Wednesday, February 27, 2013

Window on Eurasia: Most Roads in the Buryat Republic Haven’t Been Repaired in 30 Years



Paul Goble

            Staunton, February 27 – Buryatia, whose leaders hope to make it into a tourist destination for people across Asia, has a problem: most of its roads haven’t been repaired in more than 30 years and are thus impassible except for the most intrepid, and many of the bridges in the republic are equally antiquated and are at risk of collapse.

            Buryatia’s aspirations as a tourist destination were outlined in “Kommersant” yesterday (kommersant.ru/doc/2129816?fp=), but its immediate problems with its roads and bridges were detailed by Arevik Safaryan in an article on the Buryat republic’s Infopol.ru website only two days earlier (infpol.ru/news/667/149950.php).

            Russians have long said that the two biggest problems of their country are “dorogi [roads]” and “duraki [fools], and so Safaryan turned to the Russian Highway Research Institute in Moscow as he began his attempt to answer the question he posed to himself: “Why are there poor roads in Buryatia?”

            Not mentioning Russia’s harsh climate which is something many often do, the Moscow highway researchers suggested that the country’s poor quality roads were the product of poor contracting practices, the absence of controls over those performing the work, and low-quality materials and workmanship.

            All these problems affect Buryatia just as they do all other regions of the Russian Federation, Safaryan said, but in addition, there are some additional reasons why the roads in Buryatia are especially bad, according to officials at the republic’s Administration of Regional Highways.

Acknowledging that the region’s roads “do not correspond to contemporary social-economic requirements,” the officials said that a major reason for that is that “as a result of a shortage of funds in the republic budget, repairs on most of the roads had not been carried out for more than 30 years.”

Because of that, 64.5 percent of the 2,000 km of roads in the republic do not correspond to contemporary standards, and 24 percent of the 461 highway bridges need immediate reconstruction to prevent their collapse, officials at the republic’s transportation told the journalist.

Despite the infusion of new funds – republic spending on highways doubled between 2007 and 2012 – reconstruction of older roads has practically stopped over the last several years, leaving “approximately 90 percent of the roads” there in need of immediate repair, ministry officials said.

According to these officials, the reason that they have not spent more on roads is that they have had to focus their efforts on the bridges which, were any of them to collapse, would leave portions of the republic isolated.  Last year, they repaired four bridges that had collapsed, leaving them with funds for repair work on fewer than 90 kilometers of roadways.

Buryatia also faces a cadres problem in this sector, the ministry said. Until 2004, there was no opportunity for people to receive advanced training in road construction, and since that time, the relevant faculty has prepared only 38 specialists for this branch. And the republic faces problems with defects in federal legislation governing road construction.

That legislation, the republic ministry officials indicated, often makes it impossible for them to do their work in a quality fashion because the federal law defines success only in terms of the number of kilometers built or facilities constructed rather than with regard to their quality of maintenance.

Safaryan’s article is filled with a variety of other statistics highlighting Buryatia’s problems in this area, and his article thus offers a remarkable glimpse into an aspect of Russian life often neglected by observers but critical to the lives of the peoples of that country now as well as in the future.

Tuesday, February 26, 2013

Window on Eurasia: Xenophobic Attitudes Growing Across Russian Political Spectrum, Moscow Expert Says



Paul Goble

            Staunton, February 26 – Xenophobic attitudes are now to be found among communist, nationalist, liberal and pro-Kremlin parties and groups, according to Moscow’s leading specialist on inter-ethnic relations, a development that reflects the efforts of these organizations to tap into popular attitudes and win votes.

            Such outreach programs are not likely to be successful, other Russian commentators say, although it is clearly the case that the diversity of such efforts has already achieved one thing: it has kept the Russian nationalist part of the spectrum split and prevented it from coming together and forming a party that might challenge the incumbent regime.

            In an article in today’s “Novyye izvestiya,” Nadezhda Krasilova describes what she calls “the fashion for xenophobia” among Russia’s political parties ranging from the pro-government United Russia to the Liberal Democratic Party of Vladimir Zhirinovsky to the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (newizv.ru/politics/2013-02-26/178323-moda-na-ksenofobiju.html).

            All of these groups have adopted increasingly nationalist rhetoric and even in many cases formed special “wings” devoted to nationalist causes, she points out, but according to Krasilova, “in the opinion of experts, despite the intensification of xenophobia in society, nationalist rhetoric will not bring these parties more votes in the elections.

            Emil Pain, the director of the Moscow Center for Ethno-Political and Regional Research, told her that he and his colleagues have identified four ideological “trends” in the Russian blogosphere: the communist, the nationalistic, the liberal, and the pro-government “For all these groups,” he said, “the growth of xenophobia is characteristic, and it is even hard to say where it is manifested the most.”

            “Practically all political forces one way or another and in this or that form have played with Russian nationalism,” Pain said. That has led to splits within these parties “between those who support nationalism and those who do not accept it,” especially among parties on the left for whom nationalism traditionally has been anathema.

            Among these groups, one can see an ever greater “split between the new Euro-left groupings” which support the rights of minorities and more old-fashioned communists like Gennady Zyuganov who are increasingly inclined to modify their leftist rhetoric with nationalistic slogans.

            But something similar, Pain continues, “is taking place in other groups as well.” But it may not help any of them because the nationalism of such parties often is “rejected” by ordinary people who either see it as hypocritical or not thorough-going enough.  Thus, “the situation is very complicated. Here it is possible to acquire something but sometimes to lose more.”

            Any party that employs nationalist rhetoric may pick up some support in predominantly ethnic Russian areas, but that in and of itself will only intensify opposition to it “in certain regions of Russia, for example, the Middle Volga, where a significant part of the [country’s] Muslims live.”

             That danger appears to be one of the reasons these “nationalist” wings or groups associated with Russia’s major political parties go out of their way to stress that they are not nationalists but only interested in defending the rights of the largest ethnic group in the country and doing more than the Kremlin is about issues like immigration from Central Asia.

            But there is another and perhaps even more compelling reason why these groups, however nationalistic their statements may be, insist that they are not nationalistic.  Vladimir Nikitin, who heads the KPRF-related Russian Harmony group, notes that in Russia, the word “’nationalistic’ has a negative connotation.”

            Anyone using it “immediately” causes people to think about “Nazism in Germany,” he said. Therefore, his group “is not nationalistic but internationalist with a Russian national trend. In its documents, it is directly stated that this movement pulls together [ethnic] Russians who by their spirit and worldview are people independent of nationality.”

            Moreover, Nikitin, who is also a Duma deputy, continued, it is hardly possible for Russia “to develop normally as a country if the state-forming people is denigrated.” That way leads “to chaos and destruction, while Russian Harmony “will direct this energy of the people in constructive ways.”

Window on Eurasia: Many Russians, Offended by Orthodoxy’s Authoritarianism, Now Turning to Buddhism



Paul Goble

            Staunton, February 26 – Just as at the end of the imperial period, many Russians, who are offended by the authoritarianism and obscurantism of the current leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church, are turning to Buddhism, and their numbers are sufficiently large that one journalist feels comfortable entitling her article about it “Buddhist Rus’.”

            In an article on Gazeta.ru, Aleksandra Garmazhapova reports that approximately 30 percent of those attending the New Year ceremony at the Buddhist datsan in St. Petersburg earlier this month were ethnic Russians and that they were not just curious but in fact committed to Buddhism (gazeta.ru/politics/blogs/garmazhapova/b_4972749.shtml).

            Garmazhapova, a Buryat who now works as a “Novaya gazeta” correspondent in the northern capital, says that when she was growing up, her parents and grandparents regularly took her to datsans and that for her it was more “a tradition” than “a faith.” She notes that “Russians rarely appeared at such ceremonies,” and then only if they had Buryat or Kalmyk friends.
           
            When Russians did come, she continues, they “stood at the side watching what was taking place.” But “about two years ago, the number of Russians coming to the datsan not to watch but to pray became larger, although not too much.”  Now, their numbers and their interest have grown.

            Indeed, Garmazhapova says, those Russians who have become Buddhists are often more consciously so than are “certain Buryats or Tuvins” who like her take part because that is a part of their national traditions rather than a faith as such. And it is clear that the new Russian influx into Buddhism is not driven by fashion either.

            At least part of the reason that ethnic Russians are turning to Buddhism, the journalist suggests, is the “aggressive” approach of the Russian Orthodox Church as it seeks to gain a larger role in the Russian political system.  Many Russians are offended by that, and some of them have decided to “flee from it” to other faiths, including Buddhism.

            One can dispute the suggestion of one communist who said recently that “the Russian Orthodox church will soon drive out its entire flock,” she says, but one cannot ignore the reality that “over the course of the last year, the number of Russians coming to Buddhist temples has become significantly larger.”

            A recent example of the contrasting approaches of Orthodox leaders and Buddhist ones occurred in St. Petersburg.  There one Orthodox deputy proposed that religious organizations have a veto over the holding of meetings near their facilities. Most went along, but Buda Badmayev, the leader of the local datsan, objected, saying that such an action would simply lead people to say that “religious fanatics are again seeking some kind of preferences for themselves.”

            Badmayev suggested that “today, faith is becoming a pragmatic institution which has nothing in common with spirituality” and said that the Buddhists “do not want to be converted into apparatchiks.” That commitment to freedom undoubtedly is attractive to those who have been part of a church whose basic message is “prohibit—prohibit--prohibit.”

            Garmazhapova does not mention it, but there is a precedent for Russians turning to Buddhism.  In the last years of the Russian Empire, when many Orthodox leaders were promoting the most authoritarian and obscurantist ideas, a significant number of ethnic Russians turned to Buddhism and viewed it as a possible salvation for their nation.


           

Window on Eurasia: Many Moscow Natives Don’t Identify as Muscovites, Sociologist Says



Paul Goble

            Staunton, February 26 – Many Moscow natives do not identify themselves as Muscovites, a Russian sociologist says, while some who have moved to the city, particularly those who have been there more than ten years, identify strongly with it, just two of the many paradoxes of life in the Russian capital.

            In an article on the Postnauka.ru site, Viktor Vakhshtayn, a sociologist who teaches at the Presidential Academy of Economics and State Service, says that one of the most intriguing paradoxes of Moscow is that “an enormous number of people live in this city without noting that they live in it” (postnauka.ru/faq/9646).

            For most of them, he continues, recent surveys conducted by the Moscow Institute of Social-Cultural Programs and the Public Opinion Foundation, “Moscow is not a city;” instead, it “is the administrative company of the country.”  That creates a very different relationship between its residents and their self-identifications.

            About 60 percent of Moscow’s residents were born somewhere else, and about 40 percent are people who were born there. According to the surveys, “about 60 percent of the people who continuously live and work in Moscow do not feel themselves to be Muscovites in any way.”  But that 60 percent is not made up entirely of the 60 percent born elsewhere.

            “In fact,” Vakhshtayn says, “among those who live in Moscow, continuously work here, and do not connect in any way with this place, 20 percent were born” in the city. Another 30 percent of this group, he adds, is made up of people who arrived in the Russian capital more than a decade earlier.

            At the same time, “the most-intensely-held Muscovite identity is shown by people who were not born [in the capital] but who have lived in Moscow more than ten years; that is, those for whom this move was a serious achievement, possibly their main life plan because for them, this was an identity that they won, unlike the case of many native urban residents.”

            “The underlying metaphor through which people who continuously live in Moscow see their city is that of ‘the city as office.’”  It is “an enormous multi-million roomed office, something like F[ritz] Lang’s [classic film] ‘Metropolis.’” It is not a place where “as a rule,” those who earn money want to spend it. Instead, they go elsewhere.

            This has some important implications, Vakhshtayn points out. “The archetype of social space was the agora in the ancient Greek polis. It was not so much a place in which you were comfortable and which you went to spend time with friends asa space in which the city recognize itself as a city.”

            Such a space is where an urban identity is formed, he says. “And if there is no place in which you feel your tie with this strange meta-city formation, then an urban identity will not be formed.” Moscow for many people lacks such a space, and that in turn creates some unusual circumstances.

            One of those was revealed when double-decker buses were introduced in Moscow. They completely transformed “the picture of the world” which residents had. Their sudden appearance has had the effect of giving people a chance “to see the space they have not noticed up to then with new eyes.”

            Vaynshtayn adds that his research shows that in Moscow at least, “the demand for the  activities of the institutions of culture is far from the most significant,” unlike what most people assume. Far more significant are “a demand for events because events are what creates a city in time” and one “for a cultural milieu” through which people can travel.”

             Another “ paradoxical fact” in Moscow is that parents are far more comfortable sending their child for walks in the city center than allowing him or her to play in the yard. “Their own district seems to them a much less secure place than does” the latter.  This is a very different pattern than the one found elsewhere.

            One needs “to understand,” he says, that this lack of identity is “a logical result of the fact that Moscow is a met-city formation,” that is, it is “a multi-space object” in which many different spaces intersect.  That makes it more difficult for individuals to craft an identity and then accept it for themselves.

            This can be seen by comparing Moscow to other cities.  “What makes Petersburg Petersburg?” The answer is simple: the places within the city like Palace Square and the Neva, none of which can be taken away. But “those relations which make Moscow Moscow are primarily those which are not localized on its territory” but rather outside its borders.

             Those objects include among others Sheremetyevo, Domodedova and the Moscow region. And thus “half of these urban objects could be moved and no one would notice it. Thus, those stable relations which form Moscow today as an urban unity are not in the full sense of the word “’Muscovite.’”