Sunday, August 2, 2020

Moscow Closes Another Military Facility Abroad – This Time in Kazakhstan


Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 30 – Despite the aggressiveness of Vladimir Putin’s rhetoric, he has been quietly cutting back on Russia’s permanent military presence abroad, closing down bases of various kinds in former Soviet republics. The latest such move came in Kazakhstan less than two weeks ago.

            On July 21, the Duma denounced its agreement with Kazakhstan on a Russian radar site near Lake Balkhash that was set to run out in December. This legislative action means that Moscow will not extend the agreement for another five years as the 2014 accord, ratified a year later, allowed.

            There are two other Russian facilities abroad which Moscow was supposed to make a decision on extending or closing in July but which up to now the Russian government has made no announcement, military expert Pavel Luzin says. These are a radar site and a naval communications facility in Belarus (ridl.io/ru/kogda-rossija-pokidaet-svoi-bazy/).

            Given tensions with Belarus and the upcoming presidential election there which may lead to a change in government, it is understandable to Moscow hasn’t made any announcement, especially as it is possible that it might be forced to change its position if a new president in Belarus were to insist upon it.

            But the Kazakhstan case raises a larger question, he says. “Why is the Kremlin which by tradition considers a military presence on of the most important foreign policy levers, prepared to give up this presence?”

            According to Luzin, the answer lies in the fact that in the decades since the disintegration of the USSR, Moscow has established replacements for radar sites in the former republics on its own territory and therefore doesn’t need them in these neighboring countries and so in most cases is prepared to give them up.

            And even if it does maintain such bases, Luzin says, Moscow wants to avoid being dependent on them given uncertainties about the future. Consequently, it will preserve bases on former Soviet territory only where its foreign policy interests but not its defense of Russia require it.

            At present, Moscow has eliminated the military value of such facilities abroad in all but one case: the Window optical-electronic site in Tajikistan which even today is “the most advanced system” for the Russian military and one that Russia’s defenses require (structure.mil.ru/structure/forces/vks/50letRKO/skkp.htm).

            According to Luzin, the Russian government could give up the others if purely military considerations were the only ones involved; but it retains them at least for the time being for political ones. That is the case in Belarus. Moscow could shutter the two facilities there without a loss in security, but it doesn’t want to be embarrassed by such a withdrawal.

            If in fact, Moscow is compelled to close them, the commentator suggests, that would constitute “a serious diplomatic defeat for the Kremlin.” And Moscow would seek some compensation by taking other means to cover its loss. 

Saturday, August 1, 2020

Long-Dormant Institutions of Democracy and Federalism have Awakened in Khabarovsk, Navalny’s Man on the Scene Says


Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 30 – Aleksey Vorsin, Khabarovsk coordinator for Aleksey Navalny, says that over the last two years, democracy and federalism, long-dormant but never completely dead in the Russian Far East have re-awoken and are a genie the Kremlin will find it extremely difficult to put back to sleep.

            Vorsin calls attention to three things that have received little attention up until now: Sergey Furgal’s promotion of democracy in local institutions in the kray, his revival of ideas associated with the region’s first post-Soviet governor, and the dangers ahead given the way pro-Moscow officials have turned to the criminal elements (region.expert/institutes/).

            First of all, most observers assume that the people of Khabarovsk back Furgal because he was a local man they elected. That is certainly part of the story, Vorsin says; but the now-former governor did more than that to win support and perhaps the most important thing was to restore the direct elections of heads of districts and settlements in the kray.

            Furgal said, the Navalny activist says, declared that “a head elected by the people feels a connection with his territory and works better.” He or she certainly has more support, and that link between the people and these lower levels of power continues, complicating any plans to restore Khabarovsk to a pre-Furgal state.

            Second, consciously or unconsciously, Furgal built on the ideas and actions of his predecessor, Viktor Ishayev, “a heavyweight governor” in the 1990s, who regularly proclaimed that “my party is Khabarovsk kray!”  He spoke with Moscow as an equal, promoted local studies in schools, and backed the spread of regional symbols like the flag and even a hymn.

            Vorsin says that when he was a pupil during Ishayev’s times, a special atlas was prepared and published for schools bearing the title “Love and Know Your Kray,” promoting attitudes that define the cultural code of the region and ensuring that there wouldn’t be any outsiders appointed who would survive politically.

            The current wave of protests underscores this, he continues. “Everyone understands perfectly well that there is a legitimate regional power elected by the people and there is a federal center, Moscow, which doesn’t pay attention to our opinion.”  The protests may end but these attitudes will continue.

            And third, there is a dangerous trend among officials opposed to the Khabarovsk people in the streets. If the Kremlin decides on repression, not all local police will go along. Some in the power structures are now turning to “semi-criminal sports clubs” for people preferred to fill in for police who won’t do this dirty work, the Navalny man says.

            Of course, if Moscow does decide to crush the demonstrators, it will have to bring in OMON forces “from the central regions” of the Russian Federation. Police from elsewhere in the Far East and Siberia undoubtedly suffer from the same “disease” as do police in Khabarovsk itself.

            Regardless of whether the protests continue or not, Vorsin says, “Khabarovsk people already feel themselves free and aren’t going to submit to diktat again.” They will show that in the upcoming elections and in other ways, and Moscow needs to recognize that all its political technologists can’t change that.

            At the same time, the Navalny activist says, any real regionalist party and any real federalism will not come back to Russia as a whole while Putin is still in office; and people in Khabarovsk need to recognize that they can’t establish federalism on their own in a single federal subject.

            To make Russia a genuine federation will require “the consolidated action of all subjects of the Federation, including Moscow.” And there is little chance of that now. But regional protests are happening and regional movements will emerge, and both will help promote the development of federalism in the future.

            As for himself, Vorsin says, he views such movements and even parties as “positive” and “necessary” and will fight for their creation.

Separatism Doesn’t Threaten Russia But Will If Kremlin Fails to Listen to Regions, Yarulin Says


Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 30 – The most important lesson of the Khabarovsk protests is that separatism doesn’t threaten Russia now but could if the central government continues to try to make all the decisions, consolidate all the power and wealth, and ignore the aspirations of Russians in the regions, Ildus Yarulin says.

            The director of the Vladivostok Institute of Political Technologies and Communications argues that “when Vladimir Putin came to power, he faced a super-important task: not to allow the country to fall apart into principalities. Such a threat existed,” and Putin dealt with it successfully (regnum.ru/news/polit/3023700.html).

            “But today before the president and before all of us stands a yet more important task: to listen to the aspirations of the people in the regions and bring the regions together because strong regions as we know are the basis of a strong Russia,” Yarulin continues. If Putin is willing to listen, that is all possible; if he isn’t, then to the dangers he suppressed earlier could return. 

            How the Kremlin leader chooses to respond will determine who will emerge as the leaders of regional movements and parties, the political analyst says; and who these people are will determine whether they move toward separatism or become participants in the strengthening of the state.

            Discussions about new regional parties have been taking place for some time, despite the legal ban against them, Yarulin points out.  And now given the failures of both the systemic and extra-systemic parties at the center, many people are talking about creating replacements for them as well.

            One thing about the latter discussions is especially troubling: no one involved in those discussions is talking about regional problems, “even though all the problems are in the regions: poverty is in the regions, and illness, and death, and disintegrating housing, and lack of roads and access, and ‘the black hole’ of municipal services – everything is in the regions.”

            If neither the old nor the new parties will talk about these things, then regional parties will emerge, including across the entire Russian Far East; and the longer the parties at the all-Russian level ignore the problems of the regions, the more radical these regional parties are going to become.

            “The regions, especially in the Far East, are ever more angry that they do the work and the federal center distributes their earnings.” Some are given more, others less, but the decisions are made behind closed doors at the center.  Khabarovsk didn’t invent this issue but the city’s protests have attracted new attention to it.

            The center and the regions must function so that each can trust the other, Yarulin argues.  If they don’t, “nothing good” is in prospect. Perhaps the country needs a new federative treaty or an elected Federation Council. At least, such things need to be discussed because the current ones are viewed in the regions as meaningless.

            In the current situation, various groups are appearing, including in Khabarovsk, in the form of The Voice of the Far Easterner. It may have some influence on the upcoming elections but largely because of the weakness of the other parties.  But it will be effective only if the center works with rather than against it.

            Will that movement become “a real force”? “Will there appear in the Far Eastern Federal District  new movements oriented not at protests but at development?” Positive answers to these questions are needed and needed now. Otherwise, the situation could deteriorate in very threatening ways.

            “The protests in Khabarovsk Kray continue,” but “sooner or later these marches will end. But will the protest end? How will it end? And who will head the new movements?” The future of the Far East and of Russia as a whole depend on those answers: Moscow needs to start listening and the regions need to start focusing on becoming strong parts of a strong Russia.