Sunday, September 28, 2014

Window on Eurasia: Scotland has Lessons for Daghestan and for Russia, Makhachkala Commentator Says

Paul Goble

 

            Staunton, September 28 – The referendum in Scotland in terms of both the way in which it was conducted and its outcome has important lessons for Daghestanis and the government of the Russian Federation, according to a Makhachkala commentator, lessons that neither has yet assimilated but that both should.

 

            On the one hand, Eduard Urazayev says, what has taken place in Scotland shows that political struggles conducted with ballots rather than bullets are more likely to produce positive outcomes.  And on the other, it shows that decentralization and federalization are necessary for ethnically diverse countries (chernovik.net/content/respublika/uroki-shotlandii-dlya-dagestana).

 

            In the current issue of “Chernovik,” the Daghestani commentator notes that reaction to the vote in Scotland has ranged from delight to despair, depending on the politics of those involved because “each has taken from this referendum his own lessons,” but, he says, “certain conclusions are [quite obviously] useful for Daghestan.”

 

            While many in the Russian Federation are now disappointed with democracy as an institution, he says, “Great Britain and Scotland demonstrated in model fashion to the entire world how it is possible by law and without war to reach a decision on an extremely sensitive issue – the possible division of one country into two.”

 

            Indeed, Urazayev continues, their behavior is especially impressive when one considers that the vote took place at a time of increasing international tensions “because of events in Ukraine and the continuing financial-economic crisis in many countries of the West.”   Despite that, participation was high, the competition fair, and the outcome close but clear.

 

             And while the proponents of Scottish independence lost, although not by much, “in complete correspondence with the principle of democracy about taking the rights of minorities into account, the leadership of Great Britain immediately after the announcement of the results of the referendum began to prepare proposals” to give Scotland more autonomy.

 

             Most Daghestanis on hearing the word Scotland think only that it is “also a mountainous  country which conducted a national liberation struggle” and has a football team, Uruzayev says. “But we are all human beings, and comparisons are always useful,” perhaps especially in this particular case.

 

            When the Soviet Union collapsed and the state weakened, “representatives of the former communist elite were forced to make concessions and to include in the Constitution and laws of Daghestan norms about national quotas in elections for the Popular Assembly and municipal representative bodies.”

 

            They also had to “consider nationality in the assignment of ministers and leaders of other organs of executive power,” Uruzayev says. But then some of those who had risen to leading positions of national movements were found to be either convicted of crimes or closely connected with criminal elements. And the whole system was discredited.

 

            But not everything was lost at least initially. Three times (in 1992, 1993 and 1999) Daghestanis rejected the idea of a single leader of the republic and turned out in large numbers to vote for a collective president, the State Council of the Republic of Daghestan which existed from 1994 until 2006.

 

            Unfortunately, the Makhachkala commentator says, “the extent of violations and falsifications during election campaigns rose sharply in the mid-2000s after the elimination of the population elections for heads of regions, the introduction of a proportional electoral system  (elections by party list) and the elaboration of the vertical of executive power.”

 

            And as a result, “under the pretext of restoring order, increasing control and improving the governance of the country and regions, the idea of popular power was discredited, and we now have what is called administered or hybrid democracy” and not the real thing of the kind in evidence in Scotland.

 

            But all may not be lost, Uruzayev says. On the very day of the Scottish vote, President Vladimir Putin declared that moving forward “depends not only on the government but on the heads of the regions.”  That suggests he “knew that in the referendum in Scotland, the number of supporters of independence would be greater where unemployment was higher and incomes lower than average.”

 

            And Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev only shortly before that said that he was preparing legislation that would simplify the process of transferring authority from federal organs of power to regional ones because there is a fundamental “contradiction” in the fact that “the authority on which the investment climate in the regions depends is held by the federal authorities which do not bear responsibility for the result of their actions in the localities.”

 

            Many commentators have pointed out, Uruzayev says, that “in developed democratic countries, the most effective factors restraining [moves toward independence of regions] are a strong economy and a reliable financial system which in times of troubles can lead individuals to conclude that a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.”

 

            Where democracy is not developed, he continues, a far greater role is played by “political and historical factors and force.”  Typically, “separatist movements are hardly suppressed by the central authorities. But the weakening of central power can lead to a strengthening of organizations seeking independence – and then developments become unpredictable.”

 

            In neither Scotland nor Daghestan today, “financial and economic issues of interaction with the central authorities have greater importance” than any nationalist agenda. That is something the two have in common. What they don’t share is similar levels of democracy and economic development.And

 

            Uruzayev concludes his article by quoting Winston Churchill’s aphorism that “democracy is the worst form of government except for all the others which have been tried from time to time.”  The Scottish vote is clear evidence of this: “under democracy there is the chance to openly discuss a problem and to find an optimal way for its resolution.”

 

            That is “a plus” which peoples and countries without effective democratic institutions clearly do not have.

 

 

 

Window on Eurasia: Volga Tatars Demonstrate Against Russian Persecution of Crimean Tatars


Paul Goble

 

            Staunton, September 28 – Yesterday, a group of Volga Tatar nationalists demonstrated in Kazan against Russian persecution of Crimean Tatars, an action that not only reinforces the ties between the two Turkic peoples but also highlights the way in which what Moscow is doing in Crimea is increasingly resonating among non-Russians inside the Russian Federation.

 

            The Kazan protesters, RFE/RL’s Tatar-Bashkir Service says, carried signs declaring: “Crimean Tatars, we express our solidarity with you!” “Crimea 1944-2014. Genocide Must Not Be Repeated!” “The persecution of the Tatars is Russia’s shame” and “UN, EU! Defend the Crimean Tatars” (qha.com.ua/kazanskie-tatari-proveli-piket-v-podderjku-krimskih-140166.html).

 

            Those taking part in the small and entirely peaceful protest action criticized both Moscow for its persecution of the Crimean Tatars and the government of the Republic of Tatarstan for supporting the Russian Anschluss of Crimea and failing to speak out about the crimes being committed against another part of the Tatar nation.

 

            Volga Tatars have spoken out on behalf of the Crimean Tatars repeatedly this year, most recently at a meeting in memory of the great Crimean Tatar enlightenment figure, Ismail Gasprinski. But yesterday’s meeting, even though it has received relatively little coverage so far, is particularly important for three reasons.

 

            First, it shows that the Volga Tatars continue to view the Crimean Tatars as ethnically close to them and are following events there with an eye to what might happen to themselves. While the two peoples have a common origin, they have become distinct nations, but that origin is increasingly important for many in both.

 

            Second, because Tatarstan has played a leading role among non-Russian groups within the Russian Federation – Kazan has often been the bellwether for developments elsewhere – what took place in the Tatarstan capital yesterday is likely to be repeated in other non-Russian capitals in the future as people there focus on Crimea thanks to Kazan.

 

            And third, and perhaps most intriguingly, the Kazan protesters are transforming what is an international issue into a domestic political one by staking out a position opposed to their own republic leadership because of its failure to defend another Tatar nation – and thus by implication all Tatars.

 

Saturday, September 27, 2014

Window on Eurasia: Kremlin Now Forming a ‘Fascist International,’ Badretdinov Says


Paul Goble

 

            Staunton, September 27 – Moscow continues to receive support from some left-wing parties in Europe largely “as a result of inertia” from Soviet times, but the Kremlin gets most of its backing now from right-wing parties, at least some of whom evidence suggests the Kremlin is “generously financing their leading structures,” according to Sabirdzhan Badretdinov.

 

            These rightist parties, the commentator says on Kasparov.ru, are drawn to Putin by his much ballyhooed commitment to “’traditional values,’” including homophobia, militarism, nationalism, xenophobia, and anti-Americanism, but they have really become a bloc with respect to Russian aggression in Ukraine (kasparov.ru/material.php?id=542668763A8D6).

 

            Of the 24 radical right parties in Europe, he says, 14 have come out in support of Putin’s policies in Ukraine, seven have remained “more or less neutral,” and “only three have stayed with anti-Russian positions.” To make his point, Badretdinov surveys the various rightist parties on the continent whose popular support has been growing.

 

            This trend in part reflects “growing tensions in relations between the local population and Muslim immigrants in Europe which inevitably is leading to a strengthening of nationalism, populism, and xenophobia.” That has consequences in the first instance for the current member states of the EU, but it also affects the prospects of countries like Ukraine who would like to join.

 

            Many of these rightist parties, the commentator says, oppose the very idea of the European Union, but “paradoxically, they actively and regularly participate in elections to the European Parliament,” something they see as a way of promoting their views. But, Badretdinov says, this represents “an additional danger” for Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova as they seek integration with Europe.

 

            Such hostility toward European integration and toward the United States, he continues, “is driving the radical right parties into the embrace of Russia, a country they see as “a conservative alternative to liberalism and the ‘negative’ influence of globalization.”  That combination too represents “a threat to the strategic interests of Ukraine.”

Window on Eurasia: Putin’s Tragedy is Power without Purpose, Stanovya Says


Paul Goble

 

            Staunton, September 27 – Vladimir Putin has accumulated all the power he could possibly need to move in almost any direction, but despite that, “it is impossible to define with any precision what in fact [he] wants to do” because he does not appear to have any medium or long-term plan, according to Tatyana Stanovaya.

 

            For the last 15 years, many have speculated as to who Putin is and what he wants, but no one has been able to say anything more than that he wants to build power, the Moscow commentator says.  That he has done, and he has “everything he needs” to transform the country (slon.ru/russia/tragediya_putina_vertikal_est_no_missiya_nevozmozhna-1162781.xhtml).

 

            “’The fifth column’ has been driven into the extra-systemic field, elections have been turned into a plebiscite about the level of trust in presidential favorites, human rights activists have become ‘foreign agents,’ the media is patriotic, and bloggers are responsible. What next?” The answer so far is “NOTHING.”

 

            And that is because, she says, “Putin’s chief secret is that he does not have any mid-range let alone long-term strategy for the development of the country.” As a result, what is happening is that “the country is being run by decisions which Putin does not want to take” and that in turn is leading to a situation in which reality is being distorted or even ignored.

 

            In the current situation, Putin “supports the separatists [in Ukraine] but doesn’t permit the separate of regions … [he] declares war on NGOs but allows them to work [He] condemns McDonalds but promises not to close restaurants. [And he] expands the provisions of the law on political parties to allow some protest but then doesn’t register Navalny’s party.”

 

            What is holding Putin back from “calling things by their own names?”  According to Stanovaya, it not because he is clever but because he does not want to commit himself to a consistent policy but rather wants to bob and weave and keep everyone waiting for him to declare himself. But he won’t, she says, because he “doesn’t know” what he wants.

 

            That approach may be very good for building power, she continues. It is certainly popular with the population. But it means that despite all appearances, Putin’s policies are more reactive than pro-active and that again despite appearances, he is far more dependent on what others do than many think. And that in turn means it is less good for keeping power.

 

            Putin is “fulfilling the contract concluded with society but is secretly ‘changing’ it as far as the elites are concerned. It is possible to live a dual live while one has the resources. [But] when it becomes impossible to fill everyone’s mouth, then times of change will come.  And when that happens, Putin will find it very difficult to convince anyone” about his “’project.’”

 

            Precisely because, she concludes, he doesn’t have one -- or at least hasn’t given a clear sign.

 

Window on Eurasia: Dugin’s Influence in the Kremlin on the Wane, Abarinov Says


Paul Goble

 

            Staunton, September 27 – Aleksandr Dugin, the source of Vladimir Putin’s notions about “Novorossiya,” is rapidly losing his influence in the Kremlin because of his misreading of the amount of support in Ukraine for Russia and the amount of support for massive military intervention there in the Russian capital, according to Vladimir Abarinov.

 

            In a commentary posted yesterday on Grani.ru, the Moscow commentator says that the Eurasianist’s recent criticism of Moscow for failing to intervene reflect his own limitations as an analyst and politician and are rooted in Dugin’s background in the last decade of the Soviet period (grani.ru/opinion/abarinov/m.233386.html).

 

            Unlike many of his colleagues, Abarinov says, he doesn’t consider Aleksandr Dugin to be mad.” A charlatan, to be sure, but not insane in a clinical sense.  Rather he is someone who is given to mysticism rather than analysis and thus charismatic some of the time but profoundly wrong much of it.

 

As a young man in the 1980s, Dugin fell under the influence of the mystic Yevgeny Golovin, a man so far from politics that he wasn’t viewed as a problem by Soviet officials. Golovin “very much loved the middle ages,” and his notions informed Dugin’s thinking. But whereas Golovin was ironic, Dugin took everything at face value, Abarinov says.

 

If Dugin became a traditionalist, medievalist and occult thinker because of Golovin, the Moscow commentator says, he likely became a conspiracy theorist because of the impact of his father, a general in the GRU, who saw conspiracies everywhere and whose son extrapolated them to ever larger categories ever less connected with reality.

 

But the combination of a focus on the occult and conspiracies proved highly seductive to many in Moscow in the 1990s.  The GRU funded Dugin’s activities and his creation of a Eurasianist movement in particular, and by 1988, he had become an advisor of Gennady Seleznev, the speaker of the Russian parliament.

 

Among those who fell at least in part under Dugin’s spell was Vladimir Putin who shared his view that the disintegration of the USSR was “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century” and his passion for conspiratorial thinking. And in Putin’s statements, one increasingly finds Dugin’s “words, phraseology, and approach.”

 

After the Orange Revolution in Kyiv in 2004, Abarinov says, “Dugin was given carte blanche to form a European Union of Youth” who could serve, in his words, as “a living shield on the path of the orange bulldozer” and a kind of neo-oprichniki to defend the Russian regime of Vladimir Putin.

 

According to Abarinov, Dugin was the source of Putin’s obsession with the idea of “Novorossiya,” and when it appeared that that idea was on its way to realization, Dugin concluded that his time had come, a conclusion that led him to the excesses of conspiracy thinking and “imperial gigantomania.”

 

But when it became clear that his prediction that all the Ukrainians wanted was to rejoin Russia, Dugin’s’ influence began to decline; and when he lashed out at those in Moscow, including Putin, who weren’t prepared to redouble their bets to retake Ukraine, it declined still further.  As a result, today, Dugin is on his way to the outer edge of political influence.

 

Window on Eurasia: ‘No One in Baltic Countries Can Sleep Peacefully,’ Illarionov Says


Paul Goble

 

            Staunton, September 27 – No one in Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania should be sleeping peacefully given the threat that Vladimir Putin poses to all three and the failure of the West to stand up to the Kremlin leader in Ukraine or adequately prepare to defend the three Baltic NATO member countries, according to Andrey Illarionov.

 

            Speaking in Palanga, Illarionov said that he had recently been asked whether people in Riga should be able to sleep peacefully at night given that Latvia is a member of NATO. “No one in Riga could reply to it in the positive,” he said, and “the same question,” with the same answer, “could be raised in Tallinn, Vilnius, Palanga, Bucharest and other cities.”

 

            US President Barack Obama’s statement in the Estonian capital that NATO is “prepared to defend Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius” is helpful, the Russian commentator said.” But we must look at military readiness and military equipment available not just words.”  From that point of view, “NATO forces in the Baltic are insufficient” (en.delfi.lt/central-eastern-europe/putins-former-aid-russia-has-been-preparing-for-global-war-since-2003.d?id=65957992).

 

            More to the point, Illarionov told his Lithuanian audience, instead of talking about Riga, we should be focusing on Narva, a predominantly Russian-speaking city in Estonia on the Russian border.  “How would NATO react if ‘little green men’ turned up not near Tallinn,riga or Vilnius, but instead Narva?”

 

            According to Illarionov, the West has failed that test in Ukraine, and “as long as an aggressor is not subjected to the full force of economic and military sanctions, no one can sleep peacefully.” What is even worse, he said, is that the West talks about “a crisis in Ukraine” rather than what it is, “a Russian-Ukrainian war” in which Moscow is the aggressor.

 

            Using the term “crisis” represents a victory for Putin and his propaganda machine, especially since the Russian leader has been “preparing for a major war at least since 2003” and has made little secret of it on the assumption that no one would be prepared to call him on that – an assumption that so far has worked.

 

            Putin himself sees what he is doing as a war – and as World War IV because he views the Cold War as the third – and he believes as well that what he is doing is entirely legitimate because he is protecting “Russians,” an expansive category that includes almost anyone he wants it to, Illarionov says.

 

            Russia’s Anschluss of Crimea shows something else that is disturbing, the Russian analyst says.  The “old international consensus about the inviolability of borders” has broken down. Putin has seized a neighboring territory and the West has failed to take effective action to defend Ukraine and its own interests.

 

            In that situation, he concluded, “people in the Baltics cannot sleep peacefully.”

 

Window on Eurasia: To Avoid Disaster, Russia Needs a New Federation Treaty, Shteppa Says


Paul Goble

 

            Staunton, September 27 – Russia does not face any prospect of disintegrating in the way that the Soviet Union did – Moscow has changed the situation too much for that to happen – but it needs to form a new relationship among it regions and between them and the center if it is to avoid stagnation or worse, according to Vadim Shtepa.

 

            But for that relationship to develop, one based on networks rather than a pyramid of power, the both the regime and its opponents will have to change their understanding of the nature of the challenges Russia faces and proceed to negotiate and sign a new federation treaty (spektr.delfi.lv/novosti/raspad-rossii-kak-fantom.d?id=45022778).

 

            In a commentary on the “Spektr” portal yesterday, Russia’s most prominent regionalist writer says that both the Putin regime and its opponents view the disintegration of the country as the end of the world, with the only difference that the regime blames the opposition for this and the opposition the regime.

 

            Escaping from this dead end is now especially difficult given the adoption of the “law against separatism, a measure that  has meant few are prepared to discuss the challenges of disintegration lest they be accused of engaging in propaganda for it – as if, Shtepa says, “prohibiting any discussion of a problem will make that problem disappear.”

 

            But one place from which one can perhaps begin is to show that Russia might ever disintegrate as the Soviet Union did is “in principle impossible.”

 

            “The Union fell apart,” he says, “because legitimately elected authorities arose in the republics which were no longer subordinate to the CPSU ‘vertical.’ But today,” he continues, elections have been eliminated or rendered meaningless, and regional political parties have been declared illegal.

 

            “It is thus quite impossible to imagine any massive civic movement for independence of this or that region like the Baltic Peoples Fronts in the USSR. The single separatist exception was Chechnya, but it was successfully drowned in money from the sale of oil,” the regionalist writer says.

 

            In Russia today, power at the center is personalized to an almost unprecedented degree, something that in most places would open the way to disaster. But in the Russian Federation, this concentration of power has had exactly the opposite effect: there are no institutions left capable of existing on their own and thus being in a position to challenge the supreme leader.

 

            That does not mean that all is right with the world. Just the reverse. What Russia needs for successful development is the replacement of the current pyramid-style of governance with a network one which can be more mobile and effective than any hierarchical one and that will benefit both those in power and those in the opposition.

 

            Hyper-centralization is a threat to the existence of such network, but so too is constant talk about disintegration which keeps regions from working with one another and prevents the center from seeing that such inter-regional cooperation is not a threat but something from which it will benefit as well, Shtepa says.

 

            Unfortunately, Moscow is seeeking to impose not less but total centralization as can be seen by the way in which air routes are now structured. They are much more Moscow-centric than they were even in Soviet times, something that irritates the regions and does nothing for the country as a whole.

 

            What has to happen, Shtepa says, is a paradigm shift. Russians must stop thinking in „imperial terms” and conceive of the country as „an equal network space made up of a multitude of self-standing regions. Making such a shift won’t be easy after 500 years of imperialism, but without it, „we will not see any prospects” for the future.

 

             A Russia which remains based on an imperial pyramid, he continues, will remain „archaic” and will drive people away rather than attract them to it. Only by making the shift to a network model, he says, will the Russian language and Russian culture become attractive rather than offensive to others.

 

            To that end, Russia’s regions „must become full-fledged ‘subjects of the federation” rather than mere decorations.  And that likely will require the adoption of a new Federation treaty not promulgated by Moscow but agreed to among country’s regions and republics, Shtepa says.

 

            The regions need to see a federation in which they will benefit rather than be harmed. If they will benefit, they will want to be part of it rather than flee from it. And such an attitude, Shtepa concludes, will only arise if there are real benefits from being part of the Federation.  It won’t appear if „someone is threatened with repression for ‘separatism.’”