Kamchatka’s Itelmens, with Only Five Native Speakers, Hope to Revive Their National Language

Paul Goble

            Staunton, October 31 – One of the numerically small peoples of the North, the 3,000 Itelmens on Russia’s Kamchatka peninsula, seldom get much attention. In the 1980s, the defection of one of their number in Japan set up a minor boomlet of interest and more recently the mass death of sea life near where they live has again attracted attention to them.

            But as Yekaterina Vasyukova of the Sibreal portal points out, they are a remarkable nation with a unique history and what may be a unique aspiration: Although there are only five native speakers of the national language left, they are committed to the rebirth of their language and with it their culture (sibreal.org/a/30921046.html).

            Because the Itelmen have been a sedentary population for centuries, they far more rapidly assimilated to Russians than did their nomadic neighbors like the Koryaks. They intermarried and were losing their language even before Soviet times, and Russian officials often lumped them together with the Russians as Kamchadals, a collective name for everyone in Kamchatka.

            In the 1920s  and early 1930s, Soviet officials promoted the language and even developed an alphabet for it based on Latin. But when Stalin ordered all languages with a Latin script-based language to go over to a Cyrillic one, Moscow somehow forgot the Itelmen. And their time with a literary language was simply ended.

            Then in the 1950s, the Khrushchev government, committed to creating a Soviet people took steps to destroy the language altogether. Children were taken from their homes, put in boarding schools and punished if they spoke anything but Russian. That effectively killed the language as an entire generation was lost.

            Only two decades later did the first circle of Itelmens who wanted to recover their language form. But there were few books in the language, now supplied with a Cyrillic-base, and after the collapse of the USSR in 1991, there has not been a single book published in Itelmen, although there is an Itelmen-Russian dictionary still in use.

            Now activists are promoting both the national language and the national culture. There is one class for those who want to learn Itelmen. Four of the five enrolled are Itelmens, but all of them are over 70. Last year, the Kamchatka University began offering a course, but it too is small.

            But Viktor Ryzhkov, the instructor, is optimistic. According to Vasyukova, “he believes that the Itelmen language can still be returned to life.”  All that is needed, he says, is a desire to have that happen. No state programs or anything like that will help if people themselves don’t want it.”

            However, the instructor says, “now I see that there are people who want to study their language. They aren’t large in number, but they do exist.” On them the future of the Itelmen language and the Itelmen nation depends.

A Biden Victory would Set Stage for New and Tougher Ideological Competition between Moscow and the West and within Russia Itself, Shelin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, October 31 – Russians are intently focused on the US presidential election, with some convinced that a Trump victory will be better for them and others that a Biden one will be. But both sides in this debate are focused almost exclusively on the question of sanctions and whether they will be lifted or strengthened.

            But there is a far more interesting aspect to the Trump-Biden contest, one that few Russians are talking about but that may have profound consequences for their country and h ow the Putin regime will deal with its international competitors and domestic enemies, Rosbalt commentator Sergey Shelin says (rosbalt.ru/blogs/2020/10/30/1870828.html).

            If Biden wins, he argues, this will become “a powerful step forward for a new American ideology which his party has subordinated itself to. One may call it progressivism, political correctness, new socialism or whatever. But it is important to understand that this is not a political doctrine of an ordinary kind.”

            It is, in Shelin’s telling, “an aggressive civil religion or, what is the same time, neo-totalitarianism.”

            “In America, almost all mass media, social networks, universities, and advanced firms willingly or unwillingly profess this new faith,” he continues. They purge those who don’t accept it and demand that the majority make sacrifices to help minorities which have suffered in the past.

            It is often suggested that “Biden and other corrupt hypocrites of his kind are only short-term beneficiaries of the progressivist way who will soon be pushed out by young and really enflamed activists.” But it is a powerful “new religion” and its followers will use a Biden victory to expand their power in the United States.

            If Trump wins, he and his supporters will continue to oppose this “progressive attack,” but they will only slow its arrival, not prevent the coming of “a bright future” as the progressives imagine. Demography and the establishment are on their side, and Trump’s base is on the losing end of the first and largely excluded from the second.

            What this means is that sooner, in the event of a Biden win, or later, if Trump comes out on top, “the United States will come close to adopting an official ideology, very similar to that which the Putin regime has created and imposed.” Similar but in some ways exactly the opposite to be sure.

            American society from below is promoting “the new totalitarianism” there, while in Russia, it is being imposed “from above.” There it is all about a progressive agenda; here it is about a reactionary one. The American variant is “anti-imperialist,” while the Russian one is imperial to the core.

            The American variant is committed to preventing the feelings of minorities from being offended, Shelin continues. The Russian one is worried about defending the feelings of bureaucrats, policemen, priests, “and all who believe in the Soviet past.” In short, they are structurally similar but diametrically opposed.

            That has consequences. It will certainly promote the growth of mutual hostility, especially in Russia as “our civic quasi-religion, thought up by not very bright and not especially self-confident people very much needs constant references to the existence of a horrific ideological opponent beyond the seas.”

            Even now, Shelin says, “unmasking Western political correctness is a most important aspect of [Russian] state propaganda. If this political correctness wins the election and rises to a new level, then this new level will intensify the struggle against it” that the Putin regime will launch against the US and its Russian supporters, the domestic opposition.

            That group will be “hit as pro-Western, and the more totalitarian the West becomes, the broader it will open itself [and its acolytes inside Russia] for such hits.” It could even prove to be the case that regardless of what happens with sanctions, this could become “a real gift for our regime.” 

Pandemic Forces Cancellation of Traditional Red Square Parades on November 4 and 7

Paul Goble

            Staunton, October 31 – Because of the pandemic, Moscow officials have cancelled the Red Square parades traditionally held on November 4 and 7 (regnum.ru/news/3104277.html), a highly symbolic move that has convinced more Russians that the regime, denials notwithstanding, will likely restore the lockdown (rosbalt.ru/posts/2020/10/30/1870790.html).

            The statistics continue to be dire, with the authorities registering 18,140 new cases of infection and 334 new deaths over the last 24 hours alone (znak.com/2020-10-31/v_rossii_za_sutki_chislo_bolnyh_covid_19_vyroslo_na_18140_chelovek).

            In some places, the flood of new patients is so great that there isn’t time for doctors to treat them, pathologists to identify the problems, and gravediggers to do their work (znak.com/2020-10-31/mediki_ne_uspevayut_lechit_patologoanatomy_vskryvat_mogilchikb_kopat_reportazh_iz_kurgana_stavshego).

The pandemic continues to spread both in Moscow and environments and in regions far from the Russian capital with closures and restrictions vastly outnumbering re-openings and a loosening of controls (regnum.ru/news/society/3101964.html).

In Moscow, more emergency hospitals are being set up (echo.msk.ru/blog/day_video/2734310-echo/).

In Moscow Oblast, the authorities are restricting government operations, restricting those over 65 to their homes, and indicating that they are prepared to take more steps if conditions deteriorate (regnum.ru/news/3104167.html and regnum.ru/news/3104162.html).

Beyond the ring road, hospitals are suffering problems with oxygen and medications (siberiantimes.com/other/others/news/two-intensive-care-covid-19-patients-died-after-oxygen-supply-booth-exploded-at-chelyabinsk-hospital/), and more schools are shifting to distance learning (regnum.ru/news/society/3072297.html and https://ura.news/news/1052456550).

In Pskov Oblast, residents staged a demonstration to protest Putin’s healthcare “optimization” which during the crisis has left them without essential services (7x7-journal.ru/news/2020/10/31/infekcionnoe-otdelenie-ostaetsya-no-v-to-zhe-vremya-net-eto-zhe-bred-zhiteli-pskovskoj-oblasti-vyshli-na-piket-protiv-optimizacii-zdravoohraneniya).

But Russians did get one piece of somewhat good news. The Russian tourism agency predicts their country’s external borders will be open for tourism again, but only in March or April of next year (vestikavkaza.ru/news/ator-rossia-mozet-otkryt-granicy-dla-turistov-v-marte.html).

On the vaccine front, Putin admits that the country is having trouble producing enough vaccine quickly, an acknowledgement that follows earlier reports that even the trials have been slowed by the lack of sufficient medication (en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64296). Moscow expects the vaccine to end the pandemic and earn Moscow enormous sums of money (business-gazeta.ru/article/486633).

In other vaccine stories, officials acknowledged that the first group of elderly volunteers has been given the first dose of the vaccine, weeks after Moscow announced it was seeking such people (regnum.ru/news/3104001.html); and experts said that many questions about the vaccine remain unanswered (kp.ru/daily/2171202.5/4313692/).

On the economic  front, 38 percent  said their standard of living had continued to fall during the third quarter, and 23 percent said they expect that trend to continue for some time (krizis-kopilka.ru/archives/81253).  And in an effort to save themselves, Russians are taking money out of banks and putting it into the stock market in hopes of earning more (ura.news/articles/1036281348).

Many Russians Want to Evade the Draft and Both State and Society have Made That Easier, Former Draft Official Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, October 30 – Polls show that more young Russians are ready to serve in the military, at least in part because of difficulties in finding work in the civilian economy; but many young men still seek to evade service and they are being aided in that by both the laws and policies of the government and the attitudes of society, Sergey Kozlov says.

            In an article in Novoye voennoye obozreniye, the former draft administrator and now military historian says that the number seeking to evade service illegally is disturbing because it points to a larger problem in Russian society of loyalty to the state and to actions by the state that encourage rather than discourage this trend (nvo.ng.ru/realty/2020-10-29/3_1115_army.html).

            This year, he writes, approximately 640,000 young men will reach the draft age of 18. That means that about 320,000 are potentially available for service in each of the two cycles, less about 10 percent who have genuine medical problems. But fewer than half of that number will actually be taken into the ranks. Last spring, only 135,000 were.

            That means that many who could be drafted won’t be and that pattern only encourages those who are at risk of being called to the colors but don’t want to be to seek ways and means of avoiding service. Instead of tightening the system up to block them, both the government and society have made it easier for young men to avoid service with fewer real penalties.

            Kozlov argues that the chief cause of this is “the lack of a state ideology” promoted by patriotic education in the schools. “Having liquidated ‘Primary Military Preparation” in the middle schools, our educational system has ceased to prepared draftees ready for service for the defense of the Fatherland.”

            And “having destroyed ideology,” he continues, “we have allowed our enemies to raise from among our children a generation of rootless cosmopolitans who do not know the history of tehri country and do not have the spiritual values and ideals for which they would be prepared to sacrifice their lives.”

            But Kozlov makes clear that this absence of ideology affects not only the potential draftees who don’t want to serve but the state and the broader society, with the former not doing enough to enforce draft laws and the latter looking the other way in the cases of those who evade service.

            Earlier this year, Putin increased fines for those who don’t show up at military commissariats when called from 500 to 3,000 rubles (seven to 40 US dollars). Does anyone think that discourages those who have decided to try to avoid service, Kozlov asks. That is obviously a purely “rhetorical question.”  

            He points out that the Russian law on military service “does not have a real mechanism” of ensuring its execution. It assumes young men will simply show up and accept being drafted. That means that each commissariat has to come up with a plan on how to look for those who don’t. Some are effective; but many simply allow people to avoid service.

            Russian lawmakers have constantly reduced the penalties on those who do illegally avoid service. Restrictions on government employment have dropped from a lifetime ban to ten years to five or, in reality, even less, Kozlov says. And the number of firms offering to help young men get medical certificates to avoid service has exploded, leading to competition among them.

            Military commissariats do have the right to challenge these certificates, but they don’t always. Sending young men to military hospitals is something not all of them choose to do, especially as they can meet their quotas without doing so. As a result, this kind of fraud often works.

            As for others who don’t show up or ignore notifications, Kozlov continues, the commissariats first have to catch those involved before they can enforce any laws that do exist to punish them. That is something these boards often lack the staff or stomach for, given that the young men are often a step ahead of them and many in society are on their side.

            Many Russians today may admire the military but that doesn’t mean they want their own sons or the sons of their friends to serve there. After all, some of them think, there are plenty of others who can bear that particular burden.  

Ingush Court Allows Appeal of Ban on Committee Searching for MIAs from 1992 Prigorodny War

Paul Goble

            Staunton, October 30 –Ingush courts once again have shown they are far more independent that most in Russia and thus given Moscow yet another reason not to want the trial of protest leaders to take place there, a Magas court has allowed an appeal of an earlier decision to liquidate a group looking for MIAs from the 1992 Prigorodny war.

            In June, the Ingush justice ministry asked a court to liquidate the Committee for Supporting the Search for Hostages and MIAs in that conflict  because it had failed to file required paperwork (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2020/10/magas-shuts-group-seeking-mias-from.html).

            Many feared that this latest move against Ingush civil society would be successful, but now another court in Magas has accepted the arguments of the Committee that such an action was excessive – most groups are allowed to correct paperwork errors – and allowed its activists to appeal the earlier decision (kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/355903/).

            The latest decision does not mean that the liquidation order will necessarily be overturned, but it does signal that the actions of the Ingush justice ministry in this case violate standard practice to the point that some in the judicial system feel are insufficient for the remedy it sought.

            At the very least, this shows that the courts in Ingushetia, unlike those in many other parts of the Russian Federation, aren’t slavish followers of whatever executive branch agencies want and that Ingush groups under attack can have some hope that the courts will be on their side rather than that of their oppressors.

            There is another consequence here that may in the end matter more: Appeals of this decision will go to courts beyond the borders of the republic. If those courts rule against the appellants, Ingush will conclude that the original ban had its origins less in Magas than in Moscow.

            In that event, this case will only deepen the divide between Russia and Ingushetia and, more important, between Russians and Ingush, a trend that will make future activism in the republic ever more anti-Russian and limit Moscow’s ability to control it without the use of police force.

           

Only Six Federal Subjects have Conditions Favorable for Entrepreneurialism, HSE Study Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, October 30 – The decision to become an entrepreneur is inherently a personal one, but it is affected in many ways by the environment where the individual is located. At present, only six of Russia’s more than 80 federal subjects have one which makes that decision easier. The rest more or less actively discourage entrepreneurialism.

            That is the conclusion of a new study by Aleksandr Chepurenko and Olga Obraztsova (“Entrepreneurial Activity in Russia and Its Inter-Regional Differences” (in Russian), Zhurnal NEA 2:46 (2020): 199-211 at publications.hse.ru/mirror/pubs/share/direct/373079548.pdf; summarized by Svetlana Sultanova at iq.hse.ru/news/412421651.html).

            On the basis of a survey they conducted with the Russian Economics University, the two  Higher School of Economics scholars say that there are only six federal subjects where conditions exist that encourage young Russians to go into business with the remaining ones being either neutral or hostile to such aspirations. 

            In St. Petersburg, there are 427 small and mid-sized enterprises per 10,000 population, far above the all-Russian figure of 181 and within the range of many Western countries; but in the North Caucasus, there are only 20 – less than five percent of the Northern Capital’s number – and microscopically small compared to say Estonia’s 681.

            In gathering data for the period 2005 to 2019, Chepurenko and Obraztsova found that in the early years, the number of people entering business rose, then it stabilized, but in recent years it has contracted both in places where the numbers were initially high and in those where they were still low.

            Those where growth was initially high has suffered less than those where it was low, but the numbers of regions in the two other categories – the second which includes 41 regions with investment problems and the third which includes 32 with specific social and political obstacles – continue to drag the country down on this measure.

            These disparities prompt some people to decide not to go into business at all and others to move from areas where starting a business is difficult to others where it is less so, exacerbating both internal migration and the differences between the business-friendly minority and the business-hostile majority.

            “To want to become an entrepreneur and to become one are very different things, especially now,” the scholars write. When prospects are uncertain, many will refrain from taking the step even if they would like to. Many studies have focused on how to make Russians more inclined to become entrepreneurs, but what is needed is more attention to the conditions under which people will actually do so.

            That has not happened in much of the country, and Russia as a whole is paying a price for this gap.

Western Sanctions Hurt Russia’s Defense Industry and Put It at Odds with Other Sectors, Luzin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, October 30 – Many in Russia and the West believe that Western sanctions have done little to affect the Russian economy let alone Russian policy, but there is at least one area where they have had a major impact – on the Russian defense industry – that has both international security and domestic political consequences, Pavel Luzin says.

            In a commentary for the Riddle portal, the Russian analyst says that sanctions on Russian defense producers have been used since the 1990s and have had slowed modernization, increased costs and intensified tensions between that sector and the Kremlin (ridl.io/ru/sankcii-i-rossijskaja-oboronnaja-promyshlennost/).

            In evaluating the impact of sanctions, Luzin says, it is important to remember that they are less about forcing the target to change his actions than to increase his costs and limit his freedom of action, even as they occur in a situation which allows those who impose them to keep their own freedom of action.

            According to the Russian analyst, Western sanctions have not led to a split in the Russian ruling group but they have “inflicted fundamental harm on the Russian political system through the defense sector. Moscow has always assumed that it can adapt to sanctions as it did in the 1990s but has discovered that it has far more problems when these continue for long periods.

            That has been especially true with regard to the defense sector, Luzin says. Sanctions have made put a break on Russia’s weapons modernization program by increasing costs of development and forcing Moscow to spend a great deal of money trying to work around sanctions via industrial espionage or the purchase of equipment from third parties.

            Between 2015 and 2018, he continues, Moscow was forced to spend at least 25 billion US dollars more for these various programs than it otherwise would have had to, no small amount given the size of the Russian economy and its state sector. Almost all of this was to support the defense sector and came from transfers from others, increasing tensions.

            Given that the Kremlin faces rising problems at home, such transfers only magnify disputes within the elite even if they do not lead to splits. The recent economic difficulties have only magnified the impact of these sanctions, even if they have not had all the consequences some of their authors expected.

            “In other words,” Luzin concludes, “isolating Russian defense industry from Western producers and technological chains has made it less stable” and affected other sectors from which the Kremlin has taken resources in order to maintain its military posture, angering those involved in them.

            As this has happened, the defense sector has become increasingly opaque, something that has allowed it to take on far more debt than the central government wants and creating a problem that the regime will eventually have to address in order to prevent a collapse that would spread across the economy.

            This week, the US increased the stringency of its sanctions regime against Russian defense industry, bringing it into line with what it has already done with respect to  China and Venezuela (govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-10-29/pdf/2020-23962.pdf and  krizis-kopilka.ru/archives/81241).

            That will only intensify the problems Luzin describes.