Paul
Goble
Staunton, March 22 – In Soviet
times, Western analysts gleaned enormous insights into the attitudes of various
non-Russian peoples in the USSR by analyzing small variations in the level of
support voters in the various union republics gave to the always unopposed CPSU
list of candidates.
In a 1968 American Political Science
Review article, Jerome Gilison described this effort in an article often familiarly
and sometimes slightingly referred to as “The Missing One Percent” (cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/soviet-elections-as-a-measure-of-dissent-the-missing-one-percent/DBF1CB977BA60CC6DFBDBED7E0BCD096).
Now, a half century later, analysts
in both Russia and the West are moving back toward to analyzing Russian elections
in a similar way, considering relatively small, albeit larger than in Soviet
times, variations in levels of participation and support for Vladimir Putin
among different ethnic and regional groups.
In reporting on regional variations,
the Federal Press news agency said it was doing no more than football
commentators do when confronted with an expected lopsided victory: they focus
on the small things in order to keep things interesting for their audiences
even though those secondary figures are just that (fedpress.ru/article/1994706).
Putin, it notes,
did not get the highest percentage of votes in Crimea as some had expected –
the boycott by Crimean Tatars probably precluded that – but rather in
Kabardino-Balkaria, Chechnya and Daghestan, North Caucasus republics where many
say corruption this time around remained just as rampant as before (kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/318141/).
The Russian president received the
lowest levels of support in Sakha, Altay Kray and Primorsky Kray, precisely the
places where KPRF candidate Pavel Grudinin received the most votes, 27.35,
23.67 and 21.39 percent respectively. Grudinin also received over 20 percent in
the Altay Republic and in Omsk Oblast.
LDPR leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky
received his greatest support this time as in 2012 in Siberia, the Far East,
and the Transbaikal, but his figures were lower now. Kseniya Sobchak got her
highest vote totals in Moscow and St. Petersburg and among Russians living
abroad, but she did not get five percent in any of those. Her least support was in North Ossetia – 0.22
percent.
The other liberal candidate, Grigory
Yavlinsky, also did his best in the two capitals but in neither did he get as
much as 3.2 percent. “Unexpectedly,” he received 2.37 percent of the vote in
Ingushetia. Elsewhere in the North Caucasus, he got less than one percent this
time just as has been the case in the past.
As far as participation is
concerned, it grew by small amounts in both of the capitals; but the share of
voters their casting their ballots for Putin was far higher than in past, almost
exactly the same as the country as a whole and thus far more than ever
before. As a result, the liberals for
whom Moscow and Petersburg had been bastions lost out.
Participation was highest of all
among those living outside the Russian Federation, 97.80 percent. That was
followed by the 93.66 percent figure in Tyva, the 91.90 percentage share in Yamalo-Nenets
Autonomous District,, 91.80 in Kabardino-Balkaria, 91.54 in Chechnya, and 89.98
percent in North Ossetia.
At the other end of the participation
ranking, with between 55 and 58 percent casting ballots, were Transbaikal Kray,
Tver Oblast, Novgorod Oblast, Karelia and Irkutsk Oblast.
Some figures about participation and
support for Putin told a particular story. Tatarstan, under pressure from the Kremlin
for much of the last year on the power-sharing accord and language use, turned
out to be “the absolute leader in terms of the reduction of votes for Vladimir
Putin” and in the level of participation (www.idelreal.org/a/29113123.html).
This year,
Tatarstan gave the president 113,172 fewer votes than it had in 2012; and
160,000 fewer Tatarstan voters took place, a clear indication of unhappiness
with Putin and Moscow, albeit relatively small figures considering the total
number of votes in the country and the share Putin received overall.
Two other places where major shifts
in voting occurred were in the capitals and other large cities which went from
being the bastions of the opposition to places which gave Putin almost the same
share as the country as a whole and in Siberia and the Far East which did the
same (ura.news/articles/1036274324).
In 2012, for
example, only 46 percent of Moscow voters cast their ballots for Putin. This time,
71 percent did, a pattern replicated in St. Petersburg and other major cities
and a reflection both of changes in Russia since the Crimean Anschluss and the
success of Putin’s political campaign this time around.
But perhaps even more dramatic were
Putin’s gains in both participation and support east of the Urals. In 2012, some places in those regions lagged
country-wide figures by 20 percent. This time around the differences in both
were significantly small across this enormous region (regnum.ru/news/polit/2394066.html).
Indeed,
Krasnoyarsk political analyst Yury Moskvich said that these elections showed
that Putin “is not only president of Moscow, St. Petersburg and central Russia”
but of the entire country, a reflection of how much has changed since the
Russian president organized the annexation of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula.
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