1991 Did Not End the Russian Empire; It Only Reduced Its Dimensions, Shtepa Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, December 31 – For the other former Soviet republics, the end of the USSR was “a soft divorce” from the empire, but for Russia, it “brought no change” in the relationship between Moscow and the regions, Vadim Shtepa says. Indeed, “’from the beginning, ‘the new Russia’ did not foresee the exit of any regions.”

            “This is often forgotten,” the Russian regionalist who edits the Tallinn-based Region.Experet portal; “but it is an extremely indicative moment in the process of ‘the rebirth of the Russian Empire’ because it represents a step back not only from Grobachev’s “new union” but also from the Soviet one (region.expert/treaty_or_collapse/).

            Evidence for this came even before the USSR came apart: In November 1991, Yeltsin dispatched a planeload of Muscovite special servicemen to Chechnya in an attempt to introduce martial law there “in the name of ‘preserving the territorial integrity of the RSFSR.’”  Yeltsin’s “’federative treaty’” of March 1992 did nothing to change that attitude of the center.

            Shtepa cites his own observation of four years ago that the new treaty represented “a remake of the empire in which ‘the metropolitan center’ kindly shared some small authority with ‘the colonies,’” an indication that “those who suppose the empire died together with the disintegration of the USSR continue to live under a great illusion.”

            And they have not been paying attention to what Kremlin officials says. Sergey Kiriyenko, a close aide to the Russian president, for example has directly stated that “the Russian state is not build on a treaty basis” (forbes.ru/mneniya-column/vertikal/284247-zakat-federatsii-kogda-rossiya-vernulas-k-imperskomu-ustroistvu), oblivious to the fact that by making  that remark he “denies the Russian Federation as such.” 

            That this is the current situation does not mean it cannot change and change quickly: Few in 1989 thought the Soviet Union would dissolve in 1991, Shtepa says. Federative or confederative treaties in Russia are “not in principle impossible” but they are almost certainly so if the capital remains in Moscow.

            That is because, the Russian regionalist argues, “this city, operating on the basis of its centuries-old tradition will inevitably reproduce the empire” because its denizens  will insist on building any state from the top down rather than the bottom up as federal or confederal relations require.   

            Related to this is whether a future state in Eurasia will be called Russia. In Is Russia Possible After the Empire (ridero.ru/books/vozmozhna_li_rossiya_posle_imperii/), Shtepa  argues that “the more Russian wants to be an empire today, the fewer chances that post-imperial republics will tomorrow want to be called ‘Russian.’” 

            One thing is clear, however, the regionalist continues. “The only alternative to a real federalization of Russia is its complete disintegration since in the 21^st century, an imperial system of administration is simply not viable.” But at the same time, “it isn’t necessary to be afraid of the disintegration of Russia.” 

            “The disintegration of the empire is not only in the interests of the entire surrounding world but also and in the first instance in the interests of the Russians themselves for the simple reason that under conditions of the empire they are only going to continue to be cannon fodder or, in the best case, the object of state theft.”

            Shtepa concludes that he hopes that “the new republics will respect international law and conduct a completely different policy.”  The record of the post-Soviet states since 1991 is mixed; but the approach of the non-Russian countries has been consistently better than that of the Muscovite state. Unlike it, they aren’t trying to remain or regain an empire.