Window on Eurasia: More Ethnic Russians are Converting to Islam and a Few are Becoming Terrorists

Paul Goble

            Staunton, January 2 – Official identification of one of the terrorist bombers in Volgograd as an ethnic Russian from Mari El who converted to Islam and fought on the side of the militants in Daghestan has attracted attention to a trend that most Russians have been reluctant to discuss: the growing number of ethnic Russian converts to Islam and the extremism of some of them.

            Until relatively recently, few ethnic Russians converted to Islam, and indeed the numbers involved even now are relatively small.  In the past, converts tended to be among women who married Muslim men rather than members of both sexes who converted out of conviction or for ideological reasons.

            But the numbers of such converts are rising, with estimates running as high as 100,000 being offered.  Nonetheless, discussions of this phenomenon have been relatively infrequent for three reasons.  First, ethnic Russians see such conversions as further evidence of the weakness of their identity and a direct threat that some of their number will now assimilate to other peoples.

            Second, both Russian Orthodox and Muslim groups have usually opposed conversion in either direction, viewing it as something that undermines the mutually re-enforcing nature of ethnicity and religion and as a challenge to their authority given that converts often display a  more radical form of the faith than the traditional leaderships want.

            And third, ethnic Russian converts to Islam present a particular challenge to the authorities. On the one hand, such converts in order to prove their bona fides with the members of their new community sometimes feel compelled to engage in radical actions, including acts of violence.

            And on the other, the authorities and many ordinary are terrified of this possibility because ethnic Russian converts to Islam do not stand out the way that many more traditional Muslim groups do and thus can move about without attracting the suspicions that all too often members of traditional Muslim nationalities do.

            The Window on Eurasia series has carried articles on this subject for some time – see, among others,             windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2013/05/window-on-eurasia-mufti-says-ethnic.html,  windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2013/12/window-on-eurasia-kazan-treats.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2013/08/window-on-eurasia-ethnic-russians.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2012/12/window-on-eurasia-islamists-said-coming.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2013/02/window-on-eurasia-russias-muslims.html.

            Most of these stories and others like them were based on materials published outside of Moscow. But now the subject of ethnic Russian conversions to Islam is attracting the attention of Moscow outlets and Western ones as well. Among the most recent in Russia itself is an article carried by Pravda.ru on Tuesday (pravda.ru/society/how/31-12-2013/1187250-terrorizm-0/).

            Noting that ethnic Russian names increasingly appear among the lists of those engaged in terrorism, Pravda.ru asked two experts, Ruslan Kurbanov of the Institute of Oriental Studies and Harun Sidorov, the president of the National Organization of Russian Muslims (NORM), why there has been an influx of “ethnic Russians into the Wahhabi underground?”

            Kurban for his part said that it is “obvious” that the number of ethnic Russian Muslims is “increasing” and that the number of ethnic Russians in the ranks of the militants is going up as well. There are many reasons for the former, but the latter reflects the fact that ethnic Russian Muslims are viewed with suspicion by other Russians and that there are no arrangements made for their adaptation to their community.

            As a result, the orientalist says, such converts feel isolated and alienated from their own community, and “many simply are pulled into radicalism.”  Indeed, given the prejudices against them, it is very difficult for such converts to “remain within the framework of moderate positions.”

            Sidorov largely agreed.  (He subsequently published a full text of his interview with Pravda.ru on Facebook because the Russian outlet had used only a small portion of it.  That fuller text is available at facebook.com/harun.sidorov/posts/10201995678206901. What follows is taken from it.)

Sidorov points out that “a single individual can carry out an explosion in which dozens of people die. If this is repeated several times over the course of a month, everyone will speak about the flood of ethnic Russians into Islamic terrorism, although in fact, [such actions] are carried out by several individuals from among the many tens of thousands of ethnic Russian Muslims.”

According to the NORM leader, the number of ethnic Russian converts to Islam who have been involved in terrorism in fact has fallen in recent years. But some still are, and the question arises: “why are they used in such [actions]?” He suggests that there are three main reasons.

First of all, such people “blend into the crowd.”  Second, using them “inflicts a psychological hit on the opponent” by suggesting to Russians that they are threatened not just by “people from the Caucasus” but by their own.  And third, the use of ethnic Russian converts in such actions increases the alienation of all ethnic Russian Muslims from their society and makes more of them likely to be willing to engage in this way.

That there are ethnic Russian converts to Islam should not surprise or disturb anyone, Sidorov continues.  “Today Russians [because of their number and their opportunities] are to be found everywhere from the Columbian mafia and bordellos of Abu-Dhabi to Buddhist monasteries and the camps of Caucasus militants.” 

Often commentators and government officials forget this.  When North Caucasian militants launch an attack, Russian officials are careful to suggest that most North Caucasians are not involved. But if an ethnic Russian attacks, then “guilt is laid on all ethnic Russian Muslims and no one will support [them],” a pattern that only makes the situation worse.

Ethnic Russians are going to continue to convert to Islam, but none of them will be violent radicals if Russian society treats them with at least as much respect as it says it does the traditionally Muslim nationalities of the country and in fact moves toward “the normalization of Russian-Islamic relations” more generally. 

Given that terrorism is the work of individuals not large groups, Sidorov says, it is probably impossible to prevent it entirely. But it can be kept to a minimum by showing respect to religious communities and having the Russian special services focus on “real terrorists” and no engage in “witch hunts” against ethnic Russians who happen to be Muslims.

Window on Eurasia: Five of the Seven Non-Russian Republics in the North Caucasus Now have Fertility Rates below Replacement Levels

Paul Goble

            Staunton, January 2 – Five of the seven non-Russian republics in the North Caucasus – Chechnya and Ingushetia are the exceptions – now have fertility rates below replacement levels, a remarkable shift in reproductive behavior in less than a generation and one that points to a dramatic slowing of growth and ultimately a decline in many or all of them.

            That the Russian Federation as a whole is suffering a demographic crisis at least in part because of extremely low fertility rates is common ground, Igor Beloborodov, the director of the Moscow Institute of Demographic Research says, but most people assume that the situation of the non-Russians in the North Caucasus is an exception.

            They are wrong, he writes in a new report, because they fail to take into account changes in the demographic situation of the various nations in that region has changed significantly in recent years or to realize that the current trend is likely to continue and affect the Chechens and Ingushes as well (riss.ru/analitika/2508-kavkazskij-demograficheskij-drejf#.UsS3srRcUUM).

            Drawing on data from the Russian Demographic Yearbook for 2012, Beloborodov reports the following fertility rates (number of children per woman per lifetime) for the republics of the North Caucasus. Chechnya with 3.36 and Ingushetia with 2.94 are the only ones above the replacement level of 2.2.

            The other republics currently have much lower rates, higher than the ethnic Russians but much lower than they were in the past and far below replacement levels:  Adygeya – 1.66, Daghestan –1.98, Kabardino-Balkaria –1.69, Karachayevo-Cherkessia – 1.54, and North Osetia – 1.86.

            To get an idea how far below these figures are compared to those in earlier times, Beloborodov gives fertility rates for some of the major nationalities in the region for women born before 1932 and for those born between 1958 and 1958-62. Among the Avars, the rates fell from 3.8 to 2.9, among the Ingush from 5.0 to 3.6, among Cherkess from 3.4 to 2.1, and among the Chechens 4.6 to 3.1.  Among ethnic Russians in the region, the rate fell from 2.1 to 1.75.

            This does not mean that the populations in these republics will fall immediately.  First, all of them still benefit from the much higher fertility rates they had earlier. Consequently, even if the succeeding generation of women has fewer children, there are more women doing so and hence population growth will continue for some time.

            Second, changes in population also reflect changes in mortality rates as well as immigration and emigration.  Because North Caucasians drink less and have healthier lifestyles than many Slavic groups, those who are born do not suffer from the super-high mortality rates of adult males seen among ethnic Russians.

            And third, these figures which are for republic population reflect the demographic behavior of all groups. Chechnya, which is almost exclusively Chechen, is at one end, whereas some of the others which include significant Russian populations are not and thus have their fertility rates affected by that.

            As ethnic Russians continue to leave and the republics become more mono-ethnic, there should be a slight uptick in the fertility rates or at a minimum a slowing of the declines that have been characteristic in recent years.  Moreover, these rates are and will continue to be affected in various ways by out-migration of gastarbeiters to other parts of the Russian Federation.

            In that regard, not only are most migrants young men who move without their families and are likely to have fewer children as a result, but various studies show that migrants are affected in decisions about family size by the populations they are living among, in this case the ethnic Russians.

            The combination of these factors has meant that the total populations of Adygeya, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachayevo-Cherkesia and North Osetia have declined since 2002 and are projected by Russian statisticians over the next several decades and that Daghestan and Chechnya will according to the middle range projections start to decline before 2030.

            These trends show that the peoples of the North Caucasus are part of the general demographic revolution directed toward ever smaller families and are not the outliers that they are normally assumed to be. Nonetheless, they are still growing more or declining less rapidly than the ethnic Russians, a pattern that will lead to changes in the demographic balance.

            More immediately, these trends mean that there is likely to be less demographic pressure for outmigration from the North Caucasus, something that might please many Russian nationalists but a development that would likely mean that Russia would have to draw an increasing number of workers from Central Asia where fertility rates remain higher.

Window on Eurasia: Is the Moscow Patriarchate Seeking a Belarusian ‘Scenario’ for Its Ukrainian Branch?

Paul Goble

            Staunton, January 1 – A Kremlinological reading of recent moves by the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church suggests that Moscow hopes somehow to engineer the replacement of the head of its branch of Orthodoxy in Ukraine, a step intended to bring the Ukrainians to heel but an attempt likely to further alienate it from Moscow.

            On December 25, the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate held a meeting at which it discussed “events in Ukraine and adopted special declaration about them as well as replaced the longtime head of the Russian Orthodox Church in Belarus (patriarchia.ru/db/print/3480916.html).

            A close reading by the “Religion in Ukraine” portal of that document, both what it says and even more what it doesn’t say, suggests that Moscow may seek to replace the top leader of branch of Orthodoxy in Ukraine subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate -- as it recently did in Belarus -- to ensure ideological loyalty (religion.in.ua/main/daycomment/24432-vozmozhen-li-v-ukrainskoj-cerkvi-belorusskij-scenarij.html).

            The editors of “Religion in Ukraine” note that at one level, the Moscow declaration “does not contain anything special.” It reiterates what the Patriarchate has said many times before: “the Ukrainians must not violate the unity of the Russian Church” and “only the moral values of ‘historic Rus’ can give a future to the people of Ukraine.”

            But there are two interesting details about the document, the editors continue.  On the one hand, the declaration makes repeated references to the need to “preserve and strengthen the family,” words that are clearly if not specifically an attack on European liberalism and those who support Ukraine’s rapprochement with the EU.

            And on the other, despite its focus on “the Ukrainian question,” the Moscow declaration contains not a single reference to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church or its leader Metropolitan Vladimir or to the recent statements religious leaders in Ukraine have made about the events there.

            “The absence of direct approval in church diplomatic language,” the editors of “Religion in Ukraine” say, “is to be read as an indirect disapproval of that position which the Ukrainian Orthodox Church occupies today.”

            In recent weeks, “the official speakers of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church have frequently spoken about the right of citizens of Ukraine to freely express their opinion and organize civic actions of protest as long as they remain within the limits of existing law,” the editors note. Only a few “marginal” figures like Metropolitan Agafangel of Odessa have condemned the Maidan.

            The Ukrainian Orthodox Church as an institution, of course, has not officially praised the Maidan, “but to its honor, it has refrained also from praising the existing authorities. And that has allowed some of its priests to back in often outspoken ways the movement to link Ukraine to Europe.

                There is not a word about any of this in the Moscow declaration nor is there any condemnation of Kyiv’s use of force against the demonstrators, “Religion in Ukraine” says.  But it is clear which side Patriarch Kirill and the Moscow Patriarchate are on and which side they want their Ukrainian church to be on.

            Many Ukrainians have been critical of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church for its failure to back the Maidan openly, the editors say. But the Moscow document shows what “the Moscow chiefs expect from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church” and what the UOC has not delivered as far as the Moscow Patriarchate is concerned.

            The Moscow Synod also provided an object lesson of what it would like to do in Ukraine, “Religion in Ukraine” says.  The synod replaced Metropolitan Filaret of Minsk with Metropolitan Pavel. Filaret is both old and ill and his retirement was expected, but Pavel is clearly the kind of churchman that Kirill wants to install in neighboring countries.

                Little known outside the Patriarchate, Pavel from the 1970s to 1990s served abroad, at the Russian Spiritual Mission in Jerusalem, in the United States, and in Vienna. He was thus subordinate to and promoted by the current patriarch when Kirill was head of the Synod’s powerful Department of External Church Relations.

            Pavel takes over in Belarus despite the fact that he has not served their before and “does not have Belarusian roots,” the editors point out, adding that for Patriarch Kirill the chief criteria for selecting anyone to such posts is personal loyalty and discipline.

            Unlike under Aleksii II, Kirill can do more or less what he wants in such situations because in contrast to his predecessor, the current patriarch does not have to deal with many churchman of his own generation and thus is unlikely to face opposition especially on questions of appointments.

            But Kirill and Moscow face a different situation in Ukraine than they did in Belarus.  They cannot simply appoint someone from the outside to be the metropolitan of Kyiv. That position according to church law is elected in Ukraine rather than appointed by Moscow. Moreover, Moscow has relatively few levers to affect the outcome of such a vote.

            At present, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is increasingly ignoring the Moscow Patrirchate and moving ever further away from it, the editors of “Religion in Ukraine” say.   “The more often [Ukrainians] hear calls from Moscow calls to preserve ‘the unity of the Russian world,’ the less convincing [those calls] are going to sound.”

Window on Eurasia: Putin’s ‘Conservatism’ a Parody on the Real Thing, Commentator Says

Paul Goble

           

            Staunton, January 1 –President Vladimir Putin’s “conservatism” is a combination of the ideas of the Russian radical right of the early 20^th century and Stalin’s notions of “traditional values” which the dictator used to cover repression and fool the west, according to a Moscow commentator.

            In short, Pavel Protsenko argues in “Yezhednevny zhurnal” this week, it is “a parody” of the real thing and conceals a political agenda which will destroy any possibility for the future development of Russia as what it once was, part of rather than opposed to European civilization (ej.ru/?a=note&id=24116).

            Few political terms have been abused as much in recent years as conservatism, and so it is perhaps not surprising that many people have been prepared to accept Putin’s recent efforts to define himself as a follower and promoter of that set of ideas, but Protsenko suggests that to do so is to fundamentally misunderstand what the Kremlin leader is about.

In two recent addresses, one to the country’s literary establishment and another to the Federal Assembly, the commentator says, Putin invoked conservatism not only in his capacity as the most important leader in Russia but as “an expression of the official ideology” he wishes to define and make use of.

            Putin’s understanding of conservatism, Protsenko says, can be summarized in the following way: “Russia is the guardian of traditional values. More than that, it is the defender of these values from ‘the so-called tolerance, sexless and fruitless,’ which has triumphed in the Western world.”

            “Liberal tolerance there,” Putin suggests, “has passed all limits and been transformed into a dictatorship which has destroyed morality, equated good and evil, and thus become a threat for the existence of humanity.  Moscow, having become the defender of ‘the moral foundations of civilization,’ has become an outpost of the struggle for ‘genuine human live,’ including for religious life and the values of humanism.”

            Putin’s statements and his claim that “the policy of the Russian government” is one that reflects this “’conservative position’” has attracted support around the world.  “But,” Protsenko points out, as Nikolay Berdyayev pointed out, “’the meaning of conservatism is not that it blocks movement forward and upward but that it prevents movement backward and down.”

            Before accepting Putin’s assertion at face value, the Moscow writer says, it is worth enquiring just what his “conservatism” consist of.  It is clearly not the conservatism of tsarist Russia which was “close to the conservatives of Europe and the so-called civilized world.” Indeed, until the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, “Russia was an organic part, albeit on the borders of the Euro-Atlantic world.”

            After seizing power, Protsenko continues, “the communists immediately began a war against national traditions and against the foundations of civilization.”  Not surprisingly, this approach led “very quickly to the moral degradation of society” and even forced the Soviet regime to pull back.

            “In the intervals between the waves of terror, under conditions of a growing demographic catastrophe called forth by mass repressions, Stalin prohibited” much that the Bolsheviks had allowed earlier, such as abortions. But Protsenko points out, “this return to ‘traditional values’ was not a rehabilitation of the values of Christian culture.”

                Instead, Stalin exploited the imagery of “the former empire and the former culture” to stupefy people and cover his repression. The Soviet dictator, with some success, “used the dead forms of Christian ethical norms for the radicalization of totalitarian repression of the personality” inside the USSR and “with the goal of blinding Western society.”

            But one penetrating observer at that time, Bishop Varnava, who was in a Soviet concentration camp, noted that what Stalin was doing was “a Soviet playing with traditional values” and nothing more than a deception,” a kind of “Trojan horse dragged into the camp of [the communist regime’s] ideological opponent.”

            Conservatism in both the Eastern and Western Christian traditions while drawn to conservatism is “at one and the same time the basis for creativity,” according to Protsenko who draws on the writings of Berdyayev, who noted that those who call themselves conservatives but seek to block this creativity are “a parody on genuine conservatism” and will be responsible for “future revolutions.”

            Even though he cited Berdyayev, Protsenko points out, Putin, “by linking the struggle for tradition with the army and fleet involuntarily, according to Berdyayev, reveals the anti-Christian roots” of its ideas.

            But that is not the worst part of Putin’s misuse of conservatism.  Despite his use of that term, Putin made use of “the terminology of the radical right publicists of the beginning of the 20^th century” who were anything but conservative and talked about combatting what they and he called “the amoral international” by “mobilizing the masses” against unnamed enemies.

            Not only did he take a leaf from those who helped inspire the Black Hundreds, Protsenko argues, but the current Kremlin leader “followed Stalin in exploiting the traditional values of Russian society for its enslavement and for the deception of the world outside” as a means to dividing and weakening it.

            “Stalinism will not return,” however much some “current bureaucrats who came from the KGB” would like to see that happen, the Moscow commentator says.  But Putin’s false “conservatism” is nonetheless “extremely dangerous and does not allow contemporary Russian society to have a worthy future.”

            Russia does need “a return to the great experience of Euro-Atlantic civilization, part of which it is,” Protsenko says. But that return is highly problematic when the “goal of the ruling nomenklatura has become the destruction in the country of the atmosphere of freedom which for European culture is the chief virtue and motor of development.”

            Putin’s “conservatism” instead of promoting a return to European values simply is a pastiche of worn-out Soviet ideological clichés which are “cut off from the main paths of the development of humanity.” But “the errors and sins of the West” to which Putin refers “cannot be the basis for a return” to the Soviet past.

            In his speeches, Putin says that Russia and other countries must “return” to traditional values and then “move forward.”  But “forward to what?” Protsenko asks. “The dreams of the veterans of the security agencies? From Lenin Street to Stalin Square past the monument of Dzerzhinsky under church banner holders with icons singing Mikhalkov’s hymn?”

            Such a path, the Moscow commentator concludes, one “where by definition there are no values at all,” conservative or otherwise.

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