Within 15 Years, Kazakhstan will Be a Kazakh Country, Political Analyst Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, November 30 – Ten to fifteen years from now, Kazakhstan will become a Kazakh country, Aydos Sarym says; but there will still be minorities, who over the next generation will have to recognize that even “an absolute mastery of the Kazakh language will not be an entry ticket to the ‘Kazakh world.’”

            In a 3500-word interview to the Russian-language matritca.kz site, the Kazakh political analyst provides some remarkable insights into the changing relationships of language, ethnic identification and political identity in his country (matritca.kz/news/27807-absolyutnoe-vladenie-kazahskim-yazykom-ne-yavlyaetsya-vhodnym-biletom-v-kazahskiy-mir.html).

            Most ethnic Russian in Kazakhstan even now speak only Russian, he points out. If they know a second language, it is far more likely to be English than Kazakh. But “the absolute majority of Kazakhs speak both Kazakh and Russian and an increasing share of the young speak English and Turkish.

            But that general pattern obscures something important: the Russian-speaking segment of the population, which includes both Russians and Ukrainians, has split over the war in Ukraine and do not form “one and the same social and political stratum” in Kazakhstan. They have no “common values and markers,” although they may have “common fears.”

            And just because a Kazakh knows Russian does not make him or her part of the Russian world. “Russian is a lingua franca; it is not the property of the Russian people or of Russia. Russian in the same degree is mine or yours to the extent that we actively use it. But Sarym says, he would never want to identify as part of “’the Russian world’” as that term is used now.

            Instead, the Kazakhstan analyst says, he views himself as “a representative of ‘the Kazakh world’ and of ‘Kazakh civilization.’”  And he points out that there are many members of that world and civilization who do not speak Kazakh well, just as there are some “ethnic Kazakhs” who do identify with Putin’s “’Russian world.’”

            “The main problem” in Kazakhstan today, he continues, is that Kazakhstan society “does not have even one commonly recognized by the majority idea. In essence, we have today two ideas, which only rarely intersect, one [the Soviet Russian] of which is declining in size while the other [the Kazakh] is unceasingly growing.”

            The situation is changing rapidly in favor of the latter, Sarym says; and the country will be “Kazakh and Kazakh-speaking.” And “it would be good if this Kazakh and Kazakh-speaking society mastered as well not only Russian but also English, Turkish, Chinese and other languages.” 

            That presents special challenges to those who today speak only Russian. “It is no secret,” he continues, “that many of our fell citizens up to now think that Kazakhs are limited and that the possibilities of the Kazakh language and education are limited as well.”  But that is simply wrong, although it is in fact sustained by the current educational system.

            “Our system of education and the mentality of Russian-speaking parents today is leading to serious consequences for their very own children.  If the current system of ignoring the Kazakh language in the school is retained, then in a short time, Russian and Slavic youth will have a choice: to be uncompetitive in the labor market in Kazakhstan or to be ready to migrate.”

            The shifting balance between Russian and Kazakh is already being registered in those businesses that depend on people aged 20 to 45. In that age group, Kazakh speakers predominate, and in younger cohorts, they are even more dominant. Almost 80 percent of those entering school now are ethnic Kazakhs, and they are the future customers and investors.

            Today, the average age of ethnic Kazakhs in Kazakhstan is 26-27; that of the Slavic residents of the country – 46-47, Sarym says; and that alone tells those who are paying attention what they need to know about the future. Kazakh may not be the language of all the business community now, but it soon will be.

Another trend that matters, Sarym says, is that Kazakhs, historically a rural population – in 1986, only three percent of the residents of Almaaty were Kazakh – are moving into the cities. In the past, that mean Sovietization and Russification, but in the future, it must be the basis for the formation of an urban Kazakh identity.

Kazakh cities have not yet become “Kazakh friendly,” but they must become such or there will be “collisions and problems,” not so much for the Kazakhs who as a result of their numbers will simply overwhelm the cities but for the others who will find themselves ever more an embattled minority.

According to Sarym, “the city musts become more Kazakh, and the arriving rural people must become more urban.” That will require effective programs of socialization, new schools, trade centers, and hospitals in the areas between the core city and rural lands.  And that must happen soon, he says.

“Otherwise we will become something like Rio de Janiero or Johannesburg where there are wealth centers” surrounded by impoverished neighborhoods, a situation in which “all are unhappy with the poor stealing from the rich, and the rich hiding behind their walls … If we don’t want this for our megalopolis and its residents, we must all change.”

West Needs to End Its Illusions about Putin’s Power, Shevtsova Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, November 30 – Many in the West still view Vladimir Putin as a powerful miracle worker who never loses at home or abroad, a perspective increasingly at odds with the facts and one that only partially conceals their own unwillingness to respond forcefully to his hooligan-like actions, according to Liliya Shevtsova.

            In an interview with Apostrophe’s Artem Dekhtyarenko, the first part of which is online today, the Russian political analyst argues that the notion that Putin is so strong is getting in the way of an adequate understanding of what is going on and preventing an adequate response (apostrophe.com.ua/article/world/2015-11-30/prishla-pora-konchat-s-illyuziyami-o-sile-putina---rossiyskiy-politolog-shevtsova/2660).

            Despite what many in the West think, Putin’s actions in Syria in fact reflect his weakness not his strength. On the one hand, Shevtsova says, “Putin is seeking a new model of the legitimation of his power because that legitimation which he obtained in the course of the war with Ukraine has already exhausted itself.”

            And on the other, she continues, the Kremlin recognizes that its current situation is unsustainable and that it must find a way to break out of its diplomatic isolation and the sanctions regime the West has imposed on it, at a minimum before the next election cycle in 2016-2018.

            The West was not prepared for Putin’s moves either in Ukraine or Syria and has been attempting “in essence to return to the times of the cold war, to find a new form of the cold war in new conditions.”  But that is a highly problematic effort because of how much the world has changed.

            The Russian elites are far more integrated in the West than the Soviet ones were, they have common ground with many on the right in Western countries, and at the same time, the West has lost its sense of mission and unity. As a result, the West is acting without the self-confidence it had and is far too inclined to see Putin as more powerful than he is.

            In Syria, Shevtsova says, Putin has three goals: First, he hopes to “break out of Russia’s international isolation … by distracting the attention of the world and the West from Ukraine and his defeat there.” Second, he wants to use Western “indecisiveness and disorientation to force the West to accept the Kremlin rules of the game.” And third, Putin wants to raise “to a new level the patriotic-militaristic legitimation of his power and thus preserve and reproduce his regime. 

            But in considering Putin’s approach, the Brookings analyst says, the West needs to end “two illusions and stereotypes,” to stop believing that Putin is somehow all powerful, and to cease thinking that Putin is constantly winning and acting from strength rather than seeking to escape from weakness.  The facts are quite otherwise, she points out.

             These illusions, she says, arise from the fact that after Iraq, the West has “returned to political and diplomatic forms of interaction,” something that has given others the power to ‘break glass’” not because they are strong but because they are frightened of the situation they find themselves in. Putin is a classic case, and he has made many costly mistakes.

            Shevtsova points to eight of them, a far from exhaustive list. Putin has acted in ways that have led to the isolation of Russia. He has created a situation in which other major powers do not take him seriously. He has plunged Russia into a serious economic recession. He has ensured that encircling Russia is a ring of states hostile to his country.

            The Kremlin leader has revived Europe “which has begun to return itself to is normal functioning.” He has done the same thing for NATO “which was until now paralyzed.” He has opened the way for the return of American forces to Europe.  And he has gotten involved in the Sunni-Shiia conflict which can be fatal for Russia itself.

            And these defeats keep mounting even though they are not always recognized as such. Yes, French President Francois Hollande went to Moscow after the Paris terrorist attacks, but he did not agree with Putin on how to deal with Asad, a reality that was a defeat for Putin but that may refused to recognize as such.

                Far more important, Shevtsova says, it is now completely clear that the West has not and will not trade off Ukraine for Syria. Even the Western leaders most inclined to talk to Moscow recognize that to do so would undermine both the West as a set of values and the West’s interests and security.

            They recognize that if they took this step, then Putin would cross other red lines where they would have to act. And consequently, they understand that to defend their interests elsewhere, they cannot trade away Ukraine.

            That has enormous consequences for the Syrian crisis, Shevtsova suggests. Putin is not so tied to Asad personally as he is to the idea that he should not give up any position he has taken without getting something in return, but as of today, the Western coalition in Syria is “not capable of offering Russian dividends and ‘payoffs’ for the surrender of Asad.”

            But at the same time, she argues, the Syrian crisis is limited by the fact that “the Kremlin and Putin are not interested in and do not want, are frightened and trying to exclude a serious confrontation of Russia with the West.”

            “Even Ukraine did not testify to the desire of Moscow to confront the West,” Shevtsova continues. “The annexation of Crimea and the direct aggression on Ukrainian territory was based on the near certainty of the Kremlin that the West would swallow this.”  That didn’t happen, and now Putin hopes to use Syria to “escape from [a full-scale] confrontation.”

            Because he has multiple goals, however, Shevtsova concludes, Putin will continue to play “two pianos.” On one, he will signal his desire for cooperation. On the other, he will be threatening – but these threats will reflect his desire to achieve cooperation and reflect not the strength of his position but his weakness.

            Shevtsova does not say, but one could easily add that the tendency of Western leaders to overrate the power of those who engage in bombastic and aggressive actions is an old one. Throughout much of the Cold War, the West overrated Soviet power – until one Western leader, Ronald Reagan, recognized how weak the USSR really was and acted accordingly.

Warsaw Pact a Model for Organization of Collective Security Treaty Countries, Moscow Analyst Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, November 29 – Aleksey Chichkin, an economist who specializes on military production issues, says that Moscow should revive the kind of cooperation among the military-industrial complexes that existed among the members of the Warsaw Pact for the countries that are members of the post-Soviet Organization for the Collective Security Treaty.

            Such a proposal, made in the current issue of the influential “Voenno-Promyshlenny kuryer,” suggests some within the Moscow defense bureaucracy now expect current East-West tensions to remain high for an extended period of time and are thinking about how to organize production under those conditions (vpk-news.ru/articles/28165).

            Sixty years ago this year, immediately after the creation of the Warsaw Pact, Chichkin writes, the member states agreed with Moscow on dividing up defense industrial production both to achieve new efficiencies and to save money on moving raw materials and semi-finished production around. “This experience can be used today,” he writes.

            By 1958, the plans for this were fully developed, something that meant that Warsaw Pact members other than Russia were able to boost their contribution to the common defense of that alliance from 25 percent in 1961 to more than 40 percent at the end of the 1970s, something that removed some of the burden on the Soviet economy.

            The importance of this cooperation, Chichkin says, is underscored by NATO efforts to disrupt it not only by pushing Albania to break away from the pact and thus close a Soviet base there but also by its promotion of popular risings in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland which, among other things, disrupted this shared defense production.

            Chichkin describes the evolution of the planning process among defense producers in Warsaw Pact countries and argues that “such a unique experience can be completely used for the development of military-industrial cooperation in the Organization for the Collective Security Treaty countries.”

            Any signs that Moscow may be pushing for this idea with these countries or even more than they may be agreeing to it will not only highlight Russia’s current economic difficulties but also show that in this area as well, Vladimir Putin is taking another page from the Soviet past in order to strengthen Moscow’s position and his own.