Tuesday, July 25, 2023

Russian Population after Putin Likely to Be ‘Godless’ But with Large Protestant Denominations, Savvin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 21 – If Russia continues to exist as a single country, Dimitry Savvin says, it almost certainly will be “a predominantly godless country” where most of its residents will be as godless as the Soviet leadership ever wanted. But within that world, there are likely to be numerous large Protestant denominations.

            The editor of the conservative Russian nationalist portal Harbin which is based in Riga says this falling away from religion is a worldwide phenomenon, one that Russia is unlikely to be able to escape, but there are two special reasons for drawing the most negative conclusions about the future (kasparov.ru/material.php?id=64B9F1A2C9213).

            “On the one hand,” Savvin says, Russia experienced “a genocidal atheistic terror in the 20th century; and on the other, there are serious historical defects in the development of the Russian Orthodox Church. As a result, even before 1917, the Russian people were ‘baptized but not enlightened by religion,’” a feature that allowed the Soviets to move against religion.

            What this means, he continues, is that when the current Russian regime with all its talk about “’spirituality’ and ‘traditional values’ disappears,” it will become obvious that “the level of real religiosity in Russia will be about the same as in the Czech Republic, a place where the vast majority of people are neither for or against faith but for nothing at all.”

            The only positive spots on this mental map will be provided by Protestant denominations, such as Baptists and Pentecostals who “most likely will be the most united and organized” and thus the largest, far larger than the Orthodox.

All But Three Non-Russian Languages in Russian Federation have Fewer Speakers Now than They did when Putin Came to Power, ‘To Be Exact’ Reports

 Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 21 – Speakers of non-Russian languages in Russia have declined in number across the board over the last two decades, the period of Vladimir Putin’s time in power; and they are set to fall still further given the Kremlin leader’s hostility toward them and the accompanying dramatic falloffs in the number of instructors in these languages.

            According to statistics from the last two Russian censuses in 2010 and 2020/21 gathered by the To Be Exact portal, only three non-Russian languages showed an increase in the number of speakers during that period – Chechen, Tuvin and Tat (tochno.st/materials/v-respublikakh-rossii-bolshe-30-yazykov-kotorye-mogli-by-ispolzovatsya-naravne-s-russkim-no-mnogie-iz-nikh-perezhivayut-upadok-rasskazyvaem-pochemu-tak-proiskhodit).

            The greatest declines were among the Finno-Ugric peoples where the number of speakers between the two censuses fell 40 percent or more. The worse case was that of the Karelians, who saw the number of their language’s speaker fall by 74 percent. Karelian is the only titular language of a non-Russian republic that does not have any official status.

            Since 2005, linguists say, Putin has been promoting the use of Russian and doing what he can to discourage and finally block non-Russians from studying their own languages, first and foremost outside the republics where they are titular peoples but increasingly within the non-Russian republics as well.

            In some cases, instruction in non-Russian languages has come to a complete end, To Be Exact reports. “If in 2016, 5,000 children of all age groups under 18 studied Kalmyk but five years later, in 2021, there did not remain a single student doing so. The same thing happened with Tat, Ingush, Khakass, Altay, Chechen and Adygey.”

            Even where such instruction did not end, the number of pupils studying in these languages fell dramatically. In 2016, 293,000 pupils studied in languages other than Russian; but in 2022, only 186,000 did so. And this trend is almost certain to continue because of radical declines in the number of teachers.

            In 2009, there were 22,000 teachers using non-Russian languages; but in 2020, there were only 16,000.

            Putin and some analysts see this as a natural and even positive development, but some experts are warning about a backlash. Shlomo Veber of Moscow’s Russian School of Economics says that this suppression of non-Russian languages isn’t reducing secessionist sentiments as Putin imagines but producing them.

            That is because the non-Russians are learning that as far as their government is concerned, they are second class citizens and their languages are fated to disappear. Those who don’t want that outcome are thus increasingly thinking about leaving, exactly the opposite outcome the Kremlin would like to see.

Sunday, July 23, 2023

Russians See Their Pay Fall as They Approach Pension Age, Often to Levels Close to Those at the Start of Their Careers, New HSE Study Finds

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 20 – In most developed countries, the pay of workers rises with time as they acquire more experience; but according to a new study by two HSE scholars, the situation in Russia is different: there, pay declines at the end of the working lives of individuals, and “the level of pay just before pension age turns out to be no higher” at the end than when they began.

            In an article in the latest issue of the Journal of Comparative Economics, Yevgeniya Chernina and Vladimir Gimpelson describe this as “the Russian puzzle” and discuss why the situation in Russia is so different (sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0147596723000057; discussed in Russian at iq.hse.ru/news/847424929.html).

            Their explanation and the evidence they provide gives real substance to what many have assumed without the kind of proof that is usually required. The two authors say that three factors affect wages: experience, the age cohort from which one emerges, and changes over time in the economy.

            In most developed economy, experience trumps the other two because the economy changes relatively slowly and consequently initial training, something captured by the cohorts of workers, has much less of an impact. But in transitional economies, those trained in the old ways find themselves falling behind those trained after the initial changes are made.

            In the Russian Federation, those trained before 1991 are now at the end of their working lives. They acquired skills and habits that allowed them to succeed in the old system but not the new one. And so they are falling behind younger workers trained later. As a result, their contribution to output has declined relatively and their wages as well.

            Chernina and Gimpelson conclude that under Russian conditions, the cohort effect reduces the effect of experience after workers reach the middle of their working careers. This is reflected in what they describe as “the massive aging of the human capital of workers of the older cohorts” relative to those in younger age groups.

            The two say that their work is the first study to analyze the impact of experience, periodization and cohorts on wages in the Russian Federation and conclude that “the correct interpretation of the salary-experience profile lies in the age-period-cohort problem” when the three factors are mixed together. 

            Their work lays the foundation for addressing larger questions about attitudes among the pre-pensioner population and about tensions between age groups in the work force, tensions that may be very different than those in other countries.   

Tatar who Emigrated to France Uses Cartoons to Tell How She Became More Tatar as a Result

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 21 – Earlier this year, the Horizontal Russia 7x7 portal launched a project on “the non-Russian world” in which non-Russians have used various means to tell about their experiences and how they have made them more or less attached to the nation of their birth. The latest offering is especially striking.

            Entitled “How the Tatar Girl Rezeda Came to Recognize Her Lack of Similarity to Russians,” her offering consists of a series of seven cartoon illustrations with accompanying text that show how this process occurred (semnasem.org/articles/2023/07/21/nerusskij-mir-kak-tatarka-rezeda-osoznala-svoyu-nepohozhest-na-russkih).

            Below are the texts accompanying these drawings:

·       I was born and grew up in Tatarstan. As children, my brother and I spoke a mixture of Tatar and Russia which infuriated our parents. They tried to teach us to speak pure Tatar.

·       As a pupil, I began to speak Russian more often because I read a lot and there were more interesting books in Russian than in Tatar, for example, Harry Potter. 

·      

At university, Tatars sometimes spoke Tatar. Russian-speaking students invariably intervened and told us to speak Russian even if they weren’t taking part in the conversations. At times this was offensive.

·       My brother told me that because of his name, he had difficulties finding an apartment in St. Petersburg. But to me Russians, thinking that they were giving me a compliment, said that I didn’t look like a native Tatar.

·      

I began thinking about my identity after I moved to France. There, few know about Tatarstan: they think it is one of the countries of the former USSR. In the French language, there is no word for non-ethnic Russian; there is only russe which is close to russky. I am uncomfortable calling myself russe.

·       Longing for my native culture, I became more interested in it” and focused on stories in Tatar.

·       I like telling the French about the Tatars.  

The use of such cartoons is a very serious matter because it helps those who encounter them understand how identity develops and how efforts to suppress or ignore it often play the largest roles in promoting it.

Russian Regions Failing to Meet Quotas for Volunteers to Serve as Professional Soldiers, ‘NeMoskva’ Reports

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 21 – Moscow is counting on poverty and patriotism to lead more young people to sign up as professional soldiers, but neither factor is working, the NeMoskva portal says, with officials in numerous regions reporting that they have been unable to meet the quotas Moscow has assigned to them.

            According to the portal, which focuses on news from beyond the ring road, such shortfalls in recruiting have occurred in Irkutsk Oblast, the Khanty-Mansiisk AD, and Bashkortostan, a trend that likely extends to other federal subjects across Russia  (nemoskva.net/v-regionah-rossii-ne-hvataet-kontraktnikov/)

            In the case of Bashkortostan, the officials were able to recruit only half of the number of men that Moscow had ordered to be sent to the Russian army as professional soldiers during March and April. Such shortfalls will make it ever more difficult for Moscow to compensate for combat losses in Ukraine.

Russia Being ‘Occupied’ by Migrant Workers and Must Save Itself by Leaving the CIS, Vetoshkin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 21 – Migrant workers are flooding into Russia, bringing with them crime and undermining the Russian nation, Sergey Vetoshkin says. Indeed, they are effectively “occupying” Russia with Moscow’s consent. “The first step to the de-occupation of our country must be the disbanding of the CIS which has exhausted itself.”

            The Russian commentator blames the Commonwealth of Independent States for Russia’s demographic crisis because it has allowed the authorities to assume that the decline of the Russian nation can be compensated for by allowing migrant workers to enter and remain in the country (svpressa.ru/blogs/article/380740/).

            But he argues that “the artificial formation of the CIS has become obsolete. If after the collapse of the USSR, it was a kind of psychological defense and a weak attempt to reserve the memory of the past and even cling to it, now, it has acquired the character of a parasite on the body of Russia.”

            “The republics of the former Soviet Union,” Vetoshkin says, “are using the CIS to impose their national interests on Russia, to drain its economic resources … and in this way, our national development is fettered and our economic opportunities are being squandered” with others getting the benefits.

            According to the commentator, “Russia’s withdrawal from the CIS or the dissolution of this entity will give our country the chance to build relations with each former republic on the basis of our interests and not theirs and allow us to plan our development without looking back to the past.”

            “Its time to let the former republics of the USSR float away, to get rid of this ballast.”

 

War in Ukraine Pushing North Caucasians from Interest in Federalism to Backing Independence, Yevloyeva Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 20 – Non-Russians in the North Caucasus and especially in its eastern half have shifted their positions since the start of Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine, Izabella Yevloyeva says. Before February 2022, most were interested in greater autonomy and federalism; now, ever more of them believe that independence is the only way forward and that it is possible.

            Yevloyeva, the founding editor of the independent Ingushetia portal Fortanga, reaches that conclusion after surveying the opinions of experts about attitudes across the North Caucasus (kavkazr.com/a/hotyat-li-kavkaztsy-nezavisimosti-voyna-v-ukraine-i-dekolonizatsiya-v-rossii/32501825.html).

            Saykhan Muzayev of the émigré Chechen movement United Force, says that Chechens and others now understand that Moscow is weakening because of the war in Ukraine and that they have a far better chance to pursue independence than they did as recently as only two years ago.

            Those Chechens committed to independence now want “almost the same thing” that the Icherkia movement in the 1990s wanted, namely an independent state that would be “part of the global community.” And people like him are convinced, Musayev adds, that this goal is achievable if the right tactics are adopted.

            Ruslan Iouloy of the Committee of Ingush Independence says that no nation wants to live in subordination to another, particularly in one where the dominant nationality treats the others as second-class citizens or worse. The Ingush today see that they are an occupied people and they want out.

            Davur Dordzhiyev of the Congress of the Oyrat-Kalmyk People and the League of Free Nations, says that in the past those who wanted independence were very much  marginal figures but since the war in Ukraine began, they now find themselves “in the mainstream” of public opinion. That is what the war in Ukraine has achieved.

            Prague-based commentator Vadim Sidorov says that it is difficult to know exactly how widespread such views are because of Moscow’s repression and the absence of public opinion polling. “On the territory of Russia,” he points out, “it is impossible even now to openly speak about de-colonization.

            But increasing numbers of people in many non-Russian nations are increasingly interested in defending their languages and cultures and this is becoming “’a breeding ground’ for the development’” of attitudes which support independence. This is most true in the eastern portion of the North Caucasus but less in the west where the situation is more complicated.

            Non-Russians have long recognized that Moscow’s policy is a colonial one, but the war in Ukraine has changed one important dimension with regard to that. Russian behavior in Ukraine has shown the world that Russia is an imperial state and so non-Russians now feel they have allies and support in the West, Yevloyeva concludes.