Window on Eurasia: Former Heads of Russian Federation Subjects No Longer Non-Persons

Paul Goble

            Staunton, November 28 – One of the most unfortunate inheritances the Russian Federation has received from the Soviet Union is the nearly universal notion that any official who is ousted from a position by his superiors cannot hope to play an active political role in the future.

            As a result, officials then and to a large extent still often desperately have tried to retain their position lest they become non-persons and thus lose their inviolability to prosecution and their ability to protect their relatives and closest friends, a struggle that leaves politics more a zero-sum game than it is in Western democracies.

            But a new study prepared by the Petersburg Politics Foundation released today provides some evidence that this may be changing at least at the level of governors and that those ousted sometimes can and do remain extremely popular and thus have the opportunity to resume a prominent role either in political life or in the economy.

            That study, which is described in an article in today’s “Kommersant” (which also includes a hypertext link to the original document, considered the fate of 94 heads of federal subjects who were replaced over the last decade and provides both specific data on each and certain generalizations about the group as well (www.kommersant.ru/doc/2077519).

                Seven have died, four are under investigation, but only 24 of the 83 others have disappeared from public view, the usual fates of ex-officials in the past.  Eleven, the study says, have the chance to return to active politics in their regions, while nine have moved into the corporate world.  Only 14 still live in the regions they once headed, while 48 are in Moscow.

            The return of these former governors to public life would, the study concludes, “significantly enliven political life in the regions,” a life that has become duller given the absence of “bright and passionate figures.”  And for some of them, who continue to enjoy popularity, such a return is at least a possibility.

            Mikhail Vinogradov,  the lead investigator, told “Kommersant” that “the investigation showed that a significant portion of the ex-governors remain political figures and as a rule preserve their influence on regional politics.  About a third of them,” he said, “will take direct or indirect part” in future elections.”

            Another analyst, Aleksandr Kynyev was less optimistic about the return of the former governors to office.  Some may do so but “everything will depend on the format of the voting … If there will be a repetition of what we saw on October 14,then there are very few chances that some of the former governors will even run.”

            But the paper said, the political scientist “did not exclude that ‘if the federal center moves toward a definite liberalization of the gubernatorial elections,” then some of these “former” people will return.  While Kynyev doesn’t say so, that may be one of the most important reasons why there is unlikely to be the liberalization of which he speaks

Window on Eurasia: Daghestanis Want to Patrol Moscow Alongside Cossacks

Paul Goble

            Staunton, November 28 – Now that 600 Cossacks are patrolling the streets of Moscow, Daghestanis in the Russian capital insist they should have the same opportunity, a reflection of the fears of North Caucasians that the Cossacks will be anything but law-abiding and of the risks the Kremlin is running in allowing the Cossacks to play this role in the first place.

            “Izvestiya” reported today that Daghestanis in Moscow are “afraid that Cossack druzhinniki, who yesterday began to patrol central Moscow will exacerbate inter-ethnic tensions. To avoid that, [they suggest that] representatives of the diaspora be attached to the [Cossack] patrols” (izvestia.ru/news/540425).

                 Kamil Davdiyev, chairman of the Daghestani Popular Assembly committee for inter-ethnic relations and religious groups, said that the authorities in Moscow ought to have checked with the North Caucasian diasporas before beginning to use Cossack patrols to supplement the work of the police.

            Had they done so, he continued, they would have been told precisely why people from the North Caucasus are concerned: In September, Aleksandr Tkachev, the governor of Krasnodar Kray, began this practice by suggesting that the Cossacks, more than the police, have the right to act as they see fit to maintain public order.

            Another Daghestani, Magomedrasul Omarov, the press secretary of the Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) of that republic, agreed and suggested to the Moscow paper that using Cossack patrols for law enforcement was “excessive.” No such patrols would be necessary “if the law enforcement organs were functioning in a normal fashion.”

            Setting up such quasi-official forces raises the question, Omarov continued, of just what the authorities may do next.  What they should be doing is ensuring that the police “do their jobs,” something that is clearly not currently the case.

            The Cossacks say the fears of the North Caucasians are misplaced, “Izvestiya” said.  Igor Gulichev, the first deputy ataman of the South-East District Cossack Society, acknowledged that “in principle everything is possible. But we [Cossacks],” he continued, “do not define our task as persecuting those who think differently or are representatives of other confessions or faiths.”

                If the North Caucasians have any doubts on that score, the ataman said, “there is only one way out: don’t violate public order.” If “Daghestanis, Chechens, Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, or Tajiks” do that, “then no one [including the Cossack druzhinniki] will apply any measures” against them. But the Cossacks will make sure that there is order.

            Gulichev insisted that Cossack units will coordinate all their activities with the local organs of internal affairs. But already on the first day, there was evidence reported both by “Izvestiya” and by “Novaya gazeta” (www.novayagazeta.ru/politics/55625.html) that that is not the case at least some of the time.

            The press office of the Moscow Administration of Internal Affairs said that the Cossacks patrolling the Belorussky railway station had not sought or received approval for their actions there, a statement that makes what the Cossacks are doing all the more disturbing, not only to people from the North Caucasus but to many others as well.

            That is because the authorities either have a group that can act with little regard for the law and can be disowned when necessary, an arrangement that invites and even encourages abuse, or have one whose existence is likely to leader others to organize themselves against the Cossacks, a development that could quickly escalate conflict in the streets of Moscow.

            At the very least, as the “Novaya gazeta” article pointed out, this latest Kremlin-backed move is certain to raise the question in the minds of many Russians:  “Why in general are some groups of [private] citizens given some kind of extra authority for control over the actions of other citizens?” 

Window on Eurasia: Russians Increasingly Hostile to Ethnic Minorities, Immigrants, Levada Poll Finds

Paul Goble

            Staunton, November 28 – Fewer Russian residents than 16 years ago believe that the national minorities of their country should receive government support to preserve their customs and traditions, and far more are negative about immigrant communities and their role in Russian society, according to the results of a poll released by the Levada Center today.

            To a large extent, such attitudes reflect the views of President Vladimir Putin, but to the extent that they now predominate in the population, that both limits the range of options the regime has at least in the short term and creates a heightened potential for conflict in a country that is far from mono-ethnic.

            Earlier this month, the independent Levada Center surveyed 1516 Russian residents concerning their attitudes toward ethnic minorities in general and non-Russian immigrant communities in major Russian cities in particular (www.levada.ru/28-11-2012/natsionalnaya-politika-i-otnoshenie-k-migrantam).

            Asked whether the state should support national minorities in Russia in order to help preserve their customs and traditions, a question the Center had asked in June 1996 and July 2003, the sociologists found that today, 49 percent of Russian residents agree with that proposition down from 65 percent in 1996 and 62 percent in 2003.

            The Center’s sociologists also presented longitudinal data on a series of other questions.  Asked in these same years whether they agreed with the suggestion that “immigrants increase the level of crime,” 71 percent said that such groups did this month compared to only 54 percent in 1996 and 59 percent in 2003

            Asked whether immigrants contribute to the development of the Russian economy, only 23 percent this month agreed that they have, a slight increase from the 16 percent in 2003 and 15 percent in 1996. And asked whether they agreed that “immigrants take jobs from Russian residents, 67 percent now agreed with that proposition, up from 48 percent in 1996

            The October 2012 survey also queried Russians on issues that the Levada Center had not asked about specifically in the earlier years.  Forty-six percent of Russian residents said that they agreed with statements that “on the whole, immigrants are destroying Russian culture.” Only 22 percent said they disagreed.

            Responses to other questions conformed to the same pattern. Thirty-four percent of Russian residents said that legal immigrants ought to have the same rights as Russian citizens, down from 36 percent nine years ago, Seventy-three percent said this month that Moscow should adopt “strict measures in order to expel from the country illegal immigrants.

            Only seven percent said there should be a greater number of immigrants in Russia in the future, while 65 percent said that there should be fewer or many fewer.  And strikingly, 74.4 percent said that immigrants who come to Russia should give up their own culture and accept that of Russia.

            Thirty-four percent agreed that “strong patriotic attitudes in Russia are contributing to the growth of intolerance in Russia,” while only 22 percent disagreed, and 64 percent said that “strong patriotic attitudes in Russia are needed for the preservation of the integrity” of the Russian Federation.

           

Window on Eurasia: Generational Change Shaking Russia’s Muslim Leadership

Paul Goble

            Staunton, November 26 – Generational change has come to Russia’s Muslim leadership, with the Soviet-era cohort quickly passing from the scene and a younger and largely foreign trained one taking its place, a development that is shifting “the paradigm of Islamic activity as a whole,” according to a Muslim commentator.

            In an essay on the Islamnews.ru portal, Marat Rasulov describes this change. “The old pleiade of Russian Muslim leaders already took shape in the era of the USSR, and most of its members passed through the Soviet school for the preparation of religious cadres” (www.islamnews.ru/news-137270.html).

            “Today,” the Islamnews.ru commentator observes, “it is no secret to anyone that the specific feature of religious education in the country of the soviets was directed at training, if one may so express it, of party functionaries from religion, the main goal of which was serving the interests of the ruling communist regime.”

            Given that goal, the Soviets had little interest in “the deep study of Islamic scholarship” or Arab language training. And it is “symptomatic that the overwhelming majority of graduates of the Mir Arab medressah in Bukhara – the only official Muslim training school in the entire USSR – in practice did not have Arabic,” despite the importance of that language in the faith.

            That put the Muslim leaders at a severe disadvantage to Soviet orientalists and Islamic studies experts who “had mastered the language of the Koran.”  An example to this “rule” was Supreme Mufti Talgat Tajuddin, who was the face of the country at receptions of delegations from [the Muslim world. He was [even permitted to study at Cairo’s Al Azhar University.”

            This “Bukharan” generation as a result focused almost exclusively on “the economic functions” of the mosque, and its members occupied themselves with “’the religious cult’” by taking orders for prayers for the ill or the dead.” That allowed them to maintain the budget of the small number of official mosques.

           

            But this lack of knowledge had another consequence, Rasulov notes. The Muslims genuinely interested in their faith had no choice but to turn to “the so-called hujurat” or unofficial underground medressahs whose instructors were able to provide more but not always reliable instruction.

            Those officials secular and religious who are members of the older generation and who say they want to go back to “traditional Islam,” most of whom are to be found in the Middle Volga, mean that they want to restore “the classical Soviet model ‘of the server of the Muslim cult’ together with an intensified maskhab identity.  

            The younger generation is very different regarding both training and intention.  “After the fall of ‘the iron curtain,’” Rasulov continues, “thousands of young people from Russia and other republics of the former USSR were sent abroad to obtain Islamic education mostly in the Arabic countries.”

            Only a few of those who went abroad received a broadly based Islamic education. Most dropped out after only a few months, either dropping their plans to become imams or mullahs or becoming the ill-educated leaders of radical groups inside the Russian Federation. But a few did receive good training and now form the successor generation.

            Indeed, Rasulov writes, “being the bearers of moderate views, not burdened with the weight of ‘the Bukhara special school,’ they have become the locomotive of the changing paradigm of Russian Islam.” Moreover, and unlike the radicals, they have had “the wisdom and tact to find a common language with the older generation of Muslims and with the authorities.”

            This new group unfortunately faces two obstacles. On the one hand, some of the remaining “Soviet” Muslim leaders view this rising generation as “competition.” And on the other, it has been easy for opponents of Islam to convince Russians that there is no difference between these well-trained mullahs and the radicals and that both are “enemies of the people.”

            Moreover, according to many Russian officials and commentators, “any cooperation of Russian Muslims with their fellow believers abroad” must be about “not only antagonism to ‘traditional Islam’ but also the betrayal of the motherland,” all evidence to the contrary notwithstanding.

            But despite this, Rasulov says, “the natural rotation of Muslim cadres taking place with the departure from the  scene of the older generation of Soviet functionaries is opening a new page in relations between the state and Islam” with both politicians and Muslim leaders allied in their opposition to “the idea of the return to ‘the iron curtain.’”