Iranian Government Wants Country’s Parliament to Ratify 2018 Caspian Accord

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 9 – Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi says his government is sending Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea to its parliament for ratification that Iran and the other littoral states signed in 2018 but that Iran has not ratified in the intervening years.

            This announcement comes only a week before Tehran is slated to host a meeting of representatives of the five littoral states – Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and the Russian Federation – in Tehran (iranintl.com/en/202608076370 and timesca.com/iran-moves-to-ratify-caspian-sea-agreement-amid-tensions/).

            Iran has resisted ratifying the accord because conservatives in Tehran say it gives up too much of Iran’s claims to the Caspian; but officials like Gharibabadi say that the 2018 accord only deals with delimitation of the surface of the Caspian and that agreements about the seabed remain to be negotiated.

            Moscow has pressed Tehran to ratify the agreement for many years and will no doubt view this as a major Russian diplomatic victory. (On that history, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/12/moscow-urges-iran-to-ratify-caspian.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/07/moscow-tries-to-work-around-tehrans.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2021/07/iran-remains-stumbling-block-to.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2021/12/iran-shows-no-signs-of-ratifying-2018.html.)

            Other littoral states, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan in the first instance, will also be pleased because Iran’s ratification will make it easier for them to develop trans-Caspian networks and even oil platforms despite the fact that as Tehran is making clear, the 2018 accord does not directly resolve issues involving them.

Young Russians Increasingly Doubt Their Work will be Adequately Rewarded, Academy of Sciences Study Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 9 – Low levels of official unemployment hide a potentially dangerous trend, according to a new sociological study; and this that economic pessimism among the young is significantly increasing because “nearly 40 percent of the young are convinced their labor will not be adequately rewarded.

            The research, conducted by scholars at the Federal Center of Theoretical and Applied Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, has been summarized by Mikhail Sergeyev, the economics editor of Moscow’s Nezavisimaya Gazeta (ng.ru/economics/2026-08-09/1_9555_pessimism.html).

            According to the investigation, he says, the widespread view among older Russians that younger people don’t want to work has “deep-seated socio-economic causes” that have increasingly led young Russians to conclude that the existing state of labor relations in Russia is unfair and that hard work will not necessarily be rewarded.

            Among the more intriguing findings of the study, Sergeyev reports is that “’the rally ‘round the flag’ effect sparked by the beginning of the special military operation [against Ukraine in February 2022] was short-lived and that by 2024, it had begun to give way to structural pessimism.”

            Those who have such pessimistic attitudes are predominantly female, have vocation and technical education, and identify in class terms, with one in five of them identifying as lower class and three out of five middle class, a pattern that could lead to a growth in social tensions.

            But as of now, the scholars report, even the pessimists are still very loyal to key state institutions like the president and the army, with slightly more of the economic pessimists among the Russian young than among the optimists saying they trust Putin, 80.5 percent as against 77 percent.

If Mobilization Occurs without Bonuses, Moscow will Have a Deeply Divided Military, Inozemstev Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 7 – If the military conducts a mobilization without providing bonuses to the new soldiers, Moscow will find itself with an army “in which 500,000 people are fighting for money and another 500,000 are fighting for an idea which they don’t have,” Vladislav Inozemtsev says.

            “It is impossible to imagine” how anyone could expect that to work, the Russian economist and commentator says, given that members of each of these groups would look at those who are members of the other with suspicion or disdain and not cooperate (echofm.online/video-dnya/hvatit-li-u-vlasti-deneg-na-novuyu-mobilizacziyu-vladislav-inozemczev).

            He says that there is a way out: Moscow could cut back on signing bonuses and even more on death benefits and raise the pay for those soldiers who are sent to the front lines. Most men entering military service don’t expect to die, but they would be far more enthusiastic about doing so if they were paid depending on whether they fought at the front or not.

            But that may be too rational a move for the Kremlin given its confidence that money can solve everything and that now Russians are becoming more patriotic as the war with Ukraine extends into its fifth year, two illusions for which the Russian leadership may very well have to pay dearly in the future.

Only ‘About 15 Percent’ of Orthodox Priests in Russia Support Putin’s War, Mitrokhin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 8 – Many assume that Moscow Patriarch Kirill’s  regular statements of support for Putin’s war in Ukraine set the weather for Orthodox priests and laiety in the Russain Federation, Nikolay Mitrokhin says; but that is not the case: Indeed, “only about 15 percent” of Orthodox priests there actively support the expanded Russian invasion.

            Kirill’s delarations, the scholar at the University of Bremen says, are not so much directed at the priests and believers to get them to accept his position – in Orthodoxy, even a patriarch doesn’t have that right – as a sign to the Kremlin that the Patriarchate as such is loyal to Putin (vot-tak.tv/94741767/rpc-voyna).

            Mitrokhin notes that “Patriarch Kirill is often perceived by analogy with the Pope or Ayatollah Khomeini - as a figure whose words automatically encourage believers to act. However, in Orthodoxy in general and in the ROC in particular, there is no direct connection between the rhetoric of the top leadership and the behavior of ordinary laity.”

            Kirill’s words, he points out, “are addressed primarily to the state power, as a demonstration of loyalty. Their practice influence ends at the church pulpit where the speech was made and the real administrative powers of the patriarch are limited to the boundaries of the Moscow diocese alone,” where Kirill is bishop.

            Most priests avoid talking about the war to avoid sparking conflicts within their parishes, and the Patriarchate does not encourage them to travel to Ukraine or to serve in the ranks of the Russian army. It decided on that course when priests who did early in the expanded war began to die, forcing the Patriarchate to take a public position it preferred not do so, Mitrokhin says.

            Few Russian parishes are enthusiastic about the war or actively involved in getting people to serve there either from their own faithful or more generally, although many more are quite prepared to collect money and goods for humanitarian assistance, something they see as a Christian duty but not an indication of support for Putin’s political goals. 

FSB Tells Circassian Repatriant He’ll Be Sent to Fight and Die in Ukraine Unless He Stops Searching for His Son who Already had Been and was Killed There, ‘Kavkaz-Uzel’ Reports

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 7 – Kalid Qaraf, a Circassian repatriant from Syria who now lives in Kabardino-Balkaria, says he was called by the FSB and told he would be sent to fight in Ukraine unless he stopped searching for his son who had been and was killed there and talking about the travails of the Circassians inside Russia, according to Kavkaz-Uzel.

            The news agency said it did not have independent confirmation, but both Kavkaz-Uzel and Circassian outlets said it was plausible given the way in which the KBR authorities have put pressure on returning Circassians to fight for Russia and keep quiet about their own aspirations (kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/425525, oc-media.org/repatriated-circassian-reportedly-threatened-by-fsb/ and personal communication from editor of Justice for the North Caucasus).

            Kalid Qaraf’s story is particularly heart-breaking. He returned to the North Caucasus homeland with his family. Then his son announced he was moving to Moscow, but he never got there, with Qaraf assuming he had and the Moscow friends that he had not yet come. When Kalid learned that, he tried to find out what had happened, even turning to Russian officials for help.

            The official response was to tell him to stop his propaganda campaign and then to inform him that his son had already fought and died in Ukraine and that unless Kalid shut up, he too would be sent to fight in Ukraine, put on the front lines and suffer a similar fate, a threat that they expected would silence him but that has had the opposite effect. 

            Russian propagandists have now taken up the issue and pointed out to all who will listen that many Circassians who have returned are proud to fight for Moscow in Ukraine. Among them was the son of Kalid Qaraf. Moreover, these outlets insist that all the things that Kalid has said are untrue and politically motivated.

Northern Sea Route Saves Only Half as Much Time for Ships to Travel Between China and Europe as Moscow Claims, Russian Captain Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 7 – One of the reasons so many people around the world look to the Northern Sea Route as a replacement for the Suez Canal is that Moscow routinely claims that the travel time of ships travelling between China and Europe is 20 days less than that of vessels going via the Suez Canal.

            But that isn’t true, Vadim Alekseyev, a retired Russian sea captain says, pointing out that because ships using the NSR operate at slower speeds, the actual saving in time is ten days rather than the 20 the Moscow media claim and that many others accept as plausible and even true given the shorter distances involved (svpressa.ru/business/article/526509/).

            Because of ice conditions and safety requirements, he says, “the average travel speeds on the NSR are lower [than those on the routes through the Suez Canal], about 15 knots versus 20 on the southern routes.” That means that savings in time and fuel “turn out to be less significant” than many think.

            But that is only one reason that the NSR still carries only a tiny percentage of the cargo that passes through Suez, Alekseyev continues. Even with global warming, “unrestricted navigation for standard, that is, non-ice-class vessels is currently possible for only three to four months a year.

            Icebreakers can extend this season but only at much higher costs. And one should not forget, “there are vessel requirements: large capacity contain ships optimized for the Suez Canal are unsuitable for the NSR,” something that “limits the pool of potential participants” via the Arctic route.

            Russia’s existing and planned icebreakers can handle projected cargo volumes on the NSR through 2030, Alekseyev says; but “However, if the NSR begins to attract significant numbers of foreign transit vessels, the strain on icebreakers will increase many times over.”

            But there is an even larger “bottleneck,” he indicates, on the development of the NSR: the state of Russian ports. They lack the capacity to handle significantly larger cargo loads than they do now, not having sufficient docks, repair facilities, dredging operations, and worst of all rail and road links from them to other transportation networks. 

Four European Countries Warn Moscow Against Annexing South Ossetia

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 7 – On the 18^th anniversary of Russia’s war against Georgia as a result of which Abkhazia and South Ossetia became partially recognized states, Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy have warned Moscow against annexing South Ossetia, something that has appeared increasingly likely in recent months.

            The four warn that such a step “will not remain unanswered” and demand that Russia live up to the ceasefire agreement that ended the 2008 war and withdraw its military forces from South Ossetia and Abkhazia (echofm.online/news/evropejskie-strany-zayavili-ob-ugroze-polnomasshtabnoj-anneksii-yuzhnoj-osetii-rossiej).

            This move has less to do with the anniversary of the Russian-Georgian war than with the fact that in May, Russia and South Ossetia took steps which many observers around the world view as moves that will result in the annexation of South Ossetia, a step that appears to have become more possible given what has happened in Ukraine since that time.

            The four also welcome the decision of the Naoero Republic as Nauru has been officially known since June to end its recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. After its decision, only three other countries – Nicaragua, Venezuelaand Syria – besides the Russian Federation continue to recognize the two North Caucasian republics as independent.

            For background on Russia’s decision not to annex South Ossetia up to now, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2026/06/even-though-moscow-has-not-yet-annexed.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/06/russian-military-base-in-south-ossetia.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/08/both-moscow-and-tsinkhval-have-reasons.html.