Love for Russian People can ‘Split the Empire, But without the Russian People, the Empire ‘Can’t be Built,’ Malofeyev Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 26 – At a Moscow seminar on Russians as the state-forming people, Konstantin Malofeyev, a wealthy supporter of Russian Orthodox nationalist projects, says his dilemma is that he understands that “a love for the Russian people can split the empire” but that the empire “cannot be built without the Russian people.”

            That internal contradiction, he suggests, can be resolved only by insisting that Russians are as a civilization the state-forming people of the empire and understanding that in the fighting in Ukraine today, “no one is dying for the Russian Federation.” People are “dying for Russia” (business-gazeta.ru/article/712130).

            The current Russian constitution is out of step with reality and must be change because it fails to recognize Russians as the state-forming people, threatens them with dilution by insisting that they must come together with others, and fails to require that non-Russians within the country’s borders recognize the special role of the Russian people and defer to its members.ut

            If nothing is done, Malofeyev suggests, there exist two dangers: either Russians will cease to be Russians or the Russian empire will come apart. And to avoid either of those outcomes, Russia must become Russia rather than try to be something else as all the other means of holding it together are now out of date.

            Rarely do Russian nationalists speak about the contradiction between their love for their nation and their love for the imperial state as clearly as Malofeyev does on this occasion. Whether his words represent only his own internal angst at the difficulties this generates or represents the views of others is difficult to say.

            But it is important to recognize the fact that Russian nationalism and Russian statism are in conflict and that the resolution of this conflict either by the transformation of Russians or the disintegration of the state they dominate is the choice they and others must make – and even more must be clear about as they all think about the future.

Kynyev Case Shows Moscow Actively Working to ‘Depoliticize Repression,’ Gallyamov and Romanova Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 25 – The arrest of Aleksandr Kynyev, one of Russia’s most prominent independent electoral analysts, on drug charges just five days after the Duma vote highlights the Moscow’s increasing desire to “depoliticize repression” by using ordinary criminal charges rather than “political” ones against its opponents, Abbas Gallyamov and Olga Romanova say.

            The former Putin speechwriter and now Putin critic and the head of the Russia Behind Bars organization respectively make that point, arguing that it serves the Putin regime by suggesting that its opponents are mere criminals rather than political actors (t.me/abbasgallyamovpolitics/11179 and echofm.online/opinions/narkoticheskie-stati-pozvolyayut-depolitizirovat-repressiyu).

            There are three reasons why Moscow is increasingly choosing to use ordinary criminal charges rather than political ones, Romanova says. First and most important, doing so allows the Kremlin to “depoliticize repression,” giving it the opportunity to treat those who act in ways it doesn’t like not as political opponents but as ordinary criminals.

            Second, she continues, charges like possession of drugs carry far more weighty sentences than do the political provisions of Russian law. If Kynyev and others charged like him are found guilty and there is little doubt he and they will be, all of them could face as much as 20 years behind bars, not the far fewer that political paragraphs of the law allow.

            And third, manufacturing and presenting evidence  in drug cases is far easier and less dangerous than in political ones, easier because drugs can be planted and less dangerous than having what the accused have actually said and done and makes it less likely that supporters will attract more support for those the state is repressing.

            “To say that drug laws are the main instrument of political repressions in present-day Russia would be incorrect,” Romanova says. “Now it is much easier to use the paragraphs about extremism, terrorism, military ‘fakes’ and the like. But the drug laws are an old and well know instrument precisely for cases when the powers want to make their actions look non-political.”

            Kynyev is a perfect case for using ordinary rather than political charges, she suggests. He is a very public political scientist who has already been designated a foreign agent. But it is unclear just who made this decision. Normally it would be Putin and the Presidential Administration; but a Vyorstka report says the PA was “surprised” by it.

            If so, Romanova says, that “could mean that this initiative did not originate from the usual political channels” but instead came from the FSB. In that case, this is another piece of evidence showing that the FSB is increasingly setting the weather even in cases where the PA had done so in the past.

Moscow Seeks to Have It Both Ways by Posting a Threat to Lithuania and Then Deleting It

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 25 – The Russian information agency Novosti posted an article saying that the Lithuanian parliament’s support for doing away with the ban on the deployment of nuclear weapons in that Baltic country opens the way for another Russian “special military operation” against it and warning that such an SVO would be “very short.”

            A few hours later, the text was deleted ostensibly because “the material ‘does not correspond to the opinion of the editorial board, its policies and the policies of the Russian Federation” (meduza.io/news/2026/09/25/propagandisty-iz-ria-novosti-opublikovali-kolonku-o-tom-chto-rossiyu-zhdet-esche-odna-svo-v-litve-a-potom-udalili-ee).

            This is the latest example of a longstanding operational principle of the Kremlin’s media operations, one that calls for delivering a message and then claiming it doesn’t mean it and so giving Moscow an opportunity to encourage some in the West to think that the powers that be are somehow more “peace-loving” than they are.

            The author of the article, Aleksandr Nosovich, certainly knows how this game is played. He is a member of the Russian Council for Foreign and Defense Policy and editor of the pro-Moscow RuBaltic.ru portal in Kaliningrad. In 2020, a Dossier investigation linked him to the Presidential Administration and Russian foreign intelligence service.

            What is critical is that no one be deceived by what is going on: The Kremlin wants to threaten Lithuania in order to destabilize it; and articles like Nosovich’s do that; but at the same time, it wants to be able to present itself to useful idiots in the West as indicated in peace in Ukraine and cooperation in Europe.

Calling Russian Actions in Europe a ‘Hybrid’ War Understates How Dangerous They Are, Latvian President Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 25 – Latvian President Edgars Rinkēvičs says that it is a serious mistake to call the subversive actions Putin is carrying out in Europe “manifestations of ‘hybrid war’” because that makes these actions “somehow sound less dangerous and more harmless than these actions really are.”

            These actions including sabotage and cyberattacks are intended to punish those who support Ukraine and divide NATO, the Latvian leader says. Unfortunately, in the current environment, Western leaders don’t want to call them acts of war (currenttime.tv/a/prezident-latvii-rinkevichs-my-dopustili-oshibku-nazyvaya-deystviya-rossii-gibridnoy-voynoy-eto-zvuchit-menee-opasno-chem-na-samom-dele/33862766.html).

            While that is perhaps understandable given that these Russian moves are not full-scale war, Rinkēvičs says, the words of these leaders have the effect of allowing Moscow to steal a march on Western countries because Moscow is thereby given the opportunity to make advances by military means that would otherwise lead to a united front of opposition.

            But the real danger is that Moscow will conclude that it can continue to do what it is doing or even expand it to the point that the West will respond. Thus failure to label what Russia is doing accurately does not lessen the chance of a broader war but in fact increases it by leading Putin to misread Western resolve.

More than 3,000 Russians have Succeeded in Being Allowed to Perform Alternative Service So Far This Year Alone, ‘Vyorstka’ Finds

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 26 – Despite Moscow’s need to fill the rapidly depleting ranks of its invasion force in Ukraine, 3387 men have succeeded in being allowed to perform alternative service so far in 2026, three times more than in pre-war years, according to a study carried out by the Vyorstka portal.

            This increase has taken place, rights activists say, despite intensifying opposition in draft commissions that are usually but not always backed by the courts, because of the even more dramatic increase in the number of men seeking alternative service (verstka.media/komu-otkazyvayut-a-komu-odobryayut-alternativnuyu-grazhdanskuyu-sluzhbu-v-2026-godu).

            In the past, many who were given the right to perform alternative service had religious backgrounds; but that is no longer a guarantee that those making application for such service will be given it because of the pro-war position of the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate.

            The Vyorstka report is important because it is yet another indication of growing unhappiness of Russians with the lengthening war in Ukraine and the unwillingness of many young men and their families to send yet more men to the meatgrinder that Putin’s military adventure has become. 

First Demonstration against Duma Vote Falsification Takes Place in Restive Komi Republic

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 26 – Residents of various places in the Russian Federation are talking about organizing protests against Moscow’s falsification of the Duma elections (echofm.online/news/v-semi-regionah-rossii-zayavili-akczii-protiv-falsifikaczij-na-vyborah), but the very first has taken place in Syktyvkar, the capital of the Komi Republic.

            The meeting of approximately 100 people was put together by KPRF activists upset that the Putin regime had orchestrated the defeat of their comrades by first excluding some of them and then falsifying the results in other cases so that the KPRF candidates lost – even though the authorities didn’t give them permission (vkrizis.info/russia/komi-miting-po-michurinski/ and ru.thebarentsobserver.com/novosti/v-syktyvkare-prosel-pervyj-v-rossii-miting-protiv-falsifikacij-na-vyborah-v-gosdumu/458843).

            That the Komi Republic should have been the first is in many ways not especially surprising: its KPRF units have acted more like a banned regionalist party than any others (https://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/03/despite-law-against-regional-parties.html), and Komi residents have long objected to Moscow policies.

            They have voted against Putin in the past, they were active in the successful protests to kill Moscow’s plans to build a trash dump at Shiyes, and they are currently among the leaders in protesting Moscow’s amalgamation of smaller metropolitan districts into larger ones (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/07/by-criticizing-putins-war-komi-deputy.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2026/05/komi-activists-say-liquidation-of-local.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/01/public-power-law-nail-in-coffin-of.html).

            Perhaps equally important, Komi activists have a long tradition of acting on their own regardless of what opposition figures in Moscow say, something that explains why they have acted while others are only talking (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2026/08/moscow-opposition-figures-tried-to-tell.html).

Kremlin Forming Superficial Analogue to USSR's New Soviet People in Form of ‘a People for Whom the Motherland is the Special Military Operation and Putin, Kolesnikov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 25 – For most of the last two decades, there has been a debate in the Russian Federation about whether the Kremlin intends to create a variant of “the Soviet people” by its promotion of the idea of non-political Russianness (rossisskost’) in place of all ethnic groups, Russian and non-Russian alike.

            But Novaya Gazeta commentator Andrey Kolesnikov suggests that that is not what Putin is seeking but rather the creation of “a people for whom the Motherland is the Special Military Operation and Putin,” an arrangement even more disturbing now and in the future than the one many have suspected (novayagazeta.ru/articles/2026/09/25/izobretenie-natsii).

            This process of “reinventing” the nation began when Putin took power by blowing up Russian apartment blocks, expanded with his war against Ukraine, and now has taken final shape during the just-completed Duma election campaign, according to Kolesnikov who points to the statements Putin and his apologists have made.

            In recent months, the commentator says, these people have insisted that “citizenship of Russia is citizenship in the special military operation and that the voters of Russia are voters of the special military operation” in order to argue that “the very fact of taking part in the elections is equal to voting for the special military operation.”

            Some may draw an analogy between this new definition of nationhood and that which the Soviet authorities did when they proclaimed the formation of the new Soviet people, Kolesnikov says; but the differences are enormous and consequential given that Sovietism was internationalist and rather than, as Putin’s nation is, nationalist, imperialist and aggressive.

“The ‘"special military operation’ is thus a battle for identity. It is being waged by a "garrison state" backed—according to the narrative pushed by propaganda and top officials—by a united nation. The theme of unity is paramount; hence the eradication of any alternative thinking or pacifist discourse.”

And at least for the time being, Putin has reinvented the nation out of the populace of the Russian Federation and transformed it in directions that are not limited in its goals, that is, the goals of the regime, in space or in time except perhaps with the passing of the current Kremlin leader.