Russia Must ‘De-Moscovize’ to Recover and Prosper, Tushin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, February 1 – The Moscow-centric nature of Russian life is “a dead end” for the country. It cannot be ended by decree from the Kremlin because such an approach, whatever its intentions, will always result in something “empire-like” and thus incompatible with the federal system enshrined in the Constitution, according to Artur Tushin.

            In a Rufabula portal commentary, the Moscow-based federalist argues that “in the 21^st century there should only be a museum in the medieval Moscow Kremlin” and a genuinely new Russia will need “a new capital city,” one established east of the Urals in Siberia (rufabula.com/articles/2016/01/29/moscow-centrism).

            “Moving the capital is not a goal in and of itself,” he says; “it is a means” because there is no other way to end the Moscow focus and feudal nature of Russian political life.  If a divorce is arranged between Moscow and the capital, Tushin argues, “this will be good both for Russia and for Moscow.”

            Shifting the capital would “represent an attempt to put an end to the existence of feudalism in the country, to end the existence of the Muscovite grand duchy because since Moscow began to assemble Russian and non-Russian territories around itself, the state structure of Russia hasn’t changed.”

            The names and decorations have changed, “but the feudal foundation remains. The main principle of that state system is absolute monarchy (not necessarily inherited) under any title – tsar, general secretary, president, prime minister and so on – localism, and, what is most important the feeding” of this or that group.

            Such “feeding” is “the foundation of the entire economic and state structure of Russia” as organized under Moscow, Tushin continues.  Everything else is kept in the status of “vassal dependency of one degree or another.” There is no federation: there is the grand duchy of Muscovy or the Russian Empire.” And that must be destroyed and replaced by a federation.

            Russia today, he argues, is suffering “a profound civilizational and systemic crisis;” and because that is so, “half measures will not work,” especially as this is “Russia’s last chance to escape from the chains of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. The time for imitations is ending.”

            Unless Russia transforms itself into a genuine federation and that means de-linking the capital and Moscow, all other attempts at political transformation will fail, he argues. Tushin points to the fact that “all the post-Soviet countries are building NEW states, some good, some bad, but all NEW and only Russia is building the past OLD state, a mix of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union.” There is no future in that.

           

            To escape its past-present, Russia needs a passionate push; but that can’t come from Moscow given Moscow’s link to all the unfortunate state structures of the past.  Only moving the capital “beyond the Ural” can give Russia the new energy it will need to overcome the past-present and move forward.

            He calls on those Russians not indifferent to the fate of their country to unite under the slogan “Move the Capital of Russia Beyond the Urals!” arguing that this dramatic step is “the reform of the state not from above (by the authorities) or from below (by the people) by means of a revolution.”  Instead, he says, it represents an effort to restructure Russia “TOGETHER.”

            “Yes, this variant is risky,” Tushin concedes. “But there are already no options without risks” if Russia is going to escape its Muscovite past.

Kadyrov, Putin and the Desensitization of Russia

Paul Goble

            Staunton, February 1 – Each day seems to bring a fresh outrage from Ramzan Kadyrov, Vladimir Putin and their ilk, an outrage many dutifully denounce without connecting the dots and seeing the ways in which this drip-by-drip set of actions is making Russians and indeed many outside observers increasingly insensitive to what is going on and thus what lies ahead.

            Among the rich harvest of horrors over the last few days are the following:

·         Ramzan Kadyrov has posted on Instagram a photo showing Mikhail Kasyanov, the leader of the opposion PARNAS party, in the crosshairs of a rifle site, an action Kasyanov’s colleagues denounced but that Putin’s press secretary did not have anything to say (rbc.ru/politics/01/02/2016/56ae9b889a7947f044618a2f).

·         The pro-Putin All-Russian Popular Front has made a series of cartoons showing Vladimir Putin killing those he has identified as corrupt (echo.msk.ru/blog/echomsk/1704530-echo/).

·         German Klimenko, Putin’s new advisor on the Internet, says that if he were allowed to, he would “shoot” those who use the Internet in ways that the Kremlin doesn’t like. Challenged on his words, he said he was being “completely serious” (nr2.com.ua/News/politics_and_society/Rossiyskie-chinovniki-predlagayut-porot-inakomyslyashchih-115646.html).

·         Igor Kholmanskikh, Putin’s plenipotentiary for the Urals, says that it is necessary to get rid of the fifth column in ways like those described in the 1930s by Ilf and Petrov. He isn’t calling for executions of the extra-systemic opposition -- at least not yet.

·         And KPRF activists in Yekaterinburg are accusing the Yeltsin Center there of violating the law on “the rehabilitation of Nazism” by providing information about the victims of Stalin’s repressions. 

This list could easily be extended, and as Novy Region-2 journalist Kseniya Kirillova points out in summarizing this list, it is not clear that “the worse the economic crisis in Russia becomes, the ‘better and happier’ will be the lives of its citizens. Apparently,” she suggests, “there isn’t a lot of time to wait until the promised shootings.”

            Beyond doubt, Kirillov is right to call attention to this trend, something many are reluctant to do.  But three immediate points need to be made. First, Kadyrov must not be dismissed as some kind of new Zhirinovsky, whose words simply allow people to get things out of their systems. He is changing the system and promoting the Chechenization of Russia.

            Second, every time such statements are made and are not immediately and actively denounced by Russians and by the West, it gets easier for Kadyrov and Putin to say and do even worse things. It would have been hard to imagine the gunsight picture appearing even on Kadyrov’s site a year ago; now, it is likely to become background noise.

            And third – and this is the most important point – Putin bears responsibility for all of this. If Russia is heading in the wrong direction, it is not because it is facing opposition from the Kremlin. Rather, Putin is encouraging such things, desensitizing Russians to them, and could stop them if he wanted to.

            He must be held accountable, as difficult and even dangerous as that task may be.

Russian Oil Sector Now Where Soviet One was Just before USSR Collapsed, ‘Nezavisimaya Gazeta’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, February 1 – Many observers have suggested that the single best indicator of what has happened and will happen in Russia is the price of oil. If it is high enough, they suggest, Soviet or Russian leaders can appear to do no wrong; if it is low enough, at least one current anecdote has it, Vladimir Putin will begin learning Ukrainian.

            In today’s “Nezavisimaya Gazeta,” Anastasiya Bashkatova, who specializes on economic issues, says that the situation in Russia’s oil sector is now so dire that “the events which preceded the collapse of the USSR may be repeated” despite all of Moscow’s attempts to escape that fate (ng.ru/economics/2016-02-01/1_opek.html).

            She reports that Moscow “has not been able to convince Saudi Arabia to end the price war,” even though Russia was prepared to “’capitulate’” before OPEC by reducing its own production by five percent.  Or at least that it what appears to be the case from the public statements from Russian energy minister Aleksandr Novakov and other news agency reports.

            Like Russia, Venezuela has been pushing for an end to the price war, but it has not succeeded. President Nicholas Maduro says that he believes that an accord on that is “’close’” but he stresses that this does not mean “’finally agreed upon.’”  Even that was enough to send oil prices up a little, but now OPEC leaders have shot down the idea of an end to the price war.

            As a result, Bashkatova says, Russia’s “oil branch could repeat the events of the end of the 1980s when over the course of several years, the production of oil on the territory of Russia contracted by almost 20 percent, from 568.8 million tons in 1988 to 462 million tons in 1991,” a contraction that was driven by a sharp fall in oil prices.

            Russia’s production has recovered and in 2015, experts say, it stood at 530 million tons, even though prices have again fallen.  Moreover, “under conditions of the budget deficit, the Russian government is seeking means to compensate for the fall in oil prices,” including the imposition of additional taxes and fees on the oil producers.

            The oil lobby will naturally oppose this and warn that “a growing tax burden will lead to a contraction in investment” in the sector. But experts say that “it would be unprofitable for Russia now to cut production.” That would be technically hard to do, would cost the government money and would make Russia lose face with other oil producers.

            According to Eldar Kasayev, an expert at the Union of Oil Producers of Russia, consumers not producers are driving prices and therefore “the suppliers (Russia, Saudi Arabia and Iran) are taking the interests of the purchasers into account, seeking by all possible means to keep their niche in the struggle with each other by offering serious discounts to clients.”

            He adds that “OPEC and Russia will never agree – their goals are too different.” That is all the more so because Saudi Arabia has a major voice in that organization and there are now serious differences between Moscow and Riyadh because of the war in Syria.  Riyadh assumes it has enough resources saved up to last five to seven years of low oil prices.

            The question, especially given the experience of 1988-1991, is whether Russia does.