Even Governors Imposed by Moscow Now Being Compelled to Choose Echo of Parade of Sovereignties to Forestall Unrest, Rybakova Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 14 – Given the restrictions various federal subject governments are imposing on the sale of gasoline, ever more commentators are drawing parallels with the parade of sovereignties in the late 1980s and early 1990s when regions introduced similar restrictions and their own currencies and even border posts.

            Most doubt that things can go as far this time around given that the center is far stronger than it was and the governors are not popularly elected with local support but selected and imposed by the Kremlin, but Tatyana Rybakova argues those differences may not be sufficient to block a new parade of sovereignties (nemoskva.net/2026/07/14/regiony-ogorazhivayutsya/).

            It is sometimes forgotten, the NeMoskva commentator says, that the original parade of sovereignties reflected not just the desire for freedom but also to prevent a social explosion that many feared would occur because of food shortages and the declining ability of Moscow to control the situation.

            At that time, Rybakova continues, “the central government was young, democratic and shaky;” and “the heads of the regions were much stronger politically,” elected rather than appointed and thus more ready to take action in defense of their voters than in support of Moscow.

            Today, the situation is different. Moscow is stronger and governors weaker; and many assume that because that is so, no new parade of sovereignties based on gas shortages rather than food shortages is possible, she says. But there are compelling reasons to think that such a conclusion may prove to be wrong.

            The governors are facing both their own budget deficits and unhappy populations, and while Moscow can send prosecutors, it is no longer in a position to send money or the kind of assistance that would calm the population, at least not without a wholesale transformation of Kremlin policy.

            As a result, even the most ostensibly loyal governors are beginning to speak out and try to defend their populations by the kind of steps that led to rise of the parade of sovereignties a generation ago.  In such a situation, Rybakova says, the governors are increasingly forced to choose “between popular revolt and Kremlin discontent.”

            And unless there are major changes in Moscow’s approach, she says, “it is only a question of time” until at least some governors will choose to try to forestall a revolt at home rather than to worry about a negative reaction from the Kremlin, all the more so because the center installed them to keep things quiet.

            The situation has now reached the point where Moscow’s inability or unwillingness to help the regional governments means that even the most loyal governors are driven by the logic of the situation to try to mollify the population, an effort that could trigger a new parade of sovereignties far more easily and quickly than many suspect.