Putin has Far More Reason than His Predecessors to Want Russians to Forget Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, ‘RusMonitor’ Says

 Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 23 – Eighty-four years ago, the Soviet and Nazi regimes signedwhat became known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact whose public pledges of non-aggression opened the way for World War II and whose secret protocols allowed Stalin to occupy the Baltic countries as well as western Belarus and western Ukraine and portions of Moldova.

            Stalin and his Soviet successors tried to conceal the pact as such and especially its secret protocols. But after the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the Russian authorities acknowledged that the pact was illegal and condemned it and its secret protocol (rusmonitor.com/pochemu-rossiya-hochet-zabyt-o-pakte-molotova-ribbentropa.html).

            But with the rise of Vladimir Putin, things changed again. Putin initially denied its existence and then argued it was a forced measure who had no other option given Western betrayal at Munich. Throughout, the Kremlin leader insisted that what had happened was an ordinary act of diplomacy which had no relation at all to the start of World War II.

            According to the editors of RusMonitor, Putin wanted Russians to forget about the pact primarily because its existence undercut his “cult of ‘the great victory” in the war. He also has sought to justify his own “aggressive policies” toward Russia’s neighbors and to convince the world that Russia “has the right to spheres of influence.

            In addition, Putin wants to distract attention from domestic problems and has a long tradition of saying anything, including outright falsehoods and dishonest denials, that he believes will help him achieve his personal goals.

            One aspect of the situation that neither RusMonitor nor Putin talk much about is that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact played a key role in saving the Soviet state, not because it put Moscow’s western borders further west than they were than because of what happened in Tokyo when the Japanese learned of the pact.

            Then, the pro-war government of Japan which had agreed to attack the Soviet Union when Hitler did fell and was succeeded by one that chose to attack south and east instead, against China and the US. Had the earlier government not fallen and had Japan invaded Siberia when Hitler invaded the USSR, the result on the eastern front might have been very different indeed. 

Russian Officials Likely to Quote Putin as Soviet Ones Did Lenin Rather than Come Up with a Clearly Defined State Ideology, Barbashin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 20 – Many in Russia want and many in the West expect that eventually Moscow will define a state ideology for the Russian Federation, but Anton Barbashin, the editor of the Riddle portal argues, that “any proper formulation of an official ‘state ideology’ won’t be likely to take place.”

            The reason is simple: coming up with such a formulation would “require giving definitive answers to questions that the Kremlin would very much prefer to remain vaguely defined,” he argues. Instead, Russian officials will “quote President Putin just as their Soviet predecessors did Lenin” before 1991 (ridl.io/ru/putin-tsivilizatsiya/).

            Given that Putin has taken a variety of positions, that lack of a codification of a state ideology will allow him and his followers the same kind of flexibility or even greater freedom of action than was the case with Soviet officials who often found it necessary to explore Lenin’s works to find a justification for what they wanted to do.

            One new feature of this situation, however, is that Putin and other officials will frequently put out new ideas that allow them new possibilities to find justification. Among these, Barbashin argues, is the idea of Russia as a state-civilization (russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/gosudarstvo-tsivilizatsiya-i-politicheskaya-teoriya/?sphrase_id=103528484).

            As the political scientist-editor shows, the Kremlin and its supporters have not offered “any straightforward definition of ‘state-civilization’” but instead have provided “plenty of hints” that allow various people to read various things into it and that permits Putin to stress now one and now another of these.

Ukraine Fighting Not Only Against Russian Invaders but Against Westerners who Would Welcome a New Cold War, Pastukhov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 20 – Ukraine’s decision to continue to fight until Russia is defeated and perhaps dismembered brings it into diplomatic conflict with the United States which has already achieved its “main goals” in this conflict and would not oppose the appearance of a new cold war given that it would inevitably win that conflict as it did the first one, Vladimir Pastukhov says.

            “Unlike Ukraine,” the London-based Russian analyst says, “the US continues to tacitly adhere to its longstanding concept of ‘the containment of Russia.’” That concept “doesn’t imply the destruction of Russia as a political goal” and helps to explain Washington’s dose by dose supply of assistance to Kyiv (echofm.online/opinions/politicheskaya-konfiguracziya-voennogo-konflikta-v-ukraine).

            According to Pastukhov, “the US in principle has already achieved its main goals in the current conflict: Ukraine has been preserved as a state and is firmly integrated into the West’s security system as its outpost on the border of ‘the steppe.’” As a result, the West and others as well are “ready for a new ‘cold war’ with a Berlin wall somewhere along the Dniepr.”

            “Everyone except Kyiv,” which has larger goals. And despite the arguments of those that Ukraine can’t do so without the continued assistance of the West, it is entirely possible that Kyiv can continue the fight for some time, underscoring the new reality that “in this situation, it is the case that not only is Ukraine dependent on the US but the US and its allies depends on Ukraine.”

            Pastukhov argues that today “Kyiv is thus waging a war on two fronts. The obvious military one, and the less obvious diplomatic one with the US and its allies in Europe. The purposes of this second one is to prevent a separate agreement between Russia and the US to return to the conditions of the Cold War with ‘a partition of Ukraine.’”

            That would recall the situation after Yalta in which the Baltic countries and much of Eastern Europe came under Moscow’s rule; and consequently, “it isn’t a surprise that the Baltic countries and most of the countries of Eastern Europe are today the only consistent allies of Ukraine, backings its pursuit of a war to a victorious end.”

            “In a sense,” Pastukhov says, “Ukraine today is fighting against everyone who is gradually moving toward a consensus in favor of freezing the conflict.” Kyiv has countered with both people to people diplomacy and employing its military against Russia before it received new aircraft from the West rather than after.

            That doesn’t make sense with regard to Ukraine’s conflict with Russia but it does concerning its diplomatic confrontation with the West, Pastukhov suggests.

 

Non-Russians who have Fled Authoritarianism at Home May Soon Get Jaakson-Style Passports from Exile Governments

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 20 – Between 1940 when the Soviet occupation of Estonia began and 1991 when that Baltic nation’s de facto independence was recovered, Ernst Jaakson, the Estonian consul in New York issued to Estonians living abroad documents which became known as Jaakson passports that were recognized by many countries as travel documents.

            Mr. Jaakson who became Estonia’s first ambassador to the United States after 1991 used a supply of passports left over from the pre-1940 Estonian government. And many Estonians proudly retained those documents both then and even after 1991. Neighboring Latvia had a similar but less widely used system.

            Now, officials in the Belarusian government abroad consisting of those loyal to Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, who won the last presidential election in her homeland but was prevented from taking office by authoritarian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka are considering issuing analogous passports to Belarusians who have moved abroad and whose “Minsk” passports are expiring.

            Other non-Russian movements are considering doing the same thing, believing that the possession of such documents will help mobilize their co-nationals living abroad to oppose the dictators and occupiers at home (idel-ural.org/archives/alternativnyj-naczionalnyj-pasport-belarusi/#more-20834).

Russians Say They’re Not Interested in Putin’s Yacht but They would Like to See His Coffin

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 20 – The Russian media have been talking a lot about Vladimir Putin’s personal yacht. But many Russians say according to the latest anecdote circulating in Moscow, they aren’t much interested in that subject. What they are really interested in and would like to see, they maintain, is his coffin,

            Among the other anecdotes collected by Moscow journalist Tatyana Pushkaryova (publizist.ru/blogs/107374/46616/-) are the following:

·       Russian media are making much of the World Bank report that as measured by PPP, the Russian Federation now has the fifth largest economy in the world. What the outlets aren’t talking about is that Russia is the uncontested world leader in terms of the number of lies.

·       Life has become so much better in Russia that its residents boosted their indebtedness by 100 billion rubles (one billion US dollars) in the last year to pay for it.

·       Russians need a television and a lot of vodka to know just how wonderful their lives are.

·       The end of the world won’t come to Russia; instead, those behind that will flee Russia as fast as they can.

·       The Russian government has tripled its spending on patriotic education. It hasn’t said how much more is being spent on baby food.

Resistance Movement for Sakha Independence Issues Programmatic Declaration

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 20 – Earlier this month, in the wake of the Tokyo Forum of Peoples of Post-Russia, national activists in Sakha (Yakutia) met in secret to create a committee to press for the independence of their republic (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/08/sakha-activists-meet-in-secret-to-plan.html).

            Initial reports were necessarily sketchy (t.me/freeyakutiafoundation/3276 and abn.org.ua/en/liberation-movements/hey-will-seek-the-independence-of-the-region-a-secret-congress-was-held-in-yakutia-to-secede-from-russia/), but now the group has issued a programmatic document.

As posted online by ABN Correspondence (abn.org.ua/en/documents/saha-independence-movement-resistance/), the declaration reads as follows:

For four centuries now, our Sakha Republic has been a colony of Moscow, our people have been enslaved by Russia against their will, our resources have been plundered, our nature has been trampled on.
Now, during the military aggression of the Kremlin criminals against the free people of Ukraine, our men are being used in a deadly conflict, depriving our families, our people of a bright future.
It’s time to put an end to this, secede from the Russian Federation and become an independent democratic state.
To achieve this, I, Raisa Zubareva, together with my like-minded people, organized the Resistance Movement for the Independence of Sakha.
Our task:
– to wage an uncompromising struggle against the Kremlin regime, regardless of who will lead it, until victory.
Our goal:
– achieve the independence of the Sakha Republic, return power to its citizens on their own land.
Our principles
1. Any citizen of the Republic of Sakha, regardless of nationality, can become a participant in the movement.
Anyone who shares the goals and principles of the Movement and acts in their defense can consider himself a part of the Movement.
2. Strategy is centralized, tactics are decentralized
We are creating an operational headquarters that will determine the strategic priorities of the Movement.
Representatives of various already well-known republican opposition initiatives can enter the operational headquarters.
Movement members can perform tasks autonomously.
3. Each participant in the movement independently determines the acceptable course of action
To achieve the goals of the Movement, any action is welcomed that is not aimed at intentionally causing harm to the life and health of civilians of the Republic of Sakha. The right to self-defence is guaranteed by law.

            Were Sakha to gain independence, it would be a country larger than all of the EU states put together and would be enormously rich in natural resources ranging from diamonds and coal to rare earth minerals. However, its small population – just under one million -- and its lack of a port on the Pacific – make the attainment of that goal difficult.

            But before dismissing this possibility out of hand, two things should be kept in mind. On the one hand, foreign countries like China have a serious interest in gaining exclusive access to the natural resources of Sakha and might provide support (https://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/06/chinese-analysts-say-sakha-wants.html).

            And on the other, it should be remembered that the Soviets took many years to establish effective control over this distant and far-flung land and that the numerically small peoples have enormous resources to resist and then promote their goals, as was classically outlined in Russian émigré writer Edward Topol’s 1986 novel, Red Snow.

Compared to Original, Putin’s Neo-Stalinism ‘Much More Politically Flexible,’ Dobrenko Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 22 – Putin’s neo-Stalinism resembles its namesake in many ways, but it is “much more politically flexible” and demonstrates “an extreme and demonstrated legal pragmatism” far in excess of the original, according to Yevgeny Dobrenko, a Russian study of Stalinism based at a Venetian university.

            “Like Stalinism,” he says, “neo-Stalinism operates not so much on economic, political or military institutions as on the secret policy. But if in Stalinism, this foundation was its chief secret, under conditions of present-day Russia, the deep state in the form of the secret police is in the forefront politically” (svoboda.org/a/znakomjtesj-neostalinizm-evgeniy-dobrenko-o-vernuvsheysya-epohe/32553565.html).

            This foundation is not mediated with any special “ideological or political” vision, Dobrenko says. But like Stalinism, neo-Stalinism draws on nationalism and imperialism, even though in Stalinism these were combined with Marxism and its concern with the future while in neo-Stalinism, they are all about the past as the key to the future.

            This difference, the scholar says, affects Moscow’s ability to reach out to others. Stalin could appeal to the left generally because he presented himself as a harbinger of chances that the left wanted; Putin has no such opportunity but must instead appeal to marginal groups in the hopes that they will become mainstream.

            To put this in the most lapidary terms, Dobrenko continues, the Stalinist slogan was “never again” while the neo-Stalinist one is “we can repeat what we did.” And “the chief subject of Stalinism was ‘scientific communism,’ a doctrine about the future,” while for neo-Stalinism, it is the idea that “the Russia of the future is the Russia of the past.”

            Another major difference between the two is that Stalinism like other 20^th century totalitarian ideologies was a mobilizational ideology, “neo-Stalinism is an ideology founded on the de-politicalization of the population” which plays on popular resentments rather than commitments to broader goals.

            In addition, Stalinism was statist. Stalin was a bureaucrat, Dobrenko says, and he elevated the state to unprecedented heights. Neo-Stalinism in contract deprives the state “of all those functions which in Soviet times were marked in a socially positive way.” Now, there is the leader and the people: the state has been dethroned as an entity.

            Stalinism suppressed corruption while neo-Stalinism has made it a systemic element. And all these things rest on broader realities: in Stalin’s time, people believed; but under Putin, few if any do. His listeners know he is lying, “and he knows that his listeners know that he is doing so. Stalin could only dream of such an intimate contact with his audience.

            What makes neo-Stalinism stand out from other “neo-“ ideologies and practices is that it is deeply rooted “in the Russian authoritarian tradition and Russian imperial history. It is too national; and therefore, in part, Russia is practically in complete isolation in the present-day world.”

            “As one can see,” Dobrenko concludes, “the structure of power in contemporary Russia grew out of the political philosophy of Stalin. That isn’t surprising: Stalin was the father of the Soviet nation,” and those who came out of that environment had no other place to learn how to think and behave.

            But at the same time, “neo-Stalinism isn’t ‘the ideological kasha’ many view it as. Instead, it is a completely systemic adaptation of Stalinism to post-Soviet political reality.”