Sunday, March 31, 2019

‘Grudinin Effect’ Growing from Regions Inward Because of Kremlin Mistakes, Orlova Says


Paul Goble
           
            Staunton, March 30 – Support for the Putin regime is declining and protest attitudes are spreading and intensifying in the regions but gradually moving toward the center of power in the Kremlin, Yuliya Orlova says, the result of the failure of those in power to address the country’s problems or even show they are concerned about them.

            This trend, which the Svobodnaya pressa commentator calls “the Grudinin effect” after the KPRF presidential candidate who won 11 percent of the vote against Vladimir Putin. Despite his loss, Grudilin at least showed that he cared about people and as a result has become both a hero and role model for others (svpressa.ru/society/article/228866/).

            Orlova cites numerous occasions since the presidential elections in which people in the regions east of the Urals in particular have voted for opposition candidates because these people showed by their statements that they cared about what happens to the population while the Kremlin and its United Russia Party did not. 

            Unfortunately, she continues, given the way the Russian state is organized, these opposition victories may not lead to changes anytime soon. In fact, Moscow undoubtedly will do what it can to undermine those of its opponents who have won.  But the Russian people can see that too – and they will remember at each succeeding election.
           
            Some who’ve won by declaring they care may fail for other reasons. Many lack serious experience, and they will make mistakes, Orlova says. But they are getting at least one thing right that the Kremlin is getting wrong: they care and want change, and it doesn’t care and doesn’t want anything to change either.

            Increasingly as a result, Russians “are voting according to the principle – for anyone except ‘those’” connected with the powers that be.  Grudinin may not be that great either, but at least he isn’t with those in power – and that makes him a hero for ever more people and a role model for ever more politicians.

            If the Kremlin doesn’t change course and if its opponents continue to show that they really care and want to help people, Orlova says, the opposition candidate in 2024 will receive far more than 11 percent of the vote, winning enough to put the regime on the defensive even if he or she can’t defeat Putin.

And if that happens, the commentator says, the Kremlin will have no one to blame for its loss of position but itself. 

Navalny Says He Backs Policemen Fired in Ingushetia for Not Attacking Protesters


Paul Goble

            Staunton, March 30 – Opposition leader Aleksey Navalny says on Ekho Moskvy’s “Special Opinion” that he and his organization will support those policemen in Ingushetia who lost their jobs because they refused to attack protesters. These policemen deserve it, he adds, because “they are with the people.”

            He continues that “they must be supported” because while they may “cease to be policemen. at least within themselves they sense that they have remained honest people. And they have very great support from their own friends and acquaintances” (fortanga.org/2019/03/aleksej-navalnyj-budem-podderzhivat-uvolennyh-ingushskih-politsejskih/).

            “For anyone this is important,” Navalny says but “in the Caucasus, “it is much more important because there all family ties are one hundred times more important.” Unlike many Moscow opposition figures, Navalny has regularly covered the Ingush protests both last fall over the border accord with Chechnya and now over that and Yekurov’s remaining in office.

            Meanwhile, in Ingushetia, those who organized the March 26 demonstration which the authorities forcibly dispersed denounced Yevkurov and by name the various officials who had betrayed the promises of the authorities to allow the meeting to take place, an indication that tensions there remain very high and may be intensifying (zamanho.com/?p=5708).

            Among the biggest complaints of the Ingush opposition besides the fact that the authorities have made promises they haven’t kept and refused to take up the issues the opposition raises is that Yevkurov has been inserting provocateurs among the demonstrators hoping to cause trouble (capost.media/news/politika/chlen-spch-brod-ne-prekrashchayutsya-popytki-provokatorov-vzorvat-situatsiyu-v-ingushetii-/ and kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/333626/).

            So far, the opposition has been able to identify and isolate these people; but the fact that the Ingush government (and possibly the Russian government behind it) have taken this step does not bode well for the future. There has already been some violence in Ingushetia but the opposition rejects the notion that it is related to the protests.

            A larger problem on the horizon consists of reports that the Russian Guard, few of whose members are Ingush, are now seeking to confiscate weapons from the Ingush population. The Guard denies this, but the reports continue, a situation that could prove explosive because most Ingush have guns (meduza.io/news/2019/03/30/v-ingushetii-rasskazali-o-reydah-po-iz-yatiyu-oruzhiya-u-naseleniya-rosgvardiya-zayavila-o-planovoy-proverke, zamanho.com/?p=5710  and  capost.media/news/society/v-rosgvardii-oprovergli-soobshcheniya-ob-izyatii-oruzhiya-u-zhiteley-ingushetii).

Russia Can’t Escape Communist Past and Thus Must Understand Its Special ‘Sectarian’ Nature, Slezkine Says


Paul Goble

            Staunton, March 30 – Unlike other post-communist countries, Russia faces a dilemma because it can’t blame communism on foreign forces, Yuri Slezkine of the University of California, Berkeley, says.  Instead, it must face up to the domestic roots of the Soviet tragedy and especially now understand its “sectarian” nature.

            Slezkine makes those comments in interview with Mikhail Sokolov of Radio Svoboda on the occasion of the release of the Russian edition of his book, The House of Government (originally in English at Princeton UP, 2017), about the residents of the Moscow apartment complex that Yuri Lyubimov immortalized in his novel (svoboda.org/a/29847345.html).

            Bolshevism, Slezkine says, “cannot be tossed out of Russian history;” instead, it must be understood as a millenarian sect consisting initially of people who believed in an apocalyptic transformation of the world and then degenerated for various reasons into a ruling group with all the problems that ultimately led to their overthrow.

            Some see the regime of Vladimir Putin as seeking to return Russia to the Soviet past, but Slezkine argues there is one major difference: the Bolsheviks acted in the name of a goal; Putin doesn’t. “Putinism, of course, is a very interesting phenomenon,” the historian says; “but this is authoritarianism without a goal.”

            There are a large number of authoritarian regimes, he continues; there are even a large number which have a special role for an authoritarian leader. “But there are not very many regimes of the Bolshevik or Stalinist type,” regimes based on a kind of theocratic faith that existed among the Old Bolsheviks but does not exist now.

            That distinction means, Slezkine argues, that despite the trappings of Stalinism, despite the revival of the security organs, the Putin regime is not Stalinist or Bolshevik in the most fundamental sense. It is authoritarian; it does commit crimes against the population and Russia’s neighbors. But that isn’t enough to call it Bolshevik or Stalinist.

            “It does not seem to me,” the historian says, “that Russia can fail to reject the heavy inheritance of force from the past, but at the same time, “it does seem to me that It cannot denounce it as absolute evil. One can’t take communists out of the history of the Great Fatherland war, for example.”

            “This war,” he continues, “will remain one of the most important events in Russian history and will remain such in Russia for a long time to come.”