Thursday, September 1, 2016

Will Karimov’s Departure Put Karakalpakstan in Play?



Paul Goble

            Staunton, September 1 – Most commentaries on the future of Uzbekistan after the departure of Islam Karimov have focused on questions like: Will his kind of dictatorship continue? Will it be replaced by an Islamist regime? And will Tashkent change its geopolitical orientation?

            But there is one aspect of the situation that has so far received less attention but that might matter even more: Will the current borders of Uzbekistan be maintained? Or will Uzbekistan’s neighbors move in small ways or large to seize portions of that country or encourage regions now within its borders to leave?

            And even if such possibilities remain unrealized, they are likely to play a major role in the political infighting in the Uzbekistan leadership and in the way in which major outside powers as Russia, the European Union and the United States respond, especially given the commitments of the latter two to the stability of existing borders.

            Already this week, two challenges to Uzbekistan’s current borders have emerged, one small and one large, which merit attention both in terms of what they say about the possibilities of border changes and how they are likely to be read in Tashkent and used as part of the political struggle there.

            The smaller of these two challenges, one that may be replicated elsewhere along Uzbekistan’s borders, comes from Kyrgystan where government officials said yesterday that the Uzbek authorities were violating their own agreements about the border between the two countries by acting as if Tashkent owns a particular reservoir (kg.akipress.org/news:1326741).

            Kyrgyz officials said that these “illegal actions by the Uzbek side toward the Orto-Tokoy reservoir are inflicting serious harm to the friendly and good-neighborly relations between the fraternal peoples of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan,” diplomatic language for what could emerge as a serious controversy given confusion in Tashkent.

            But the greater, indeed far greater, threat to the territorial integrity of Uzbekistan is in Karakalpakia, an increasingly impoverished autonomous republic within Uzbekistan whose population is roughly divided among Karakalpaks, Uzbeks and Kazakhs and a place where at least some activists are interested in having their land become part of Kazakhstan or Russia.

            The reasons for that lie in history.  Until 1924, Karakalpak lands lay within the boundaries of historically Kazakh areas. Only in 1925 did they become part of the Kyrgyz ASSR, and only in 1936 was their region shifted to become part of the Uzbek SSR (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/06/karakalpak-separatists-in-uzbekistan.html). 

            In Soviet times, activists says, the standard of living in Uzbekistan and consequently of Karakalpakia was higher than that in Kazakhstan and so the Karakalpaks were happy to live under Tashkent.  There was almost no interest in separatism, but the disappearance of the Aral Sea and the collapse of the standard of living in Karakalpakia has changed that.

            In 1992, Karakalpakia, which covers roughly a third of Uzbekistan’s land area, declared its independence “within Uzbekistan,” an act that had few concrete consequences at the time but that did enshrine as constitutional the right of the Karakalpaks to secede, something that the union republics had had in Soviet times from the USSR.

            Over the last two decades, the Kazakh writer says, the standard of living in Kazakhstan rose while that in Karakalpakia fell; and consequently, some Karakalpaks began to talk about having their republic return to Kazakhstan. But Uzbek President Islam Karimov used force to crack down on any expressions of such desires.

            In 1993, Tashkent and Nukus signed an inter-governmental agreement which specified that Karakalkapstan would remain in Uzbekistan for 20 years. That term ran out in 2013, but Tashkent ignored calls of activists for a referendum. The activists said they had growing support and that only Karimov’s dictatorship was keeping them from realizing their rights.

            Some in Karakalpakstan were encouraged by Russia’s Anschluss of Crimea as a possible future for themselves, and both they and others may have been pushing this idea given Moscow’s long tradition of using Karakalpak separatism against Tashkent for its pro-Western positions (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2014/11/window-on-eurasia-moscow-again-focusing.html).

            Now, with the passing of Karimov, one blogger, Lidiya Gaydar argues, “none of the factors restraining Karkalpakstan remain,” and that opens the way for a new upsurge of independence activity among its population, something that will prompt other regions in Uzbekistan to think about autonomy as well (dialog.ua/news/95789_1472548767).

            Any real or perceived challenge from that direction will lead Tashkent to crack down or even become the occasion for political fights within the elite, given that the Uzbek authorities have a long history of oppressing Karakalpak activism even while insisting that it doesn’t exist (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2014/06/window-on-eurasia-tashkent-cracks-down.html).

            Moreover, any upsurge in Karakalpak activism could create problems for Tashkent with either Kazakhstan or Russia and increase the level of nationalism within the post-Karimov Uzbekistan elite, something that in turn would cause new problems with other minorities there, including Russians, Kazakhs and Uyghurs (openrussia.org/post/view/17254/).

Rodina Activist Opens Petition Drive to Unite Buryatia, Irkutsk Oblast and Trans-Baikal Kray



Paul Goble

            Staunton, September 1 – Yevgeny Buyanin, head of the Buryat section of Russia’s Rodina Party, has launched a petition drive to collect 100,000 signatures that calls on Vladimir Putin to combine Buryatia, Irkutsk Oblast and the Transbaikal Kray into a single Baikal Republic with Russian and Buryat as its official languages.

            The petition, on the change.org portal, declares that “We, the residents [of the three federal subjects] ask You [the president of Russia] to unite [the three] into a new subject of the Rusian Federation – the Baikal Republic, and we ask that the state languages of the new region be Russian and Buryat” (infpol.ru/news/society/118543-ulan-udenets-prosit-putina-sozdat-baykalskuyu-respubliku/).

            Buyanin says that having been united, “the three Baikal regions will be able to develop economically and socially more effectively and to defend their interests at the federal level.”  The move, he adds, would reduce the number of bureaucrats and thus free up money for social needs which in Buryatia in particular are not being met.

            He said that he had come up with this idea long ago but only now was seeking to push it forward via a petition.  He may have been encouraged by recent discussions about shifting Buryatia from the Siberian to the Far Eastern Federal District and about combining Buryatia and Irkutsk oblast.

            It is far from clear how many signatures Buyanin’s petition will garner or what would happen even if a sizeable number of people sign it.  That is because it has pluses and minuses for Buryatia, for the two predominantly Russian federal subjects and for the Russian Federation and Putin personally.

            For Buryatia, the minuses and pluses are obvious. On the minus side, such a move would eliminate the national republic and thus leave Buryats without the focus and support they have had, however minimal, up to now. On the plus side, it would deal with Buryat anger about the loss of the two Buryat districts to the others and would extend the reach of the national language.

            For the Russian regions, the minuses and pluses are also quite evident. It would cost them their individual governments and force them at least on paper to give more support to the Buryat language.  But on the other, such a move would create a far more powerful region, one that could use its location around Baikal to pressure Moscow more effectively than at present.

            And for the Russian Federation and Putin personally, such a move would also have a mixed set of consequences. It could restart Putin’s long-stalled effort at amalgamation of non-Russian areas with Russian ones, but it could create a monster region that would be better able to defend its interests against Moscow.

           

             

Putin’s War Games on Ukrainian Border Aimed Above All at Western Leaders, Analysts Say



Paul Goble

            Staunton, September 1 – In January 1991, after Soviet soldiers killed 14 Lithuanians in Vilnius, a remarkable political cartoon appeared: It showed a Soviet soldier pointing a gun at a Lithuanian who was proudly thrusting his chest forward and then, further away, Uncle Sam, the universally recognized symbol for the US, throwing up his hands in abject surrender.

            On the one hand, this cartoon reflected the anger many around the world felt about Washington’s failure to stand up to Mikhail Gorbachev because the West was about to begin its campaign against Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. But on the other, it underscored an important truth: the real target of Moscow’s actions may not be the most immediately apparent one.

            Three analysts are now making that point with regard to Putin’s military maneuvers near the Ukrainian border, arguing that the Kremlin leader’s real targets are Barack Obama and other Western leaders rather than Ukraine and that he hopes to achieve his goals by being threats alone but will use force if they don’t give way and put pressure on Kyiv to see things Moscow’s way.

            Indeed, each of the three suggests that Putin’s strategy is likely to be more effective if he can convince Western leaders that unless they force Kyiv to accept Russia’s conditions, Putin will use force and dramatically expand his war against Ukraine, something the West doesn’t want and that it is struggling to find a way to prevent, short of supporting Moscow.


            Putin is seeking to put pressure on Kyiv to accept his interpretation of the Minsk accords both directly and via the West by the kind of threatening behavior that the West has often responded to by seeking to find some common ground given that Putin appears quite prepared to escalate the situation if he does not get his way, Sungurovsky says.

            Putin’s goal in Ukraine since his Anschluss of Crimea remains unchanged: he wants to prevent Kyiv from “escaping the orbit of influence of Russia.”  He hasn’t achieved that, the Kyiv analyst says; but he hasn’t given up. Using the threat of force to frighten the West is just one more step in that direction.

            And the Kremlin leader thinks he has a chance to win out that way, to get the West to back down on sanctions against Russia and on its support for Ukraine.  So far, that hasn’t happened; and if it doesn’t happen soon, then, Sungurovsky concludes, Putin will go for broke and seize the territory of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts “up to their administrative borders.”

            “The occasion for such actions, the Ukrainian analyst says, “could be provocations similar to those used in Crimea.  Putn has shown what he is capable of and the next provocation certainly will be more carefully prepared, more massive, and more threatening.”  That too will send a message to both Ukraine and its Western partners.

            Belkovsky shares this interpretation of what is now happening: “Putin is seeking to gain Obama’s attention and is creating phantom threats along the borders of Ukraine” to force the American president to meet with and make concessions to the Russian leadership with regard not just to Ukraine but around the world.

            Putin’s “tactics are clear: the more problems you create for your opposite number before negotiations, the greater the chances that he will agree because he will want to escape from these problems. Before the [G-20] summit, it is useful to create a foundation for pressure and to fright everyone with the notion that Russian forces are about to attack Ukraine.”

            According to Belkovsky, “Ukraine is for Putin ‘only an instrument to force the US into negotiations about the fate of the world’” and not just about lifting sanctions. So far he has not succeeded, but his latest military moves around Ukraine are an indication that he has not ceased trying and even that he thinks the timing is especially propitious.

            The reason Putin thinks that he has a particularly good chance to influence Obama now, the Russian commentator says, is that the American president “is extremely interested in the victory of Hillary Clinton.  If a war in Ukraine begins,” he argues, “this will have a negative impact on Clinton’s chances and the chances of Donald Trump for victory will grow.”

            Andrey Piontkovsky also agrees that what Putin is doing around Ukraine now is all about the G-20 meeting and Putin’s efforts to use the West against Ukraine and to force the West to make broader concessions.  The Kremlin leader’s message to Obama and the others is simple, Piontkovsky says.

            “’If you do not agree to our interpretation of the Minsk accords and do not force Ukraine to accept it,’” Putin is suggesting, “’then we will look for other means of solving the situation, including military ones.’”

            But Piontkovsky suggests, implying that the West should keep this in mind that “Moscow isn’t prepared” for a real war.  That would be “insane.”  But threats and bluffs of one often have worked on Western leaders and diplomats in the past, and so it is no surprise that Putin is using them again.

            He concludes that he believes it would be a very good thing for Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko to tell Putin that he has no hope of achieving his aims. Poroshenko’s rhetoric has become tougher in recent weeks, and Putin should hear directly from him that “Ukraine will never change its constitution or destroy its state” as the Kremlin leader wants because after all “Moscow doesn’t need the Donbass or Crimea but rather all Ukraine.”

            And a fourth observer, Dmitry Tymchuk, a Ukraine Popular Front deputy who coordinates the Information Resistance movement, says any quieting on the line of the front between Ukrainian forces and pro-Moscow militants may work to Russia’s advantage and do not preclude attacks in the future (gordonua.com/news/war/tymchuk-rezhim-tishiny-na-donbasse-eto-prelyudiya-k-dalneyshey-eskalacii-konflikta-148133.html).

            In his view, the Russians are “trying to show a certain contrast: now is a cessation of fighting but if need be, everything can be changed” and changed very quickly because there are a lot of Russian soldiers and Russian weapons in or near Ukraine and they haven’t been pulled back at all.