Paul
Goble
Staunton, February 22 – “Federalism
in Russia is impossible because it is impossible to imagine the level of
political self-standingness of regional societies” that pre-existed the rise of
federalism in other countries, Aleksandr Morozov says; and without that, “it is
impossible to ‘construct’ a federation.”
The head of the Nemtsov Center for
the Study of Russia at Prague’s Charles University says that there must be
regional powers based on property rights that have been secured as a result of
a contest between them and the central authorities. “Russia has never had this”
(afterempire.info/2018/02/20/morozov/; republished in newizv.ru/article/general/22-02-2018/aleksandr-morozov-federalizm-v-rossii-nevozmozhen).
And when regional elites did appear
to be emerging in Russia during periods of crisis (1917-1920 and 1989-1991),
they quickly were reined in and did not establish “’a contract’ with the
Russian center of power” that might have become the basis for the institutionalization
of genuine federalism.
“In
Russia, there is no ‘aristocracy of the land,’ as was the case in Germany or
Britain; and therefore there is also no tradition of a different system of
power in the regions besides one based on being representatives of the
center. Federalism cannot exist without
independent political subjects which form it.”
That is why in
Russia, “the question is always not about ‘a federation’ but about ‘the powers
of the regions.’” When Gorbachev or Yeltsin were talking about sovereignty,
that is what they meant: greater regional authority but not federalism in any
real sense. Things might have been
different under the Provisional Government, but it did not last.
If decentralization is to take place
in a way that might allow for the rise of real federalism, Morozov suggests, it
is not going to be along the existing oblasts or republics but rather around
the 13 “millionaire” urban agglomerations where “’politics’ in Russia is now
concentrated.” That is where the political future of Russia will be decided.
“At present,” the commentator says, “there
are no large active political groups, but in each there is a large contemporary
and progressive milieu; and a conflict between this milieu and the new, even
large – conservative strata. After
several years we will see how this conflict will end.”
To win out, the progressive groups will
need to form “a political majority” not in statistical terms but rather by
forming “an alliance with a significant part of the establishment with broad
strata of their own citizens who ‘are waiting for change.’” At various points,
both Gorbachev and Yeltsin possessed a political majority in this sense.
But then they lost it, Morozov says;
and as a result, “not one of the so-called ‘revolutions’ at the end of the 20th
and beginning of the 21st centuries despite all expectations and
energy led to fundamental changes in the political system of any country” where
people rose in the streets against their rulers.
Instead, “the governments change but
the reformist plans were choked off.”
As far as the power of regionalism
in Russia is concerned, Morozov suggests it should not be overrated. “In cultural
and economic terms, it is very fruitful; but ‘political regionalism’ is almost
always a rightist, conservative political utopia.” That is certainly the case in Russia today.
“One can of course try to construct
from nothing the status of Bavaria for Kalmykia. But you won’t get any ‘Bavaria’
there. Instead, all you’ll get will be ‘a Daghestan.’”
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