of all the others and threaten the decay of the country.

            In the course of a wide-ranging interview in Kazan’s Business-Gazeta portal, the Moscow demographer says that de-urbanization is not the answer to Russia’s problems. Instead, with the government taking the lead, Russia must choose to pursue a different kind of urbanization (business-gazeta.ru/article/693166).

            The best choice, Krupnov suggests, is for Moscow to adopt as its model “a landscape-estate low-rise urbanization” reflecting “the historical model of the classic Russian city in its ideal state,” something that he argues can be achieved by reversing the de-industrialization of the country and all the deleterious demographic, social and political consequences that has entailed.

            Moscow should be inserting federal enterprises in the roughly 2,000 small and mid-sized cities so that people there will still have work at home and won’t continue to flee to the megacities for work, “regardless of what kind” it might be and will thus be more likely to have families with two, three or even more children.

            “Large, concentrated megacities are indeed similar to concentration camps, but in modern, low comfort form,” Krupnov argues. But he notes that “unfortunately, it seems that our government doesn’t see the problems at all and doesn’t manage anything” that could change the nature of Russian urbanization and solve the country’s problems.

            Moscow “doesn’t manage demographics either, he continues. Instead, it “tells fairy tales about adding another 2,000 rubles to existing child benefits or paying 200,000 rubles to female pupils if they decide to become mothers” instead of having abortions.  Such tales may amuse but they won’t solve Russia’s problems.

            “That is the same thing as claiming that in a country without conservatories, concert halls and music teachers that if we being paying chemistry students 200,000 rubles, they will become world-class musical performers in the future,” Krupnov says, pointing out that “that’s now how it works.”

            And he concludes that Russia will not solve its demographic problems unless it breaks out of its megacity-centric urbanization and re-industrializes. Unless the country does not, it is unlikely to be able to block the extinction of the country at some point before the end of the current century. 

Putin’s War in Ukraine 'Unsuccessful for Russia Even Though It is Even More Unsuccessful for Ukraine,' Pastukhov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Jan. 25 – Putin has compelling personal reasons for continuing his war in Ukraine and/or launching new wars elsewhere, Vladimir Pastukhov says; but all of those require that his war is going well for Russia. But today, his war in Ukraine is proving to be unsuccessful for Russia even thought it is at present even more unsuccessful for Ukraine.

            According to the London-based Russian analyst, “war is the zone of maximum political comfort” for him, something that prompts “the interesting question: might Putin dare to live on without a war?” (t.me/v_pastukhov/1798 reposted at echofm.online/opinions/risknet-li-putin-zhit-dalshe-bez-vojny).

            “There are many reasons for this,” Pastukhov says; but “it is worth repeating some of them.” First of all, “war is a powerful political tranquilizer which disables the critical consciousness of the aggressively passive majority.” Second, war abroad allows him to bring terror home.

            Third, “the combination of the themes ‘corruption and social injustice’ which is the Achilles’ heel of his regime is completely pushed to the periphery of the information agenda during wartime and replaced by patriotic hysteria.” And fourth, it is “the best co er for solving … the successful transfer of power to the next generation.”

            These and other factors favoring a continuation of the war are all “working ‘like clockwork’” for Putin; but their success depends “on the condition that the war is being waged successfully.” However, Pstukhov argues, “the war in Ukraine has ceased to be successful for Russia, and the fact that it now looks even less successful for Ukraine doesn’t change that.”

            “So what’s ‘wrong’ with the war as far as Putin is concerned? the Russian analyst asks rhetorically. Many have been offered, “but again it makes sense to briefly recall why the war is a dead end” now for the Kremlin:

            First, “the possibilities of waging war as a "colonial expedition" by the hands of "mercenaries," whose recruitment is carried out using medieval methods, are practically exhausted. Ahead looms another mobilization with its unpredictable socio-political consequences.”

            Second, “the plateau of stability, ensured by the efforts of the Mishustin-Nabiullina government, has its limits. The lack of real economic growth and technological prospects practically guarantees stagnation and inflation, which will inevitably provoke the victory of ‘the refrigerator’ over ‘the "television’ if not this year, then next.”

            And third, “the use of terrorist methods of warfare in the center of Europe has its limitations, and at some point will provoke a ‘continental blockade, … to which it will be necessary to respond with direct aggression against Ukraine's European allies, which is easy in words, but not so simple in practice: many in the Kremlin are still living too well to want to die.”

            “In these circumstances,” Pastukhov argues, “there is a risk that the continuation of the war will lead the regime to a critical point, beyond which all its advantages will turn into disadvantages in a very historically short period of time.” Admiration for toughness will be replaced by charges that it isn’t being prosecuted well.

            Moreover, “the war will cease to be considered a factor to which all the absurdities and inconveniences of Russian life can be attributed, and accusations of corruption will come not from liberals and Navalny supporters, but from pro-government and nationalist groups who will believe thieves and swindlers stole their victory.

            Putin is thus now “carefully weighing the risks for  himself of continuing the war and the risks of ending it,” the analyst says. “Like a medieval alchemist, he is searching for a formulat to end the war that will transform the dung heap of its unforeseen complications into a gold medal of a victorious hero.”

            “If he thinks he has found it” but only then, Pastukhov concludes, Putin “will take the risk” of ending his aggression.

40 Percent of the One Percent of Russian Defendants Initially Found Not Guilty Now Being Convicted on Appeal, Lawyers Group Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Jan. 24 – Under Putin, Russian courts have found defendants not guilty in less than one percent of all cases; but apparently that is too many for the Kremlin. Prosecutors are now securing convictions in 40 percent of those found not guilty by the courts in the first instance, Svetlana Volodina says.

            The president of the Federal Chamber of Lawyers says that only a few defendants succeed in not being convicted the first time around; but court officials are unhappy anyone is and are appealing not guilty findings to lower the percentage of not guilty verdicts still further (versia.ru/pochemu-poslovica-ot-tyurmy-ne-zarekajsya-krepko-ukorenilas-v-nashix-sudax).

            Volodina says that this approach by the judicial authorities follows the same line they pursue in the original trials. There, she says, nearly three out of four defense lawyers say they have been asked by prosecutors and judges to encourage their clients to plead guilty rather than mount a defense.

When Some Russians Condemn US for Actions in Venezuela and Greenland, They May be Thinking about Moscow’s Actions in Ukraine, Russian Analyst Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Jan. 23 – One of the reasons officials in Russia’s federal subjects have come down so hard on Russians who have gone into the streets to condemn US actions in Venezuela and Greenland is that the officials suspect that when these Russians do so, they are in fact thinking and protesting about Moscow’s actions in Ukraine, Margarita Zavadskaya says.

            The Russian scholar at the Finnish Institute of International Relations says that in addition to viewing what some Russians are doing as “a proxy protest,” officials in the region recognize that any public actions could get them in trouble and so prefer not to take any risks (semnasem.org/articles/2026/01/23/protesty-v-podderzhku-venesuely-i-grenlandii).

            Russians who assume that they will not be repressed if they take actions that parallel the statements of the Kremlin are making “a fundamental error,” Zavadskaya says. They appear to think that ideology is what matters, but “the Russian regime operates not on ideology but on the loyalty of its personnel.”

            And personnel in the lower levels of the power pyramid in Russia know that they are taking an enormous risk by permitting such protests or failing to suppress them because their bosses will remove them because those higher up in the chain of command may decide that a failure to block protests represents a lack of loyalty, however “loyal” such actions may appear.

Veterans of Putin’s War in Ukraine Becoming Victims of Crime after Returning Home, ‘Regional Aspect’ Portal Says

Paul Goble     

            Staunton, Jan. 21 – The frequency with which veterans returning from Putin’s war in Ukraine has been widely covered given the fears Russians and their government have about the consequences of that, but veterans in many cases are not the perpetrators of crimes but the victims, according to a study conducted by the Regional Aspect portal.

            The investigation identified 53 court verdicts in 2025 involving crimes against former or current participants of military action. Slightly over half (52.3 percent) involved theft, 19 percent fraud, and approximately 20 percent the use or threat of the use of force (regaspect.info/2026/01/21/vernuvshiesya-i-ograblennye/).

            In a 2500-word report detailing some of the cases, the portal suggests that the actual number of cases of criminal actions against veterans is “significantly greater,” although it suggests that confirming that is impossible because Russian courts routinely remove information about victims from their decisions.

            That is perhaps particularly likely for this category of crimes, the portal suggests, because the authorities do not want to call attention to the victimization of veterans, something that if it became widely known would make it even more difficult to recruit more soldiers to fight in Putin’s wars.

Fertility Rate in Russia Falls to New Low, Highlighting Failure of Putin’s Efforts

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Jan. 23 – The fertility rate in the Russian Federation continued to decline in 2025, down to an average of 1.374 children per woman per lifetime, a figure far below the 1.77 in 2015 and slightly below the 1.4 number in 2024 and even further under the 2.2 children per woman per lifetime needed to keep the population at a stable level, Rosstat reports.

            Only two non-Russian republics, Chechnya, with a fertility rate of 2.56 and Tyva with one of 2.214, had rates above the replacement levels; and in both these cases, the figures had fallen slightly from a year earlier (vedomosti.ru/society/articles/2026/01/23/1171174-summarnii-koeffitsient-rozhdaemosti-prodolzhil-snizhatsya).

            The lowest fertility rates in 2025 were in three predominantly ethnic Russian oblasts, Leningrad with a figure of 0.914, Smolensk with one of 1.012, and Vladimir, with one of 1.059 children per woman per lifetime, a pattern that means they and other ethnic Russian regions will decline in size while non-Russian federal subjects will be more stable or grow.

            Alarmed by this evidence of demographic decline, Vladimir Putin has been promoting large families as a “traditional Russian value” and promising to spend more money in the out years to help boost family size. But because of his war in Ukraine, he has been cutting back spending on healthcare with an “optimization” campaign (nakanune.ru/articles/124281/).

            Demographers are not impressed and say that Russia and Russians will see growth in this decade only if the economic expectations of the population are realized and if potential parents believe that they are entering a new era of stability rather than one in which unexpected events like the invasion of Ukraine can be avoided.

            That is because even if financial incentives can lead women to have more children, the declining number of women in the prime cohort for giving birth is now falling so fast that the latter factor is likely to overwhelm in small increase in the number of children Russians and others elect to have.

            Alla Makarentseva, a demographer at the Russian Economy of Economics and State Servce, says that Moscow still has some chances to raise the fertility rate, “but they are not unlimited” and no one should expect a radical change in direction unless and until the economy and people’s assumptions about the future change.