Sunday, November 2, 2014

Window on Eurasia: Russians Said Becoming Mankurts in Their Own Land


Paul Goble

 

            Staunton, November 2 – In his classic novel, “A Day Longer than an Age,” the Kyrgyz writer Chingiz Aitmatov offered the powerful image of “mankurts,” people deprived of their identities and thus transformed into more pliant and subservient slaves of others. And this image was applied by many to the peoples of Central Asia in the late Soviet period.

 

            But now, the notion that large numbers of a nation in the Russian Federation have been deprived of their identities has been extended to the ethnic Russians themselves by Veniamin Bashlachev who argues that this is a cancer that threatens to destroy the Russian nation in the near future (svpressa.ru/blogs/article/102767/).

 

            He lays the blame for this on three things: the Bolshevik insistence that Russians must compensate for their earlier rule by promoting the identities of other nations, the failure of Soviet and Russian leaders to come down hard on those non-Russians who killed Russians, and the work of now mass media which don’t discuss the state of Russian self-consciousness.

 

            The first and second of these factors, he says, have contributed to the sense among non-Russians in the former Soviet space that they can oppress or even kill Russians with impunity, an idea that spread from relatively small pogroms against Russians in various places at the end of Soviet times to Chechnya and now to Ukraine.

 

            But the third appears to be even more insidious in its impact within Russia where the media is playing the role of the leather straps on the shaved heads of those Aitmatov said were destined to be mankurt-slaves for their new masters and second class people for members of all other groups.

 

            In support of this contention, Bashlachev offers two pieces of evidence. On the one hand, he says, the failure of Russians to volunteer for pro-Moscow units in Ukraine in large numbers shows that the Russian nation does not have the one or two percent of “passionate” members on whom the survival of any nation depends.

 

            And on the other, he cites the increasing number of Russians who did not declare any nationality in the last three censuses. In historically Russian regions, Bashlachev says, the numbers doing that are still small but they are growing “in geometrical proportion” and thus point to an ongoing threat of deracination of Russians.

 

            In 1989,  he says, a few dozen of every 100,000 residents declared that they had  no nationality; in 2002, the same number did but now among each 1,000 did so; and in 2010, that figure was true for every 100 residents. And he suggests that in future censuses, the share of those not identifying as Russians in Russian regions will only increase.

 

            (That ever more Russians even in Russian regions are not declaring themselves to be Russians is true, but the figures he offers are very much exaggerated and reflect other trends as well, including the rise of other sub-ethnic identities like Siberians or Cossacks and a turning away from ethnic identity as such.)

 

            Bashlachev says that people in Russian regions are not being deprived of their memories and identities as the medieval mankurts were but with modern methods: “They are now losing their memory with the help of the mass media,” which leads some to say that they are “ashamed” of being Russian. That is often the first step to the loss of identity.

 

            And with the loss of identity, he continues, there is a loss of demographic vitality. The overall population of Russia may now again be increasing slightly, but in historically Russian regions, it is continuing to decline because “there is a direct connection between the wounding of Russian self-consciousness and the withering away of the Russian people.”

 

            Bashlachev concludes: “In real life, self-consciousness is the most important and root quality of an individual. It is ‘the cement’ which ties separate individuals into a people. Self-consciousness is a defense mechanism which allows a people to reliably stand up to the challenges of the surrounding world.”

 

            In short, “without self-consciousness,” he warns, “a people as a subject of history disappears.”

 

 

Window on Eurasia: Central Asian Gastarbeiters in Russia Turning to Islam

Paul Goble

 

            Staunton, November 2 – Many Russians fear that gastarbeiters from Central Asia are bringing Islam into Russia, but a new study shows something that may disturb residents of Russian cities even more: Many Central Asian gastarbeiters who had little or no interest in Islam in their homelands are turning to the faith precisely because of their experience with migration.

 

            Sophie Rochet, a Heidelburg University researcher, says that there are many reasons for this: a protest by Central Asians against being surrounded by people who consume too much alcohol, increasing consciousness of their identities and a search for their roots, and an effort to provide defense mechanisms against the changing situation in Russia itself (rus.ozodi.org/content/article/26667936.html and ansar.ru/rfsng/2014/11/01/54850).

 

            Because of Soviet anti-religious efforts, many Central Asians do not have much knowledge about Islam even now, and they do not turn to Islam while they are living in their home areas. But the experience of migration to Russia or elsewhere often leads them to the faith, she says on the basis of interviews with Tajiks and Uzbeks in the Russian capital.

 

            Immigrants in Russia become believers, Rochet says, primarily as a result of contacts with compatriots who have been there longer and also as a result of the use of the Internet.  But the main site where this process is taking place are the markets, often dominated by Central Asians, in the Russian capital.

 

            “The markets are like a state within a state. They have their own mission and their own rules,” she says.  Various trends of Islam are represented, including radical Salafis and the Jamaat Tablig. But in most cases, young Central Asians are less interested in their message than in more mainstream Muslim beliefs, and they do not become radicals at least at first.

 

            Despite Rochet’s conclusion, the Islamization of young Central Asians is certainly going to disturb not only the Russians among whom they live who will view this as a challenge to the Russian way of life but also and perhaps more seriously among Central Asian elites who will fear that this migrant-driven shift to Islam may become a threat to their rule.

 

            The five Central Asian governments have been worried about the impact of Muslims from their populations who have studied at medrassahs and Muslim universities in the Middle East and South Asia and become radicalized. Now, they may have reason to fear yet another source of radicalism: the experience of immigration in the Russian Federation.

 

Saturday, November 1, 2014

Window on Eurasia: Consolidation of Rural Institutions Will Accelerate Death of Russia Beyond City Limits


Paul Goble

 

            Staunton, November 1 – The budget-driven, top-down, authoritarian consolidation of the institutions of rural Russia will accelerate the demise of Russia outside of its major cities, transforming the country in negative ways and creating problems that Moscow has not yet been willing to face, according to Lev Shlosberg.

 

            In remarks to the Pskov Oblast Assembly of Deputies on Thursday, Shlosberg, a member of that body, said that this danger is very much in evidence in the announcement by the Pskov oblast authorities of “an ultimatum” to society and especially to its rural members, an ukaz prepared without any input from local officials (kasparov.ru/material.php?id=54533F70381F1).

 

            If the regional government’s plans go forward, Shlosberg pointed out, the number of rural settlements will be reduced by several times over the next two years, there will be a unification of many of the existing districts, and the future of Pskov oblast as a federal subject will be put in doubt.

 

            Invoking budgetary shortages, the oblast authorities are seeking to impose “a radical simplification of the administrative-territorial division” of Pskov and “the liquidation of a significant part of the carcass of local self-administration,” a move that will open the way to “the destruction of the region” as a whole.

 

Over the last century, Pskov kray has been subjected to several administrative reforms. Many of them have destroyed the infrastructure of the region to the point that one can say, Shlosberg said, that “where local self-administration has been liquidated, life itself burns out” because the people perish.

 

In 1958, Velikii Luki oblast was liquidated and part of its territory was transferred to Pskov. Dozens of regions were “quickly and insanely liquidated,” and “he former regional centers which were not given that status [in the newly expanded oblast] were reduced from worker settlements to villages.”

 

That is because, Shlosberg said, there were almost no hospitals, schools or libraries or even banks and post offices in the downgraded regional centers, and as a result, they rapidly lost population.  Life became ever less attractive and people fled to the cities. “This was a cleansing of the territory from people,” he argued.

 

In 1961-63, Moscow artificially experimented with creating larger industrial and agricultural districts in Pskov and elsewhere, and the number of districts in Pskov oblast fell by almost half.  Fortunately, Shlosberg said, the mistaken nature of these Khrushchev reforms was recognized and over three years reversed.

 

Since that time, the administrative-territorial map of Pskov has been stable. “No one over the course of half a century thought to touch it,” he said, and it withstood the rise and fall of the USSR, the turmoil of the 1990s, and the illegality and indifference of the last 15 years. But now, officials are playing with fire once again.

 

What they do not seem to recognize, the deputy continued, is that this latest destruction of local self-administration may prove in Pskov oblast to be the last.

 

In order to block this move, Shlosberg said, he is establishing a public Resistance Movement to consist of all those who are “ready to fight for their small Motherland” and to provide “the necessary legal, informational and human assistance” in an unselfish way to those who will work against what the authorities are trying to do.

 

Everyone needs to remember, he said, that “according to the Russian Constitution, organs of local self-administration are not part of the system of organs of state power.” Instead, they are “defined by the population independently and a change in the borders of the territory in which local self-administration occurs are allowed only if the opinion of the population of that territory is taken into account.”

 

Clearly, Shlosberg said, “someone wants to rewrite not only history but also the Constitution.” But they won’t get away with it easily if “the citizens of their own kray” stand up and insist on their rights.  Tampering with the existing districts is not something anyone but the people has a right to do.

 

Window on Eurasia: Putin’s ‘New Society’ Very Dangerous but Not Fascist, ‘Russky zhurnal’ Editor Says


Paul Goble

 

            Staunton, November 1 – The new society emerging in Russia under Vladimir Putin will be “a powerful and active one, anti-democratic, militarized, with its own ‘leader cult,’ and ‘political gnosticism’ but not comparable to the interwar regimes in Italy or Germany, according to Aleksandr Morozov, the editor in chief of “Russky zhurnal.”

 

            And he argues that this is the case on the basis of an examination of seven aspects of Russian reality today, aspects that call into question the conclusions of  “enthusiasts” that what is happening is no more than the end of “the post-Soviet transition” and the rise of “a so-called ‘nation state’” (russ.ru/Mirovaya-povestka/Novoe-obschestvo-Putina-kak-evropejskij-proekt).

 

            First of all, Morozov says, the formation of “the club of the sanctioned” has changed the nature of Russian politics at the top. More than 100 Russians have now been sanctioned by the West, and many others wish they were on that list because membership confirms “the absolute devotion to Putin” that is the basis for getting ahead.

 

            Those on the list “understand that personal sanctions won’t ever be lifted” even if sectoral sanctions are, and consequently those who have been sanctioned have no choice but to be loyal to Putin for life. “There is thus no basis of expecting ‘a split in the elites,” Morozov says. Moreover, those who have been sanctioned affect public opinion because they head so many firms and institutions in what is already a “highly corporate” state.

 

             Second, while Putin lacks the funds for arms that he has talked about, the “’militarization of society’” will continue. For the first time since the Soviet period, Russians are thinking and talking about a major war with the West. And among other things, that has led more Russians to volunteer for service in the military.

 

            Third, unlike in the past when any notion that guns should be in private hands was “a taboo,” now those who are arming themselves are viewed as self-defense detachments and even as “partisans” in the good World War II sense.  These groups are becoming like the Freikorps and are “much more attractive to young people in the provinces than were the earlier formations of the National Bolsheviks,” not least because they enjoy the backing of the state rather than face its opposition.

 

            Fourth, over the last year or so, Putin has made the Security Council the primary institutionalized form of decision making at the top of the political system, and its “gnostic” language has passed throughout the elite and into the Russian population at large which now speaks in terms that Russia’s security services prefer.

 

            Fifth, the political center of the country has disappeared. Radicals at both ends of the political spectrum now make proposals that are taken seriously even though a few months ago the ideas these proposals reflect would have been treated as laughable absurdities.  And that in turn has been reflected in a change in the nature of political discourse.

 

            Sixth, the attitudes of the Russian middle class have shifted. Despite expectations of some, this educated and even sophisticated group of people like it very much that “Russia has suddenly shown the world several real ‘innovations,’ including hybrid war, cyber-war, ‘polite people,’ and effective counterpropaganda.” They “consider that the revision of history is completely justified.”

 

            And seventh, Putin and his propagandists have escaped the charges that the West might have been expected to bring against him as acting like Hitler in the Sudentenland. Instead, most Europeans view what he has done as annoying but not reflecting his transformation into some kind of  fascist leader.

 

            The reasons for that are to be found in the Kremlin’s clever exploitation of the following themes: the decline of the West, limits on the sovereignty of European countries imposed by the US, the egotism of the United States, “the paralysis of European democracy in the face of major problems,” and the increasing distrust of European voters in their own governments.

 

            “Crudely speaking,” Morozov concludes, “Putin has begun an election campaign for the imaginary post of ‘leader of Europe.’ He starts from a very low point but his ratings are rapidly increasing. [And] it would be interesting to see the results of the poll analogous to those which the Levada Center has conducted in Russia for many years.”

 

            “Do you support Putin?” Yes, more yes than no, more no than yes, No.  The answer ‘more yes than no,’” the “Russky zhurnal” editor says, “is the indicator of the increase not of direct support but of tolerance” by Europeans for what Putin has been doing.

 

 

 

Window on Eurasia: ‘Ukrainian’ Now a Synonym for ‘A Free Individual' on the Post-Soviet Space, Portnikov Says


Paul Goble

 

            Staunton, November 1 – “A Ukrainian political nation has been formed,” Vitaly Portnikov says, something that has been noticed not only by those “who love and support it” but also by “those who hate it.”  As a result, on the post-Soviet space, it has become “a synonym for a free individual,” and it hymn “the Marseillaise” of today.

 

            The Kyiv commentator writes that this dawned on him when he recently heard a Russian rant against the supposed “terrors of Ukrainian fascism, the ‘Right Sector,’ which is hunting for Jews … that Ukrainians were invented by the Americans to anger Putin,” and that “Ukraine is in fact Russia” (aboutru.com/2014/10/9981/).

 

            After listening to this outburst, Portnikov says that he pointed out to the speaker that he “himself lives in Kyiv, has not encountered any fascists, that the ‘Right Sector’ hasn’t been hunting [him] even though [he] is a Jew, and that [he] had seen the well-known Yarosh only once” and then only because of his journalistic work.

 

            To this, the Russian responded that Portnikov was clearly himself a “khokol,” using a derogatory term for Ukrainians and that it was better if they just drank.

 

            Portnikov says he was shocked. “For the first time in his almost 50 years of life, he was being viewed as an ethnic Ukrainian,” and this despite the fact that he had told “this self-satisfied individual who didn’t want to know anything except the amount of money that had been stolen” that he was a Jew, and thus in the Russian’s understanding “a kike not a khokol.”

 

            “For the first time,” the Kyiv commentator continued, he felt himself to be a Ukrainian, and that transformation from an ethnic to a political identity is “more dangerous” to Putin and his regime “than any anti-Semitism or hatred toward Caucasians or xenophobia toward gastarbeiters from Central Asia, hated and xenophobia having become the essence of the existence of the Russian people in recent decades.”

 

            That is because, Portnikov continues, “when a Russian calls a Jew ‘a kike’ or a Caucasian ‘a black,’ he knows that he has offended someone personally. But when he calls a Ukrainian ‘a khokol,’” it has an entirely different meaning because Ukrainians do not see it as necessarily derogatory but rather as simply one label of many.

 

            And that sense in turn mean, Portnikov says, that he had “no choice” but “to defend the honor of the people among whom [he] had grown up and lives” by explaining to his interlocutor that he had “offended not [him alone] but millions of people,” and that he felt as a result a Ukrainian as well.

 

            The Kyiv commentator continues by saying that he is “happy because it is possible to repeat again and again at meetings and in articles that ‘we are all Ukrainians’ and not believe it is true for oneself.” But comments like this from the Russian show that Ukrainians now are “a political nation” and that it is based “not on blood and soil but on a common love for the motherland.”

 

            A few days later when he was back in Kyiv, Portnikov says he heard an elderly intellectual woman talk about what her sister in Kemerovo had said. According to the woman, her sister had told her that everyone in Ukraine was a fascist and suggested that all of them “should kiss Putin’s feet because he has not thrown an atomic bomb at [them] for not wanting to speak Russian.”

 

            The Kyiv lady said she had only called to send her sister birthday greetings, and here her sister wanted to send back an atomic bomb. And then turning to Portnikov, she observed that this was shameful especially as both she and her sister were ethnic Russians and wondered whether she herself should give up her Russian nationality.

 

            Portnikov said that there was no reason for her to do so. “You are a real Russian simply because you are a Ukrainian, because you are free, because you wanted to greet your sister on her birthday and not throw a bomb at her.” Perhaps her sister should give up being Russian given what her remarks.

 

            “In order to be a Russian or indeed a Ukrainian, a Jew or anything else, one must first be a human being and not a beast,” Portnikov concludes, adding sadly that “this is the greatest state secret of contemporary Russia.”

 

 

Window on Eurasia: ‘Patriots’ of Putin’s Party Want to Dispense with Democracy


Paul Goble

 

            Staunton, November 1 – In a move that recalls the ending of Costa-Gavras’ 1969 classic film “Z” about the Greek junta, a group of Putin loyalists from his United Russia Party are calling for dispensing with the word “democracy” in Russia, closing the independent Higher School of Economics and Ekho Moskvy, and restoring choral singing in Russian schools.

 

            Irina Yarova, the head of the Duma anti-corruption committee, chaired the session and set the tone. She declared that “the most important event in the entire world” was the recent Valdai Forum in Sochi and the speech that Vladimir Putin gave there, and she said that speech provides guidance for all (gazeta.ru/politics/2014/10/31_a_6284789.shtml).

 

            The most important theme of Putin’s speech, Yarova said, was that “the western partners of Russia” had used democratic phraseology to justify and cover their invasions of other countries and the overthrow of constitutional governments as, she said, “had taken place in Ukraine.”

 

            The only defense against this Western “aggression,” she said, is Russia. “We as a multi-national people never swallowed another culture; we have no experience with colonization. Russia has always followed the path of unification, honor and faith!”

 

            A second speaker, Yury Zhukov, a researcher at the Moscow Institute of Russian History, called for raising the consciousness of Russian society on this point by “immediately publishing in enormous print runs a brochure containing Putin’s Munich and Valdai speeches and distributing them free on the streets of [Russian] cities.”

 

            In addition, he called for taking action against “the fifth column” in Russia to block it from continuing the kind of destructive work it already achieved in Ukraine. Specifically, Zhukov called for taking “measures” against Ekho Moskvy and Memorial because “everyone knows that they are part of the fifth column.”

 

            “Our policy must be aggressive,” the Russian historian said. “It is time to go into battle.”

 

            A third speaker, Gadzhimet Safaraliyev, the head of the Duma nationalities committee, called for two measures likely to create problems among the country’s non-Russians: he said Russian must be taught as a native language in the non-Russian republics and that there must be a required examination about Russian history so that people there will “know the branch from which they fell.”

 

            Yarova supported him, noting that attacks on language are how everything began in Ukraine.

 

            Yury Alekseyev, the deputy chairman of the central council of United Russia supporters, said that “democracy and democratic values” have “become the justification for the most odious actions of the West against Russia” and consequently Russia must drop any reference to democracy “in our documents” because for the Americans it simply means “the right to bomb” whomever Washington wants to.

 

            Zinovy Kogan of the Congress of Jewish Organizations and Unions of Russia (KEROOR), told the meeting that in his view, “Russia had too quickly moved away from Soviet ideology” and too rapidly “borrowed” Western values. “Patriotism is the basis of the unity of the country.”

 

Konstantin Semin, a host on Russia-24, said that a war had been declared against Russia and “we have no partners.” As a result, he continued, “we need a State Defense Committee,” because as of now Russians have not heard a speech like the one Stalin addressed to the Soviet people on July 3, 1941.

 

            Another participant in the meeting, historian Yevgeny Spitsyn, called for closing the Russian State Humanities University and the Higher School of Economics because these institutions have for 20 years taught students to hate their own country.

 

            And still another, Pavel Pozhigaylov, the head of the All-Russian Choral Society, said Russia had to take extraordinary measures to defend traditional values against what he described as “the liberal Babylon” of the West, a place which he said would move from approving homosexuality to backing sex with animals. Restoring choral singing in the schools and purging literature textbooks of suggestive materials, he suggested, could limit the impact of such ideas in Russia.

 

 

 

 

 

Window on Eurasia: Crimea’s Occupiers Say There is Too Much Moscow-Banned Material There for Them to Seize It All at Once


Paul Goble

 

            Staunton, November 1 – Russian occupation officials in Crimea have provided a remarkable confirmation of how free Ukraine was and how unfree Russia has become. According to them, Ukraine allowed so many publications to appear there that Russia has banned that they lack the ability to seize them all at once.

 

            Officials of the occupation regime’s State Committee for the Inter-Ethnic Relations and Deported Citizens said yesterday that there are “hundreds of thousands” of publications in Crimea that are banned in Russia, so many that they cannot be confiscated immediately as Russian law requires (ansar.ru/rfsng/2014/10/31/54826).

 

            Zaur Smirnov, the head of the State Committee, said that these “extremist” materials had flooded into Crimea before the Russian occupation in order to support “non-traditional forms of Islam” and thus to undermine the government-backed and traditionalist Muslim Spiritual Directorate of Crimea.

 

            Such materials, he said, “thank God are banned in the Russian Federation” and must be confiscated and destroyed. But because there are “hundreds of thousands” of copies in Crimea, it is “impossible” for officials “to seize them all at once.”  Consequently, the Russian authorities now there are asking religious groups to turn them in voluntarily.

 

            Smirnov noted that Sergey Aksenov, the head of the Republic of Crimea, had met with the heads of religious organizations and taken a decision to offer them “the opportunity themselves to carry out a so-called cleansing” of such materials by destroying them or handing them in.

 

            Only after they have had the chance to do so, Smirnov said, “will the laws of the Russian Federation be applied with full force.”

 

            Some in Russia and the West will applaud what the occupation is doing, viewing it as a move against Islamist extremism, but those familiar will the sweep of Moscow’s bans on religious literature will recognize it for what it is: an indication of how the freedoms Crimeans enjoyed as citizens of Ukraine are being taken away now that they are de facto subjects of Russia