Ad Hoc International Tribunal Least Problematic Way to Prosecute Russian Aggression, Tsybulenko and Rinta-Pollari Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Dec. 24 – Political leaders and legal experts around the world are debating what forum would be the most useful for trying Russian leaders for engaging in aggression in Ukraine. Two leading specialists say that the least problematic way would be the creation of an ad hoc international tribunal.

            Yevhen Tsybulenko, a Ukrainian scholar, and Henna Rinta-Pollari, a Finnish jurist, make this argument in a new article, “Legal Challenges in Prosecuting the Crime of Aggression in the Russo-Ukrainian War,” Review of Central and East European Law, 48 (3-4) (2023): 319-350 at https://brill.com/view/journals/rela/48/3-4/article-p319_003.xml.

            They reach that conclusion after examining the problems involved with other proposed solutions and suggest that while an ad hoc arrangement is not ideal, it is almost certainly on balance the best one.

            Tsybulenko and Rina-Pollari note that “neither Russia nor Ukraine are Member States of the Rome Statute, which established the International Criminal Court,” and thus have not committed themselves to having a crime like aggression transferred to its jurisdiction for final judgment.

            Creating nationally based courts also presents problems. On the one hand, there is the question of immunity, something especially troubling because “the crime of aggression … is regarded to be a leadership crime.” And on the other, the Ukrainian constitution explicitly prohibits the adoption of such courts.

            An international ad hoc tribunal would avoid these problems and could be established “either through a treaty signed by the United Nations and Ukraine on the basis of a referral from the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Secretary-General or a multilateral treaty between Ukraine and other states supported by the United Nations.”

            They argue that “despite the fact that none of the analyzed methods of prosecuting the crime are perfect, the most appropriate approach in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian war would be to establish an international ad hoc tribunal” either through a UN treaty or a multilateral treaty between Ukraine and other states with the former the more practical. 

Putin Will Seek to Trigger More Local Wars to Weaken the West, Portnikov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Dec. 24 – Like his Chinese allies, Vladimir Putin sees the rapid multiplication of military conflicts around the world as an essential element of his plan to weaken the West by dividing the attention of Western leaders and distracting their focus on his own aggressive behavior, Vitaly Portnikov says.

            The war in the Middle East is a clear example both of how such wars have that effect as far as Putin is concerned and other conflicts in Asia, Africa and Latin America are pieces cut from the same cloth, the Ukrainian commentator says (censoru.net/2023/12/23/2024-god-budet-godom-novyh-lokalnyh-vojn-gde-ih-ozhidat-dalshe.html).

            Unless that Putin strategy is recognized and opposed, Portnikov continues, there is a very real risk that multiple conflicts will give the Kremlin leader even more of an undeserved advantage than his constant talk about the risk that the war in Ukraine could grow into a nuclear conflict unless the West backs down. 

Russia Will Not Fall Apart the Way the USSR Did Because It is Not the Same Country, Inozemtsev Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Dec. 26 – Like generals who make the mistake of fighting the last war rather than the present one, many in Russia and the West like to suggest that the Russian Federation will fall apart the way the USSR did; but Vladislav Inozemtsev argues that there are at least four compelling reasons why that is unlikely – and may even be impossible.

            First of all, the Russian economist and commentator says, there was little private property in Soviet times but a great deal of it. “People do not understand that under authoritarian rule, property becomes the chief factor suppressing any desire to resist and strengthens the desire of the upper class to defend itself” (moscowtimes.ru/2023/12/26/segodnya-ne-vchera-a117209).

            “Where freedom is deeply rooted, property becomes its guarantee,” Inozemtsesv says; but “where it is something new, property becomes perhaps the best means of enslavement. Therefore, we have not seen and will not see millions of people coming out to demonstrate against the regime in today’s Russia.”

            Second, the commentator continues, those who argue that the population of the Soviet Union was demanding freedom rather than sausage are profoundly mistaken. The Soviet government couldn’t provide an adequate supply of goods for its population, and people wanted to get rid of the system to get the goods as it were.

            “Now,” Inozemtsev says, “there is no such irritant: the lack of money among part of the population is not the same as the lack of goods in all the stores. The second indicates the failure of the system; the first only the failure of its individual cogs.” Consequently, there may be demands for redistribution of money but not the end of the system as such.

            Third, at the end of the USSR, ethnic Russians formed just over 50 percent of the population and their share was declining. Moreover, the USSR was “multinational and many peoples had memories of independence” and even were encouraged to maintain their national identities by the system.

            As a result, “it was the national liberation movement that became the most important factor in the collapse of the USSR as one of the great European colonial empires.” But the situation of the Russian Federation is “fundamentally different,” Inozemtsev says. Russians form a far larger share, and the identities of the others are being “deliberately eradicated.”

            According to him, “practically no territory has the possibility of a successful independent existence” and “the outside world fears the collapse of Russia much more than it feared the collapse of the USSR. That factor is almost absent now and won’t re-appear anytime in the near future.”

            And fourth, “the USSR was undermined by the understanding that everyone in it was in a single “camp” from which “escape” was impossible, a sense that created an irresistible urge to destroy the system from which there was no way for an individual to leave.” Few besides Jews and Germans did. But today the situation is fundamentally different in this regard as well.

            “The borders are open despite all the problems this creates for the powers, and this constant release of steam makes an explosion of the pressure cooking almost impossible,” Inozemtsev says. “The USSR was destroyed by several million actively dissatisfied people, and not at all by the majority of the population.”

            But now, “during Putin’s reign alone, many more people have left Russia than the total number of those who took part in at least some protest actions during perestroika,” he says. “Their picketing of Russian missions abroad … their forums and conferences do not concern anyone at all now.”

            As a result, what happened in the 1980s can’t be reproduced, “and analogies with that time are meaningless, although of course, they are very beautiful and won’t be removed from the agenda of those who lived then.” But precisely for that reason, “these people will not produce a new wave of change” in the Russian Federation.

US Expands Arctic Shelf Claims, Likely Sparking Expanded Conflict with Russia

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Dec. 24 – Following a UN commission decision on the basis for countries to make claims on the undersea shelfs (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/02/un-clcs-accepts-russias-documentation.html) and reflecting Russia’s current inability to back up its claims by actions in the Arctic (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/12/ukrainian-war-and-western-sanctions.html), the US had expanded its claims on the Arctic seabed.

            The State Department announced that Washington was expanding its claims in the region by 520,400 square kilometers as part of approximately a million square kilometers of expanded claims on oceans adjoining the land borders of the US (state.gov/announcement-of-u-s-extended-continental-shelf-outer-limits/).

            That puts the US in conflict with other Arctic powers who are also following the UN commission finding but above all with the Russian Federation which has made the most expansive claims to undersea territories that are extremely rich in oil, gas, minerals, and rare earth minerals (bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-12-22/us-claims-huge-chunk-of-seabed-amid-strategic-push-for-resources).

            Moscow commentators are outraged arguing that what the US has done sets the stage for an expanded military confrontation between east and west in the north (stoletie.ru/lenta/ssha_objavili_o_rasshirenii_kontinentalnogo_shelfa_v_arktike_676.htm, svpressa.ru/politic/article/399549/, regnum.ru/article/3855546, ehorussia.com/new/node/30194 and moscowtimes.ru/2023/12/24/ssha-rasshirili-kontinentalnii-shelf-varktike-vzone-pretenzii-rossii-a117064).

            Among the reasons this conflict is likely to go beyond the diplomatic and possibly quite soon is that the UN body that rules on such competing claims was established by the Law of the Sea accord that all Arctic powers except the United States have agreed to. The US has signed but not ratified that treaty.

            In 2022, Moscow announced it would push for a resolution of disputes about the Arctic seabed at the UN and will continue to do so (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/08/moscow-plans-new-push-for-un.html). But faced with this US move, the Russian government may feel empowered to use other means given that Washington is not part of the LOS process.

Despite Drama, Russia Remains at the End of 2023 Much as It was at the Start of the Year, Shaburov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Dec. 24 – Despite the expectations of many that 2023 would bring radical changes to Russia and a surfeit of events that seemed in each case to give support to that view, the country remains more or less where it was at the start of this year now that 2023 is coming to an end, Aleksey Shaburov says.

            That is the case both in foreign and in domestic affairs, the Yekaterinburg commentator says, with the situation in Ukraine and in relations with the West not fundamentally changed over the last 12 months and with that inside Russia more or less the same as well (politsovet.ru/79544-vse-ostalos-kak-bylo-politicheskie-itogi-2023-goda.html).

            In Ukraine, he writes, “the sides remain where they were.” To be sure that is to the advantage of Russia, “but this is to a large degree potential rather than real. In reality, everything stands approximately where it was a year ago.” And the same thing is true inside the Russian Federation as well.

            There, the year began with fears of mobilization, but that didn’t happen; and what was “the main political event” domestically, the Prigozhin revolt, while it attracted much speculation about how it would change the political situation in the country, ended with everything more or less in place and Prigozhin and his core team dead.

            This continuity was highlighted at the end of the year when Vladimir Putin, as expected announced that he would indeed run for president in 2024, thus ending for all time talk about “the 2024 problem” or “transit.” Instead, this all shows that “there is no transit and cannot be and that too is an important result.”

            This same lack of fundamental change extended to the economy. It held out and there was neither a breakthrough or a catastrophe, both of which had been widely predicted albeit by different groups of people, Shaburov says. But it also means that next year is likely to be a time of more radical changes.

            The Putin regime will certainly feel it has an even freer hand after it collects its latest electoral victory, and at the very least, there will be changes in the government given that the president will then accept the resignations of the cabinet and appoint at least potentially some new people. And because of elections in the US and the UK, there will be changes abroad too.

            Summing up, Shaburov suggests, 2023 was “in a sense one large ‘operational pause.” But “like any pause, this can’t last forever” – and it is likely to come to an end in 2024.

Russian Courts Treating Criminals Kremlin Pardoned to Fight in Ukraine Leniently if They Commit New Crimes on Returning Home, ‘Verstka’ Investigation Finds

Paul Goble

Staunton, Dec. 24 – Many Russians, disturbed by the fact that some of the 50,000 criminals the Russian government pardoned to get them to fight in Ukraine are committing new crimes on their return home, now have a new reason for worry: Russian courts are treating such people far more leniently than they are treating other violators of the law.

That is the conclusion the Vertska news portal has reached on the basis of an investigation into what is happened to such people after they return. The portal has examined both news reports and court cases where these are available (verstka.media/kak-pomilovannye-vagnerovcy-snova-sovershayut-prestupleniya-no-ne-vsegda-vozvraschayutsia-v-tyurmu).

It says judges are inclined to give these veterans shorter times in prison than they give non-veterans or even to give them suspended sentences. To the extent that this conclusion is true across the country, that means that the Putin regime is in effect promoting the criminalization of Russia in yet another way.

And that may come back to haunt Russia’s rulers because many people in that country are already angry about the way in which those who committed crimes earlier are now being treated as heroes by the regime. If the population sees that on their return, such individuals can literally get away with murder in this way, that will undermine support for the system.

More than 90 Percent of Russian Firms Face Problems with Shortage of Workers, Sparking Inflation and Threatening Economic Growth, Moscow Experts Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Dec. 23 – Ninety-one percent of Russian firms now face difficulties in hiring enough workers, something that is leading many of them to boost wages in the hopes of attracting the cadres they need, according to Moscow economists. That in turn is threatening inflation and future economic growth.

            At the end of November, Russian Central Bank chief Elvira Nabiullina called this growing shortage of workers “the main problem” of the Russian economy at the present time. Other experts agree (iz.ru/1624816/mariia-stroiteleva/kak-zhe-bez-ruk-defitcit-rabotnikov-v-2023-godu-sostavil-48-mln).

            In addition to the threat of inflation and low growth that this worker shortage poses, it also makes it more difficult for the Russian economy, in response to sanctions, to engage in import substitution. There simply aren’t the workers needed to allow firms to change direction during this crisis, Moscow economists say.

            An additional influx of migrant workers might help solve this bottleneck in some parts of the economy, but anger about immigrants even at a time when their numbers are falling reduces the chances that the solution to this shortage can be found there. And the Kremlin’s continuing demand for men to fight in Ukraine will only intensify it (tochno.st/materials/v-2023-godu-pritok-migrantov-v-rossiiu-upal-do-minimalnyx-znacenii-eto-mozet-stat-uze-cetvertoi-volnoi-spada-migracii-s-konca-2000-x-no-poka-ona-mense-cem-ozidalos).