Paul
Goble
Staunton, May 27 – Russian
governors, “even the most loyal” to the Kremlin, as a result of the
intensification of the economic crisis, find themselves between a rock and a
hard place and are beginning to complain about Moscow’s failure to articulate
an anti-crisis strategy which takes the interests of their regions into
account, according to Nikolay Petrov.
“A clear example” of this, the head
of the Moscow Center for Political Geography Research says, was the recent
statement by Voronezh Governor Aleksey Gordeyev that the government in Moscow “doesn’t
recognize what is really happening in the regions” (daily.rbc.ru/opinions/politics/25/05/2015/5563343b9a79472e7e3ed3e4).
This does not mean that Moscow is at
risk of “regional fronds” like those in the 1990s: neither the regions nor
their leaders have the capacity to make themselves independent actors, Petrov
says. “But an increase in the economic and political independence of the
regions is inevitable” in the run-up to the 2016 elections.
Also “inevitable,” he suggests, are
fundamental changes in the regional elites, which have been degraded during
Putin’s time in office, because “some of them are not ready for such a turn of
events. And they will give way to more effective commands of crisis managers,”
in some cases with Moscow’s help and in others despite what Moscow is doing.
As anyone who has been following the
Russian media knows, governors have been retiring at a rapid rate in recent
months, some to put themselves in a position to win back their offices in
upcoming elections, others to take new positions at the center, and some
because they have proven unable to govern their regions under conditions of
economic stringency.
But all of these changes, especially
over the next two years, are going to affect center-periphery relations in the
Russian Federation, not transforming the country into a genuine federal system
but making the regions and their leaders more independent because both the
regions and Moscow need that at the present time.
“Today,” Petrov writes, “Russia if it is
a federation at all is more a federation of corporations than of regions,” with
the big companies like Gazprom, Lukoil, Russian Rail, and the like “generating
and controlling the main financial flows in the country” and in many cases
installing as governors their own people.
That makes the current situation of
regional politics “in part similar to what it was in the 1990s.” But, Petrov argues, “over the last 15 years,
regional elites have strongly degraded, the result of both intentional efforts
of the center and of negative selection,” something almost inevitable when loyalty
counts for more than effectiveness.
From his very first days in office,
Putin sought to “restore control” of Moscow over the regions. He created
presidential plenipotentiaries, chiefs of regional militias, and other federal
officials who were installed in regional governments. That worked more or less as long as oil
prices were high, but with their fall, it has become a problem and not just for
the regions.
“The strengthening of the vertical to a large extent
occurred at the expense of the weakening of horizontal ties,” something that
means that “federal structures in the regions today often coordinate their
actions very poorly.” Clearly, Petrov
says, Putin’s approach went too far and now there needs to be a correction of
some kind.
Initially,
he points out, Putin sought a solution through the creation of new bureaucratic
structures “with extraordinary authority.”
The regional development ministry was broken up, and now there are three
ministries with specific regional responsibilities. Moreover, Moscow worked
hard to increase its direct control of governors.
The Kremlin doesn’t need “strong
politicians” like Yury Luzhkov, Mintimir Shaymiyev and Murtaza Rakhimov of the
1990s; it doesn’t even want relatively independent ones like those which have
been dismissed or even arrested in recent months. But it both needs and wants
effective managers, and such people have to have the authority to do their
jobs.
The September gubernatorial elections –
11 that had long been scheduled and nine more that have become necessary
because of changes of cadres – also are affecting this process, Petrov
argues. While candidates are still
selected primarily for their loyalty, they do need to be able to do their jobs
or Moscow faces problems.
“The system of administration at the
regional level is degrading,” and that has the effect, he argues of weakening “the
entire regional pyramid of power,” something that means Moscow is forced to
intervene when it really doesn’t want to and would not have to if there were
stronger people in office.
“This degradation,” Petrov concludes, is
especially dangerous in view of the fact that the center of gravity is inevitably
shifting to the regional level.” The governors will play a major role in the
2016 Duma elections, and if they don’t have the resources they need, they will
inevitably weaken the federal center in order to do what Moscow wants.
That in turn, Petrov says, will “create
the preconditions for a new strengthening of the regions” and of those who head
them.
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