Paul Goble
Staunton,
May 4 – Had Vladimir Putin accepted the Maidan’s ouster of discredited
Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich and agreed to accept the results of the
upcoming elections, nothing that has occurred in Ukraine since that time would
have happened, according to a Ukrainian commentator.
“Thousands
of people would not have suddenly discovered in themselves an unconquerable
desire for federalism,” Dmitry Litvin says. “Thousands would not have learned
the meaning of ‘legitimacy,’ a term they had not been acquainted with. [And
they] would not have suddenly decided they could not live ... without state
status for the Russian language and constitutional reforms” (lb.ua/news/2014/05/03/265204_ostanovite_fashizm.html).
“If
in short one man by the name of Putin had not decided that Ukrainian affairs
are his affairs, then we now would not have to be catching terrorists and
burying dozens of victims of resistance.” But that reflects an even deeper
problem, one with which Russians, Ukrainians, and the world must deal.
That
one man could do this is the clearest illustration of the Fuherprinzip, “the principle of the vozhd,” Litvin says. That
principle, he continues, is “the central element of the state system under
fascism.” Whatever the leader does or thinks but be what the entire society
does and thinks.
To
that end, the Ukrainian commentator continues, “the information milieu in
Russia has been cleansed in such a way that outlets disseminate the worldview
of the leader, his relation to people and events –and nothing more, except for
entertainment.”
A second
element fascism in Russia requires is the articulation of “an historical
mission,” something for which the leader “’was called’ to power” to realize. As
defined by Putin, “Russia’s mission today is not distinguished from the mission
of other fascist states – the defense of genuine traditional values from the
influence of ‘destructive elements.’”
To be sure, Litvin
continues, fascism “at the time of its first appearance in Europe” during the interwar
period “declared ‘Judaism’ as the source of the destruction of genuine values
and harshly rejected all forms of non-classical relations to life, art, labor,
and science,” blaming these on the Jews.
Now, in fascism’s
“second appearance in Europe,” the source of such destruction is Americanism.
The Russian media under Putin’s direction is portraying Americanism as the
primary enemy in just the same way Nazi media portrayed Jewishness and
demanding that Russians do everything they can to fight against Americanism and
its agents.
And a third
element of Russian fascism under Putin, one “without fascism is impossible,” is
a drive toward war. “For the third time
in the last century, the Russian people are being dragged into a global
conflict ... [and] are in a besieged fortress” which requires “constant
vigilance in the search for enemies and wreckers.”
Litvinov points
out that the Russianness this fascism says it is defending is “much narrower
than Russianness in general,” in much the same way that the Germanness Hitler
said he was defending was much narrower than Germanness in fact. And as a
result, “fascism today is a war not only against the neighbors of Russia but
one inside Russia as well.”
All this is the
result of the decisions of one man – Vladimir Putin – and all this could have
been avoided had he decided otherwise.
People need to
remember, Litvin says, that “fascism is a policy which grows into a religion
and is not a rational phenomenon. When
people believe in a leader as in a god,” they look on his actions as a form of “divine
intervention.” And Putin has cultivated this with his “’direct line’” spectacles
and with an enemy, Americanism, just as invented for his purposes as was
Jewishness for the Nazis.
Today, Ukrainians, Russians and the world are confronted
by “Russian fascist occupiers” and thus “not only must defend [their land] but
defend themselves from their propaganda and from their political influence,”
because “this is the propaganda and influence of fascism.”
That
means that Russian media products must be evaluated to see if they reflect
three aspects of Russian fascism: the Fuherprizip, militarization, and a
narrowly state-defined and state-serving Russianness. If they do, then they
need to be countered or even blocked just as fascist ideas always must be.
“Fascism
isn’t rational,” Litvin argues. “When
Russians now are happy that Crimea has been declared part of Russia, they are
not thinking about the peninsula but about a myth. When they say that they need
the Ukrainian military-industrial complex and in general the participation of
Ukraine in the economic integration on the space of the former USSR, they have
in mind not a real economy but a myth.”
“And
when they say that they are defending their own people beyond their own
borders, they are not considering real fates; they are only generating a myth,”
the commentator says. What that means,
of course, is that one cannot negotiate with them but only work to defeat them
because they are fascists who cannot accept the idea that anyone else could be
right.
No comments:
Post a Comment