1992 Tatarstan Referendum Undercut Moves toward Real Federalism in Russia, Mikhaylov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 20 – The March 21, 1992, referendum in Tatarstan about its status relative to Moscow, the 30^th anniversary of which falls this week, did not as many still imagine represent an important step toward genuine federalism in Russia but rather had the effect of undermining the possibility that Russia could in fact move in that direction, Valentin Mikhaylov says.

            Most Tatars and many others look back at the referendum as a highwater mark of Tatarstan’s aspirations for autonomy and for the elaboration of new federal relations not only between Moscow and Kazan but between Moscow and all the other regions of the country, the Yezhednevny zhurnal commentator says (ej.ru/?a=note&id=37074).

            The March 1992 vote did give the government of Tatarstan more autonomy from Moscow in economic terms than any other republic, but it did not promote federalism but rather simply a special relationship that had the effect of prompting others to seek equally special relationships with the center rather than a genuine federal system.

            That in turn allowed Moscow first to play off one region or republic against another and then, having compromised one, use that as the basis for rolling up any concessions the center had made and restoring as now the hyper-centralized Russian state, a process few link to the 1992 Tatarstan referendum but should.

            There are two reasons for that, Mikhaylov says. On the one hand, the referendum was so poorly worded that most Tatars who did vote for it saw it as a vote for economic autonomy but many in the Tatarstan government saw it as a mandate to press for independence or at least autarky from Moscow.

            And on the other hand, the vote by which the referendum was approved was fundamentally flaws. Rural districts completely improbably voted 90 percent plus for it while the cities voted much less, an arrangement that reflected less popular attitudes in the either than the power of holdover communist officials accustomed to delivery 99 percent approval rates.

            Moscow which opposed the referendum might have pointed this out and refused to negotiate with Kazan, but instead, it accepted the results of the referendum as genuine and entered into talks that led to a separate treaty arrangement with Tatarstan, something other republics resented and did not achieve but copied as far as voting is concerned.

            Because that was the case, the 1992 referendum was not a victory for federalism but rather a nail in its coffin, not only because of the ways Tatar officials falsified the results and consciously distorted what the people had in fact voted for but also because Moscow accepted this rather than challenged it at the time.

            But this, more than anything else, Mikhaylov suggests, put a delayed action mine under relations both between Moscow and Kazan and between the federal center and the republics and regions, a mine that Vladimir Putin was only too happy to set up as he pursued a return to a variety of centralization that quickly exceeded that of late Soviet times.

Resignations by Foreigners from Russian Boards of Directors Limiting Kremlin’s Economic Prospects, Sidorov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 20 – With the exception of a few high-profile cases, few have noticed just the large number of resignations by Westerners from Russian boards of directors as the sanctions regime has deepened, Vadim Sidorov says. But their exit will limit the ability of Russian companies to get loans and sell abroad, limiting further the economic prospects of the country.

            Some former Western political leaders who have been named to Russian boards may have been given those jobs because of past or expected future services to the Kremlin, but many of them have been anything but decorative. They have helped these firms get loans and acquire market share, the Prague-based Russian analyst says.

            Now, these firms, both officially government-owned and nominally private, will lose along with the departure of these Westerners the kind of loans they had received and the market penetrations they had achieved (trtrussian.com/mnenie/ishod-inostrancev-iz-rukovodstva-rossijskih-kompanij-chto-on-oznachaet-8307763).

            In his article, Sidorov lists several dozen of these departures and suggests that they are likely to be followed out the door by other Westerners who will conclude that maintaining good relations with their own governments is more important than any incomes they may derive from serving on Russian boards.

            He does not say, but it follows from his analysis, that the consequence of sanctions may prove to be far more important than many other more direct influences. Sidorov’s article is a model of the kind of record that more countries should be maintaining and of the kind of exit from Russian boards that they should be promoting. 

 

Most Former Soviet Republics Seek ‘Balance’ on Ukraine to Avoid Angering Moscow or Breaking with the West, German Researchers Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 19 – Most former Soviet republics have sought to maintain a “balanced” position on Putin’s war in Ukraine lest anything they or their populations do anger Moscow or lead to complications or open breaks with the West, according to Aleksandr Vytovich of the Belarusian ThinkTanks portal.

            He draws that conclusion on the basis of an investigation by the Berlin Center for East European and International Studies on public action, media coverage, and government statements in seven former Soviet republics – Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Moldova (thinktanks.by/publication/2022/03/18/kak-v-postsovetskih-stranah-reagiruyut-na-voennye-deystviya-rossii-v-ukraine.html):

·       Georgia’s government has been divided in its reaction, but its population has been almost uniformly pro-Ukrainian.

·       Azerbaijan’s government is officially neutral because it has good relations with both Ukraine and Russia and because while Baku values Ukraine’s support of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, it also must reckon with the fact that there Russian “peacekeeping” troops on its territory.

·       Armenia also has occupied a neutral position. For example, it voted against the recent resolution excluding Russia from the Council of Europe but it has announced that it has no intention of recognizing the self-proclaimed “people’s republics” in the Donbass. The Armenian population is divided about the war.

·       Kazakhstan also takes a neutral position, but it too has refused to recognize the self-proclaimed Donbass republics. In contrast to the media in Russia and some other countries, it uses both Russian and Ukrainian sources to report on the war.

·       Kyrgyzstan has not taken a clear position, criticizing the war on some occasions but has expressed its “understanding” of Moscow’s recognition of the Donbass republics.

·       Uzbekistan has also maintained neutrality but its coverage of the war has included stories critical of Russia. Unlike in most other countries in the region, there have not been demonstrations for or against Russia’s war in Ukraine.

·       Moldova has sharply condemned Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and taken a variety of unilateral actions to limit any possibility Moscow will exploit Moldovan territory or airspace against Ukraine, but at the same time, it has not joined the EU sanctions regime because it feels its economy is too dependent on Russia’s to take that step.

 

Duma Appears Set to Declare Russian Government Infallible and Beyond Criticism, Vishnevsky Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 19 – Having passed a law imposing criminal penalties on anyone who criticizes the actions of the Russian military abroad, the Duma is now considering a similar measure that would do the same for any critics of any Russian representation abroad diplomatic or otherwise, Boris Vishnevsky says.

            The logical next step, the opposition deputy in St. Petersburg’s Legislative Assembly, will be to declare the Russian government at home infallible and impose administrative and criminal penalties on anyone who criticizes any of members or the actions they take (novayagazeta.ru/articles/2022/03/19/ikh-sapog-sviat).

            The powers that be undoubtedly will be happy about this; but they should remember that a similar arrangement of sorts existed in some time, “where in the information space ruled complete unanimity” and further recall how that worked out. It destroyed all possibility of feedback and led to “ineffective” decisions that could not be corrected.

            According to Vishnevsky, “there is no reason to suppose that now will be any different.”

Yerevan Announces Plans for Construction of a North-South Road in Syunik Oblast

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 19 – Because Armenia lacks sufficient resources on its own to build highways or railways along a north-south route in Syunik that would connect it with Iran, far more attention has focused on Azerbaijani and Turkish efforts to open an east-west corridor including both railways and highways between Azerbaijan proper and Nakhichevan.

            But now Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has announced a pre-qualification competition for firms interested in bidding for the construction of a highway in the northern portion of the Syunik oblast, apparently convinced that Yerevan has sufficient commitments from European banks to move ahead.

            The proposed highway would not reach Iran by itself, although it could link into existing roads in the southern part of Syunik Oblast. But it could interfere with part of the several paths Azerbaijan and Turkey have been discussing. At the very least, it could force the two Turkic states to focus on a more southerly route.

            While the project he has outlined would not be completed for at least six years, Pashinyan’s announcement will inevitably create more tensions now between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the east-west route (ritmeurasia.org/news--2022-03-19--transportnye-proekty-juzhnogo-kavkaza-armjanskij-perekrestok-protiv-zangezurskogo-koridora-59084).

              That is because the Armenians, with the support of Russia and the Europeans, are against any talk of a corridor north-south or east-west; and this announcement means that Yerevan will dig in its heels further to Azerbaijani plans for precisely that. Consequently, the future reopening of transit routes anticipated by the tripartite accords may have the opposite effect intended.

Putin Likely to Draw Same Conclusions from West’s Declarations about Ukraine as Hitler Did from Their Predecessors' Words about the Rhineland, Pastukhov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 19 – Vladimir Pastukhov says that it is unclear why Western leaders say with increasing frequency that they are not parties to Putin’s war in Ukraine and that they will not interfere because they are already “interfering” by providing lethal aid and because saying they won’t intervene will only lead the Kremlin leader to expand his aggression.

            Such declarations, the London-based Russian analyst says, either reflect an effort to calm their own populations, send a signal to Kyiv that it must ultimately make a deal with Moscow, or reflect a complete lack of understanding about the nature of aggression (t.me/v_pastukhov/60 reposted at  kasparov.ru/material.php?id=6237194F4D7A8&section_id=50A6C962A3D7C).

            Telling a leader hellbent on aggression that you won’t intervene in this or that case, Pastukhov argues, inevitably leads him to conclude that you won’t intervene ever, to launch broader aggression, and ultimately force you to begin to defend your interests and rights seriously from what will be an initially much weaker position.

            That is what happened in the case of Hitler when the British and French failed to respond to Hitler’s occupation of the Rhineland in 1936. And when the German dictator saw that, he concluded, according to his architect Albert Speer, that the road was clear for him to move even more boldly.

            That was exactly the reverse of what the British and French hoped for; and tragically, Western leaders may find themselves in exactly the same position their predecessors did in the years leading up to World War II. Those who sought to avoid that conflict most passionately as history shows were the very ones who made such a world conflagration more likely.

Is Moscow about to Play the Latgale Card against Latvia and the Balts?

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 19 – The Baltic countries have good reason to fear that should Vladimir Putin get away with his aggression against Ukraine, he will turn his attention to the Baltic countries that he insists must give up their NATO memberships and become neutral countries with close ties to the Russian Federation.

            (On that danger, which will undoubtedly grow if Putin is not stopped in Ukraine, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/03/a-worrisome-trend-moscow-increasingly.html and a more recent pro-Moscow article about how supposedly abused ethnic Russians are in Latvia (http://www.stoletie.ru/zarubejie/latvija_travla_russkih_147.htm).)

             But just as Putin began his aggression against Ukraine not by taking on the entire country but instead by his Anschluss of Crimea and establishment of breakaway and Russian dominated statelets in the Donbass, so too he may approach the Baltic countries in the same way. Indeed, there is a clear precedent for that.

           It involves Latgale, an impoverished region in eastern Latvia next to the Russian border of approximately 250,000 people whose cities are still dominated by ethnic Russians and whose rural areas are divided between Catholic Poles and Orthodox Latgals, the original indigenous population.

             Since 1991, Russians in Moscow and in Latvia have occasionally raised what many call “the Latgal card” with interest in that possibility increasing during Putin’s time (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2021/06/moscow-again-urged-to-play-latgal-card.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2020/12/moscow-again-wants-to-play-latgal-card.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2016/02/moscows-real-interest-in-latgals-to.html).

            Most Latgals have clearly indicated that they are not interested in a Russian embrace. They would like more investment in their region and greater respect for their national distinctiveness but that doesn’t mean they want to become part of Russia (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2012/12/window-on-eurasia-latgalia-catalonia-on.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2017/05/latgals-want-their-place-in-sun-but-in.html).

            But in their case as has been the case in Ukraine’s Crimea and Donbass, the Russian side has very little interest in what the inhabitants want as it views them not as subjects of politics but as potential pawns that it can use for its own purposes, especially given that some in Russia and the West who know little about these regions will accept Kremlin claims.

            And Moscow may be encouraged to try the Latgale card because of the results of a poll in Latgale about the war in Ukraine, a survey that found residents of that region are only half as likely to support Ukraine as Latvians as a whole (thinktanks.by/publication/2022/03/22/tolko-33-protsenta-naseleniya-latgalii-podderzhivaet-ukrainu.html).

            In part, of course, this poll which gave results by region rather than by ethnic group reflects the fact that the share of ethnic Russians in Latgale is higher than in other Latvian regions. But Moscow is likely to play up both that Russian component and the supposed anger of Latgals at how Riga is treating them.

            This may seem like a small issue to most outsiders, but one should remember that a decade ago, few talked about the Donbass. After Putin made it the central axis of his attack on Ukraine, however, that changed. Latgale bears watching lest he use the same page from his playbook there.