Paul
Goble
Staunton, April 25 – For at least
the last eight months, Russian commentators have been talking about how Russia
will absorb Belarus, as oblasts added to its own, as an analogue to Tatarstan
or as a union state, Sergey Shelin says; but all such talk is based on the
assumption that Belarusians in general and Alyaksandr Lukashenka in particular
want to be part of Russia.
That simply isn’t true, the Rosbalt
observer says; and thus, if Vladimir Putin wants to absorb Belarus in any of
these ways, he will have to use force and take large losses because as
Lukashenka has pointed out Belarusians are used to being an independent country
and Russia cannot offer them anything worth sacrificing that (rosbalt.ru/blogs/2019/04/23/1777651.html).
Minsk has created a state, and “what
is especially important, it controls the special services and the army,” Shelin
continues. And while it is “possible
that the Belarusian nomenklatura is tired of living under the heavy hand of the
autocrat,” can one really suggest that Russia would offer them something
better? No, many would lose and they know it.
The
Belarusian population is similarly situated. It may not be thrilled with
Lukashenka but it isn’t divided regionally as Ukraine is aknd Belarusians “who
consider themselves ethnic or civic Russians are few. They define themselves as
a separate nation even if they speak Russian more often than Belarusian.”
As a result, an honest assessment
forces one to conclude that there aren’t any domestic causes either in the
regime or in the population for the Belarusian people to willingly give up
their independence. “The only peaceful argument” present is “the colossal
material dependence” of Belarus on Russia, a dependence equal to 10 billion US
dollars a year.
Many in Russia think that
Belarusians will give up their sovereignty in order to keep that money flowing,
but Shelin says that “states which have shown their ability to independent
existence (and Belarus can be described as one of them) will do not trade
sovereignty for money.”
They will play games, make
concessions and do all kinds of things that look like they are doing so but
they will not engage in “self-liquidation.” Shelin recalls that when Moscow
turned off gas to Estonia, the response of Estonians was “’what can we do but
travel less and think more.’” The reaction of Belarusians will be the same.
Why then do many in Moscow think
otherwise? That is because for them the
absorption of Belarus “is extremely desirable not out of material
considerations but rather for spiritual ones.” The state would expand, any
foreign threat would be that much further away, and unification could solve
Putin’s 2024 problem.
If fusion happened, it could
certainly be used for the last, but the costs involved of doing so are far
greater than the costs of solving that problem in other ways. Annexing Belarus would be “expensive and
complicated in every sense – politically, organizationally and materially,”
Shelin says. Therefore, he concludes, it is unlikely to take place.
Lukashenka has made it crystal clear
that Moscow would be making a big mistake to try. Belarusians aren’t willing to
lose their country because “they already have been born in a free and
independent Belarus. And he who tries to destroy Belarus will be cursed by our
Belarusian people,” and he who does so by force will be resisted (president.gov.by/ru/news_ru/view/poslanie-belorusskomu-narodu-i-natsionalnomu-sobraniju-20903/).
The
Belarusian ruler has “created this regime and naturally wants to preserve it
for himself and his heirs,” Shelin says, adding that in his mind, “the picture
is simple: A small autocratic regime is maneuvering and shaking its first from
a desire to preserve itself.” And a big autocratic regime can see that it has
no way of changing things except by force.
That
would involve paying a price far greater than any real gains, the Rosbalt
analyst says; and he adds that he “wants to believe that the decision [to try
to take Belarus] has not been taken and won’t be.”
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