Russia has a Large but Weak State, the Worst Possible Combination, Pozharsky Says

Paul Goble

           

            Staunton, December 7 – A strong state and a large state are two very different things, even though many Russians assume they are the same, Mikhail Pozharsky says. A strong state is able to enforce its laws, while a big state if it is weak cannot in many cases and becomes a continuing source of corruption.

            Indeed, around the world, the most common kind of failed state is one that is large and corrupt but weak and ineffectual, able to extract resources from the population by force or corruption but incapable of controlling entire regions or sectors of the country, the Russian commentator says (kasparov.ru/material.php?id=5C093CC261E2C).

            “Thus, in certain countries of Latin America,” Pozharsky continues, “the state cannot in general even control certain regions where drug cartels or partisans operate, but in all the other locates has such a quantity of bureaucracy and regulation that there is not branch where there isn’t corruption and cronyism.”

            According to the commentator, “In Russia, the problem is exactly the same: the state is big but weak. It extends its hand into all spheres of the economy” but it isn’t capable of ensuring that everyone plays by the rules. “There are places in Russia where the powers are even afraid to stick their noses.” It may not be as obvious as in Latin America, but “the essence is the same.”

            Three examples of this have surfaced recently, Pozharsky says. First, a clinic was found in Moscow where female genital mutilation was carried out on young girls, something the government ought to have intervened against but for some reason didn’t do anything because powerful interests were opposed (gazeta.ru/social/2018/11/28/12075877.shtml).

            Second, a new report finds that so-called “honor killings” are widespread in the North Caucasus. “The imams approve” this dispatch of women who violate social norms; and “the police go alone. What does the central power do? Nothing,” Pozharsky says (zona.media/article/2018/12/06/srji).

            And third, the Russian Constitutional Court holds that the Chechen and Ingush leaders “can divide up Chechen and Ingush lands as they like. The federal power has nothing to do with their affairs in this regard” (ria.ru/20181206/1547520742.html).

            This list could be extended and will, he argues; and it shows that “in general, the Kremlin does not have a power monopoly in Russia. The scary Russian state with all its Russian guards ends where it encounters the power of bearded ones with ‘traditions’ at the ready” and to which the regime in Moscow defers.

            “It is possible to weaken a strong state;” but that isn’t the challenge in Russia today, Pozharsky concludes.