Putin Regime Moves from Labeling Russians as ‘Foreign Agents’ to Imposing Tight Restrictions on Them, a Trend Suggesting Even Worse May be Ahead

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Dec. 1 – Initially, the Putin regime labeled as “foreign agents” a limited number of its opponents in hopes of shaming them and limiting their influence. Now, it has radically expanded the number of people who may be given that status and imposed specific and tight restrictions on them, a move that raises the possibility that even worse may be ahead.

            As of today, a draconian new law, “On control of the activity of persons under foreign influence,” goes into effect, systematizing and expanding restrictions under which those so classified must try to live and work inside the current borders of the Russian Federation (iarex.ru/news/87819.html).

            According to the new law, any resident of the Russian Federation who receives support from abroad or who is under foreign influence and is involved in political activity, the collection of information about security matters or the dissemination of materials to others can be classified as “a foreign agent.”

            A few groups are excluded – government institutions, religious groups, political parties, employers, and members of international organizations who are only visiting Russia – but these exceptions only prove the rule that almost anyone in Russia now may be considered a foreign agent.

            Those so classified have long been required to identify themselves as such, but now they can be subject to administrative or even criminal penalties for not doing that or for carrying out any information campaigns, receiving state financing for their activities, using significant government property, participating as experts in certain fields, and becoming state employees.

            This approach recalls the way in which the Nazis and other authoritarian governments dealt with their opponents, first identifying them as such and then imposing severe restrictions on their activities only in the end to impose more draconian punishments including in the case of Jews and others in Nazi Germany death.

            There is no indication that the Putin regime intends anything similar, but the fact that it is moving in a similar direction undoubtedly is sparking fears about what it intends to do next, something that will lead some to end the ties the government opposes, others to emigrate and still others to become  more radical in their opposition to the Kremlin. 

Mobilization-Driven Emigration of Russians to CIS Countries Helping Moscow Reclaim Influence There, Moscow Commentator Says

Paul Goble

Staunton, Dec. 1 – Most analysts Russian and otherwise have seen the massive outflow of Russians because of Putin’s war in Ukraine and his partial mobilization effort as having serious costs on Russia, a brain drain in fact from which the country will have difficulty recovering anytime soon.

But one Russian commentator, Aleksandr Shustov, says that the new emigration may help Moscow at least in the former Soviet republics. At the very least, he argues this is something the Russian authorities should be sensitive to (ritmeurasia.org/news--2022-12-01--masshtabnaja-antivoennaja-emigracija-vygodna-rossii-63346).

Most of the Russians who have moved abroad since February, he points out, have moved to CIS member countries; and because they have led to a growth in the ethnic Russian population in places where it had been declining, they have “initiated a revival of the process of the Russification of the near abroad.”

“Under ordinary conditions,” Shustov says, “there are no stimuli for Russians to move to the republics of the former USSR and as a result, the ethnic Russian population and also the Russian-language cultural milieu would continue to decline. Now, however, there are great chances for forming on the perimeter of the southern Russian borders ‘new Russian diasporas.’”

These diasporas, he insists, “inevitably although unwillingly will become carriers of cultural influence and thus be a form of Russian ‘soft power’” It is interesting that any Russian commentator would make that argument because it will likely have the unintended consequence of making these countries less willing to take in new Russian immigrants.

If the governments and peoples of these countries believe that Moscow plans to use such Russians abroad for Moscow and against them, they are certain to become more hostile to the arrival of such people and more selective about whom they will allow in and whom they will turn away.

Indeed, it is possible that Shustov’s article is designed to do just that, prompting other countries to take actions that will make it less necessary for Moscow itself to impose restrictions on emigrating by having other countries increase restrictions on their entrance and remaining there.

 

Two Demographic Trends in Russia Coming Together to Limit Putin’s Ability to Wage the Kind of War He has Conducted Up to Now

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Dec. 1 – Two tectonic demographic shifts in Russian society – ever lower fertility rates and ever greater divorce rates – are now coming together in ways that will inevitably the ability of Vladimir Putin to be able to wage aggressive wars that rely on mass armies.

            On the one hand, falling fertility rates mean that the size of the draft pool is declining: Russian society is simply producing ever fewer people in the prime draft age cohorts, making it more difficult to raise a mass army, and these declines mean that ever more families have only one or two children making the potential loss even more difficult to bear.

            And on the other, rising divorce rates mean that ever more children are growing up in single-parent households, not only being the object of even more intense attention from their only parent than many are from two but also increasingly the source of income either from jobs or government subsidies. Losing such a child is thus certain to spark more resistance.

            Other countries have wrestled with this problem and there are ways around it, the most prominent being to shift away from mass armies to smaller professional ones and to avoid conflicts where mass armies are required either as the primary aggressive force or to suppress populations in occupied areas.

            But the Russian authorities have generally appeared to believe that they can continue to act as they always have, as if larger families and two-parent households are the overwhelming norm rather than being as the first is increasingly rare and the second ever less of the norm it once was.

            Two new protests, one by mothers of single sons (t.me/mobilizationnews/4633) and a second by single parents (владимиру-путину.рф/), are now highlighting this problem and prompting discussion of the ways in which demography may affect policy now and in the future (sibreal.org/a/materi-umolyayut-putina-ne-otnimat-u-nih-edinstvennyh-synovey/32153875.html).

            As Putin’s war in Ukraine grinds on toward its first anniversary, ever more families are going to face losses; and so what has been an issue confined mostly to demographers and economists up to now is likely to become a broader political question, possibly sparking demands for an end to the war or at a minimum a radical change in the way it is being fought.

Putin’s Registered Pseudo-Cossacks Foundering, a Trend that Gives Hope to the Real Ones

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 30 – Yesterday, Igor Barinov, the head of Russia’s Federal Agency for Nationality Affairs, spoke to the Second All-Russian Conference Seminar on Russian Cossacks. Two aspects of his remarks give hope to the genuine Cossacks who are not registered and thus not part of the official establishment.

            On the one hand, the fact that the senior Russian official spoke to such a meeting gives support to those who believe that the Cossacks are a distinct nation and not just a social stratum, a position very much at odds with the Putin administration but widely held among Cossack groups not registered by the authorities.

            And on the other hand, Barinov confessed that Cossack groups the state has recognized and registered are failing both because many of them “have nothing in common with Cossackdom except the name” and because they are losing members rather than attracting young people to their organizations (nazaccent.ru/content/39573-problemy-kazachestva-v-regionah-obsudili-na-seminare-soveshanii-v-moskve.html).

            The leaders of the unregistered Cossacks who count themselves the genuine article and who see the registered Cossacks as mostly people who like to dress up in fancy uniforms and collect money from the state to work as guards or to disperse demonstrations are pleased on both grounds (9111.ru/questions/7777777772064549/).

            They know that they are the real Cossacks and as such are a nation, and they are pleased that Barinov acknowledges both this and that the unregistered “Cossacks” he and the government have constructed are failing because each loss of membership in those groups represents a real gain for real Cossacks.

              (For background on the differences between registered and unregistered Cossacks and why this is no small thing, see jamestown.org/program/de-cossackization-modern-day-echoes-of-soviet-crime/, jamestown.org/program/moscow-tightens-control-over-its-cossacks/, jamestown.org/program/putins-pseudo-cossacks-assume-larger-role-but-real-cossacks-refuse-to-go-along/ and jamestown.org/program/cossackia-no-longer-an-impossible-dream/.)

As a Result of Russian Flight, Number and Share of Christians in Kazakhstan Decline

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 30 – The share of Kazakhstan residents who say they are Muslims has remained relatively constant since the 2009 census. Then, 70.2 percent of the population said they were followers of Islam; now 69.3 percent do. But in the interval, the number of Muslims has increased from 11.2 million out of 16 million o 13.3 million out of 19 million.

            At the same time, the new census shows that the number and share of Kazakhstan residents who declare themselves to be Christians have plummeted, falling from 4.3 million to 3.3 million or from just over a quarter (26.2 percent) to less than a fifth (17.2 percent) in the latest census (cabar.asia/ru/kak-izmenilos-kolichestvo-veruyushhih-v-kazahstane).

            Almost all of this change is a reflection of two things: the departure of ethnic Russians from Kazakhstan and the continued growth of the ethnic Kazakh nation. But experts say that some of it reflects how the two censuses were conducted. In 2009, census takers equated religion and nationality; in 2011, they distinguished the two.

            One consequence of that change in method is that the number of people in Kazakhstan who refused to specify their religion rose from only 81,000 in 2009 to 2.1 million (11.01 percent of the total population) in 2011, with the percentages in urban areas such as Almaty much higher than in rural areas.

            That pattern suggests there may be a loosening of ties between Kazakh national self-identification and Muslim religious affiliation, although additional investigations would be required to confirm such a trend. 

Russia and Iran Plan to Open Trade via the Caspian Sea

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Dec. 1 – In a move that reflects both the increasing ties between Moscow and Tehran and the difficulties both countries have in shipping via the Caucasus land bridge given instability and political changes there, the two governments have announced plans to open trade on the Caspian Sea between Astrakhan in Russia and Bender-Enzeli in Iran.

            The two sides have further agreed that Russia will be allowed to transfer from ships to rail lines across Iran 12 million tons of cargo a year, equally approximately 3,000 trainloads in all. In this way, “the Caspian will become for Moscow a trade window to the world” (realtribune.ru/moskva-i-tegeran-dogovorilis-o-tranzite-gruzov-cherez-iranskuju-territoriju).

            Earlier this year, Russia and Iran had agreed to trade via Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, but the sea route is preferable because fewer political and security issues are involved and because Iran is now a member of the Shanhai Cooperation Council and thus is tied more closely to Russia.

            Moreover, Russian analysts say, this new Caspian route gives Russia an alternative to complete dependence on China and sends a message to Central Asian and South Caucasus countries that the North-South trade route Russia has long wanted can be more important for them too and that they should cooperate with it rather than seek east-west ones.

            And what is especially important, these analysts say, is that this new Caspian sea route is “a natural counterweight” to Turkey’s presence and “Turkish ambitions” in the region as it challenges the networks Ankara and the West have set up to undermine or even exclude Russian influence there.

After Aliyev Says Azerbaijanis in Iran ‘Part of Our Nation,’ Baku Parliamentarian Proposes Renaming Country Northern Azerbaijan

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 30 – Last week, Azerbaijani President Ilham Alliyev told the ‘Along the Middle Corridor’ Conference that “we will do everything possible to defend our way our life as well as the secular direction of the development of Azerbaijan and of Azerbaijanis, including Azerbaijanis living in Iran. They are part of our nation” (salamnews.org/ru/news/read/480504).

            His remarks followed the uptick in tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan as a result of military exercises in the northern portions of Iran, a portion of that country which adjoins Azerbaijan and is populated overwhelmingly by Azerbaijani Turks (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/11/iran-responds-to-azerbaijani-exercises.html).

            In the wake of Aliyev’s remarks, Gudrat Gasanguliyev, an Azerbaijani parliamentarian, called for Azerbaijan to be renamed Northern Azerbaijan “exactly in the same way as in the name of other divided peoples” such as North and South Korea. He said this would serve as “a stimulus” for Azerbaijanis south of the Arax (haqqin.az/news/267382).

            According to Russian commentator, Stanislav Tarasov, these statements have potentially far-reaching consequences not only for relations between Azerbaijan and Iran but also between Azerbaijan and Turkey and thus represent a seriously destabilizing element for the greater Middle East (regnum.ru/news/3755959.html).

            Tehran currently thinks that these Azerbaijani remarks suggest that Baku is working hand in glove with Turkey to destroy Iran, but in fact, Tarasov argues, the facts of the case may be far different and lead to Azerbaijan’s becoming more independent of Turkey with regard to regional geopolitics.

            There are compelling reasons for such conclusions, he allows. In the event of a military conflict between Azerbaijan and Iran, it seems likely that a Turkic autonomy would be declared in the northern part of what is now Iran and more likely that Azerbaijan would quickly move to absorb it into a greater Azerbaijan at Iran’s expense.

            Moscow doesn’t need such complications, Tarasov says; but it isn’t in a position to eliminate the southern Azerbaijan question in Iran any more than it could the Kurdish one in Turkey. But Russian policy makers need to recognize that what Baku appears to be preparing to do may have even broader consequences than what appears to be the case.

            It is entirely possible, the Russian commentator says, that Aliyev’s decision to “play ‘the Iranian card’” is part of a Baku effort to establish Azerbaijan as a new power center in the region, one that looks more to the south into Iran and the recovery of Azerbaijanis than to Turkey and the West.

            If that should prove to be the case, then what Baku is doing will simultaneously restore an older geopolitical tradition in which what is now Azerbaijan was part of the culture around Persia rather than Turkey and in which Baku will focus its efforts to the south rather than to the west, reordering the Middle East chessboard more or less completely.