Russian Entrepreneurs and Activists Working to Ensure Books Banned by Moscow Reach Readers

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 3 – Like so many other cases of Kremlin actions, Moscow’s book bans are not working nearly as effectively as the authorities would like thanks to the work of underground entrepreneurs and activists who are selling originals or copies online, according to Ivan Smurov.

            The Vyorstka journalist says some of those involved in reselling texts taken off the shelves of bookdealers are doing it for the money while others are people committed to ensuring that Russian readers can get what they want (verstka.media/kak-iz-za-zapretov-v-rossii-poyavilas-industriya-podpolnoj-literatury).

            In a 5500-word article, Smurov says that some of the books offered are given new titles at least in the ads and at high prices which make those who engage in such practices reaping high incomes with little effort; and he notes that reprints and copies typed into internet formats are often filled with errors. Others are involved because they believe people should have the right to read what they want.  

            In some ways, this new market builds on the traditions of samizdat and especially tamizdat and even intersects with the latter; but in others, it is simply an example of the way in which clever entrepreneurs and activists can outwit the authorities, who often believe that banning the sale of books in bookstores is sufficient.

            It isn’t. While many Russians now can’t get the books they want easily, Smurov shows in case after case how those who are interested and committed to doing so can continue to do so – and are thus influenced by the reading of works the powers that be in Putin’s Russia  don’t want them to be.

To Deal with Gas Crisis, Moscow Approves Production and Sale of Dirtier Gasoline, a Move that will Harm Machinery, the Environment and Public Health

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 3 – To try to get more gasoline to consumers and stem popular outrage, the Russian government has approved the production and sale of dirtier gasoline of a kind it had banned since the 1990s, something that will harm machinery and the environment and threaten public health both immediately and over the longer term.

            Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin has issued a decree allowing Russian firms to sell gasoline with a far higher sulfur content until the end of this year in the hopes of increasing the amount of gas consumers can buy (meduza.io/en/news/2026/07/03/russia-permits-sale-of-downgraded-gasoline-as-fuel-crisis-drags-on and readovka.news/news/245108/).

            Such dirty gasoline is already banned by the EU and most countries, including the Russian Federation up to now, and means that Moscow won’t be able to sell any of it except to the few countries that don’t have such standards in place. But the real negative impact will be elsewhere.

            Such sulfur-rich fuel will harm the machinery in which it is used and the environment in which such cars and trucks operate and overtime will compromise public health, with experts saying that Russia will see “a sharp increase” in mortality in seven to nine years novayagazeta.eu/articles/2026/07/03/cherez-7-9-let-my-uvidim-rezkii-rost-smertnosti).

            In sum, this decision shows that the Russian government is so desperate to end the current gas crisis with its long lines at gas stations and rising anger among the population that it is more than ready to compromise not only machinery and the environment but the health of the peoples of the Russian Federation.

Despite Moscow’s Spending, Freight Traffic on Russia’s Rivers and Even the Length of Navigable Sections of These Waterways have Fallen Dramatically since 2022, Accounting Chamber Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 2 – Moscow has spent 190 billion rubles since 2022 to eliminate bottlenecks in its Unified Deep-Water System in the European Portion of Russia; but instead of achieving anything, it has seen riverine freight there decline by 28 percent and the total length of navigable routes by 5600 km, according to the Accounting Chamber.

            The worst situation is to be found along the Volga-Caspian canal where the movement of export-import cargo has become “virtually paralyzed,” the Russian government’s auditing agency says, a key part of Russia’s north-south trade corridor (ng.ru/economics/2026-07-02/1_9529_cargo.html ).

            That suggests that Russia’s rivers and the country’s reliance on them for the movement of freight both within the country and between Russia and foreign states have become yet another casualty of Putin’s shift in spending and attention away from the rivers in order to be able to finance his expanded war in Ukraine. 

            The government is currently scrambling to try to overcome problems there, the chamber continues; but a harbinger of worse to come is that the authorities have removed from the UDWS list major portions of rivers, an indication that Moscow has effectively decided that it can’t dredge them enough anytime soon to make them navigable.

            Officials had reported earlier that as a result of the silting up of rivers and the reduction in water flows as a result of global warming and increased use by people along the course of the country’s rivers that the total length of navigable rivers within Russia had fallen to 50,000 km (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/04/russia-now-has-only-50000-km-of-fully.html).

            The Accounting Chamber study suggests that that figure must now be reduced still further, an indication that riverine freight transport will not meet Putin’s targets in the next few years at least and that some riverine routes and the industries and populations that rely on them are going to be sacrificed instead.

            For background on how serious this is and how Putin’s policies have failed to stop the decline of riverine traffic, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2026/02/following-protests-budget-cuts-and.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/04/russia-now-has-only-50000-km-of-fully.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/01/moscow-may-finally-be-about-to-confront.html.

Lukashenka’s Repression Extends Far Beyond Political Groups and Means Victims of Domestic Abuse No Longer Getting Help They Need

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 1 -  After the Belarusian political crisis of 2020, Alyaksandr Lukashenka liquidated not only public organizations devoted to political issues but also those which were helping Belarusians with other problems. Among those suppressed were groups that had been helping victims of domestic abuse.

            As a result, researcher Tatyana Handel says, many of those suffering from this widespread plague no longer can get the help they need and had been receiving from NGOs because they are reluctant to turn to government agencies (dekoder.org/ru/article/belarus_zhenschiny_nasilie_pomosch/).

            Some Belarusian activists whose NGOs Lukashenka has suppressed have created online resources, but these often lack the kind of direct human support that the NGOs had provided and thus do not represent an adequate replacement, despite the claims of the supporters of the Lukashenka regime.

            Since 2020, the Belarusian dictator has closed more than 2,000 NGOs of all kinds, including shelters  and counseling centers for women.  Those who evaluate Lukashenka’s regime and focus on the release of political prisoners alone typically fail to take this broader impact of his repressions into account.  

             His repressive moves hit far more than just those suffering abuse in the home, but this is a group of people who seldom attract the attention political prisoners do and yet whose victimization is equally worthy of attention and condemnation. That seldom happens, but it very much should.   

Tokayev Disbands Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 1 – Reflecting the increasing dominance of the ethnic Kazakhs in Kazakhstan’s population and Astana’s commitment to building a unified civic society, Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has disbanded the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan.

            That body, which provided official representation of the country’s ethnic minorities, worked to prevent ethnic conflicts, and promoted a civic identity was set up in the early 1990s when the ethnic mix of Kazakhstan was very different and its possibilities for forming a nation state far less (spik.kz/2647-ank-bolshe-net-pochemu-ona-stala-lishnej-v-novom-kazahstane.html).

            At the end of Soviet times, ethnic Kazakhs formed only 39.7 percent of the population, barely more than the share of ethnic Russians who had been a plurality and then continued 37.8 percent. Now, ethnic Kazakhs represent 71 percent of the population with ethnic Russians forming only 14.4 percent and other ethnic groups even fewer.

            The Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan, originally called the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan, was quite active in the 1990s but has been less so in the last decade. Consequently, most Kazakhstan residents have not been all that concerned by its demise, seeing it as a structure that has already done all that it could.

            Indeed, it is striking that many analysts in Kazakhstan welcomed the demise of the Assembly, arguing that its continued existence could do more harm than good by encouraging smaller ethnic groups to mobilize against the ethnic Kazakhs and slowing the process of forming a Kazakh-informed civic nation.

Uzbekistan’s Population has Nearly Doubled Since 1989, First Post-Soviet Census There Shows

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 1 – Since the end of Soviet times, the population of Uzbekistan has nearly doubled from 19.98 million in 1989 to 39 million now, according to the results of the first, much-delayed and just-completed post-Soviet census, allowing Astana to correct upward by more than 200,000 the figures it had been using.

            Over the intervening years, the share of ethnic Uzbeks in the population of that Central Asian country has risen from 71 percent to 89.4 percent, with 91.3 percent now saying that Uzbek is their native language (podrobno.uz/cat/obchestvo/v-uzbekistane-oglasili-pervye-itogi-perepisi-naseleniya-zhiteley-strany-stalo-bolee-39-millionov/).

            Other figures of particular importance include that more than 38 percent of that country’s population is under the age of 30 and that there are slightly more men than women, an unusual pattern in the post-Soviet space and that more than half of its residents now live in cities.  

            More details are slated to be released soon, but even these permit three important conclusions: first, Uzbekistan’s population will continue to grow rapidly despite a small decline in fertility; second, that country will be increasingly monoethnic, with the role of minorities ever smaller; and third, it will have to deal with rapid urbanization.

Even Before Putin’s War in Ukraine, Young Men in Russia were Dying Far More Often than in Any Other Former Soviet Republic

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 1 – Even before Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine, young men in Russia were dying at rates far higher than their counterparts in any other former Soviet republic, costing the country numerous workers and reducing male life expectancy overall by almost a year, according to Yevgeny Chernyshov.

            The Nakanune analyst says that despite efforts to address this problem, the situation hasn’t improved in the last five years, that a third of men now do not live to retirement age, and that this pattern makes it all but impossible for Russian men to have a life expectancy of 78 years by 2030 as Vladimir Putin has decreed (nakanune.ru/articles/124799/).

            Deaths from illnesses, alcohol consumption, accidents, suicides and now combat among young men mean that Russia is losing tens of thousands of workers every year, whose places must be filled by immigrants unless the economy of the Russian Federation is to stagnate or decline.

            And it also means, Chernyshov continues, that Russia has been able to do little or nothing to reduce the longstanding gap in life expectancy between men and women, a gap that now stands at 11 years and is currently among the highest of any country on earth.

            Given that the Kremlin has stopped publishing much demographic data over the leans ast several years to hide what is happening in this and other areas, Chernyshov’s essay is a model of what can be gleaned from a variety of sources, direct and indirect, and a sign that the problems Putin is trying to conceal can’t be hidden completely.