Sunday, May 31, 2020

Putin’s ‘Constitutional Blitzkrieg’ Blowing Up in His Face, Russian Analysts Say


Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 29 – By holding a referendum on amendments to the Constitution, Putin has given Russians the chance to vote against him and his policies and by rescheduling it at a time when the pandemic will still be going on, he has ensured that they will take advantage of that opportunity.

            And consequently, Russian analysts say, the Kremlin leader’s “constitutional blitzkrieg,” one that he need not have launched or organized with a referendum at all has failed or even more blown up in his face with uncertain consequences but with ever more Russians now asking “what will happen next?”

            Public opinion polls show Russians are increasingly angry at the authorities in general and Putin in particular but not yet ready to go into the streets.  But having the opportunity to vote no, something the regime has not allowed them without negative consequences, gives them the perfect occasion to express their anger and opposition.

            Had there been a vote before the pandemic or had the pandemic not happened or had Putin and the regime handled it more successfully, the referendum might have gone through without particular difficulty. But Ilya Grashchenkov says, that moment was “missed” and the regime can’t recover it (nakanune.ru/articles/116113/).

            Others agree, including Rosbalt journalist Aleksandr Zhelenin, who says that the crux of the matter is that the powers have given the people the chance to vote against the regime without serious consequences and it is a chance that many, including himself, will rush to take advantage of (rosbalt.ru/blogs/2020/05/30/1846135.html).

            He points out that the Kremlin is only making the situation worse for itself in other ways. It has decided not to hold the vote on the same day as the Victory parade, thus underscoring its importance and apparently the fears of some that Putin may not win, a loss that would be especially embarrassing if it came on Victory Day.

            Moreover, Putin has decided that people will have to vote in person despite the pandemic, not only risking their health and even lives but the first in what many fear is a campaign to manipulate the results by suppressing those most likely to vote against the amendments and him, the young and Internet savvy.

            That will make the opposition even more suspicious and likely to mobilize large protests in the major cities if, as they fear, Putin will stop at nothing to ensure approval of measures that will allow him to serve as president until 2036.

            But the most important element in all this is that the powers that be have given Russians the chance to vote “no” without penalty for the first time in 15 years. (In 2005, Putin eliminated the “against all” line on ballots.)  But it can’t escape this time around because the question is cast in yes or no terms.

            “It would be a sin not to make use of this opportunity,” Zhelenin says. “I for example haven’t voted in more than 20 years and have called for boycotts because I consider that it is incorrect to choose from among two, three or a larger number of evils, especially since the chief one of them will remain in place,” he continues.

            But in this case, the Rosbalt journalist concludes, he “intends to go and vote” without fail.

Putin Significantly and Dangerously Broadens Definition of Extremism


Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 29 – In signing off on the new version of Moscow’s strategy for countering extremism over the next five years, Vladimir Putin has significantly expanded the definition of extremism, although broad and elastic in Russian practice, and thus dangerously put even more individuals and groups at risk of criminal sanctions.

The new document (publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202005290036), discussed at znak.com/2020-05-29/putin_utverdil_strategiyu_borby_s_ekstremizmom_tam_poyavilsya_termin_ideologiya_nasiliya), replaces the one adopted in 2014 and in force since then.

It broadens the legal definition of extremism by including a variety of new terms, including “’the ideology of force’” which the document defines as “a combination of views and ideas that justify the use of force for the achievement of political, ideological, religious and other goals.”

Further, it broadens the definition of “radicalism,” suggesting that radicalism involves “the uncompromising attachment to an ideology of force which is characterized by a seeking after decisive and cardinal change of the foundations of the constitutional system of Russia and the violation of the unity and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.”

The 2014 document, in contrast, defined radicalism only as “a deep attachment to the ideology of extremism.” The replacement strategy follows Putin and says that “certain foreign organizations are exerting significant negative influence” on the domestic situation by working under the guise of “’humanitarian, educational, cultural, ethnic, and religious projects.”

‘If It Weren’t for Tatarstan, Russia would Be a Much More Unitary State,’ Tatars Say


Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 29 – As Kazan this week marks the centenary of the formation of the Tatar ASSR at the dawn of the Soviet era, leading Tatar intellectuals and politicians are pointing out that Tatarstan is important not only in its own right but for the impact it has had and will continue to have on Russia as a whole.

            Having often played the role of leader of or at least spokesman for all non-Russian republics and even more for all non-Russians, they argue, if Tatarstan did not exist and if it did not act as it has, they argue, “Russia would be a much more unitary state” than it currently is (business-gazeta.ru/article/470314).

            Kazan’s Business-Gazeta asked a wide variety of Tatar leaders which decade of the last century they consider most successful, the 1920s when the republic was founded, the war years, the economic boom under Fikhrat Tabeyev, the disintegration of the USSR, or the last ten years.  Among the answers, the following are especially interesting and instructive:

·         Oleg Morozov who represents Tatarstan in Russia’s Federation Council, says that “in essence, Tatarstan by its unusual actions and dialogue with the federal center formed what is the Russian Federation today … Without Tatarstan, [Russia] would certainly have been different” and more unitary than it is.

·         Rafael Khakimov, head of the Marjani Institute of History, says that for him, the 1990s were the most successful because Tatarstan was able to raise its status and defend it.

·         Academician Indus Tagirov says that the 1920s were special because Tatarstan was able to arrange things with Moscow that it had control of large swaths of its national life.

·         Rafik Mukhametshin, deputy Mufti of Tatarstan, says that “if it weren’t for the sovereignty of Tatarstan, Russia would have moved far further toward a unitary state. Tatarstan reminded and reminds the center that our country is a Federation with regions and that the center must take them into account.” Kazan has not achieved all that it wants but politics is the art of the possible, and it has done well.

·         Radik Salikhov, deputy director of the Marjani Institute of History, notes that “even foreign experts recognize that one must study” Tatarstan and its impact on the collective life of Russia throughout all periods of the last 100 years.

·         And Iskander Gilyazov, head of the Institute of the Tatar Encyclopedia and Regional Studies, says that the two most important decades were the 1920s and the 1990s because in each case, Kazan was able to define itself and its future.