Fallout from Ouster of KPRF Governor May Be Large

Paul Goble

            Staunton, December 13 – The forced resignation of Sergey Levchenko, the KPRF governor of Irkutsk – he faced criminal charges if he didn’t go – has offended many in the regions by highlighting the Kremlin’s lack of respect for their votes and radicalized at least some in the KPRF who may now be inclined to become a real rather than decorative opposition. 

            Moscow political analyst Aleksandr Kynyev says that Levchenko’s ouster “demonstrates the complete lack of respect for the people’s opinion and shows the powers don’t view elections as a real institution.” In his opinion, there were no objective factors to sack him and install an outsider (vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2019/12/13/818609-otstavka-irkutskogo-gubernatora).

            Other analysts surveyed by Novaya gazeta draw the same conclusion, although they stress that from Moscow’s point of view, the KPRF governor had become too independent in his statements and actions for the Kremlin to tolerate (novayagazeta.ru/articles/2019/12/12/83141-unizhenie-regiona).

            The consequences for the KPRF may be even more important. The Irkutsk KPRF organization is furious and responded to Levchenko’s dismissal by calling for Putin and Dmitry Medvedev to be sent into retirement (irkutsk-kprf.ru/partii/5739-zayavlenie-irkutskogo-obkoma-kprf-v-svyazi-s-uvolneniem-sg-levchenko-s-dolzhnosti-gubernatora-irkutskoy-oblasti.html).

            But the more interesting question is whether this Kremlin move will cause the communists to remain only “a formal opposition” or rather lead to their  “radicalization” and a decision to “cease to be a systemic” party, Aleksandr Slabiyev of the Daily Storm portal says (dailystorm.ru/vlast/iz-sistemnoy-oppozicii-v-nesistemnuyu-kprf-privodyat-k-obshchemu-znamenatelyu).

            Analysts with whom Slabiyev spoke are divided on this point. Sergey Obukhov of the Moscow Center for Research on Political Culture suggests that while many in the KPRF are angry, few of the party’s leaders are prepared to sacrifice the advantages they enjoy as a systemic party.

            But it may not be up to them. It appears, Obukhov says, that “the Presidential Administration very much wants to start a process of ‘taming’ the KPRF and converting the party into an analogue of Just Russia.” But the KPRF has a real program. And so what may be going on is a Kremlin effort to provoke a revolt so that it can crush it and purge the party’s ranks.

            He points to the example of the Communist Party of Ukraine “which was systemic until 2014 but after the Maidan was banned.”

            Yevgeny Minchenko of Minchenko Consulting has a different take. He says that serious changes in the relationship of the authorities and the KPRF really are taking place. “Inside the party is occurring a serious demoralization.” And many are furious at their leaders and at the Kremlin. 

            The latter may want to push it out of the systemic parties but there are serious risks if the regime tries to do so.  That could upset the existing balance of forces and lead the KPRF to assume a greater role in the rising tide of protests.  Many within the upper reaches of the party, he says, believe that the Kremlin has violated its agreement with the KPRF.

            A scenario in which a radicalized KPRF could move to active opposition is “improbable but possible,” Minchenko says.  But if the Kremlin moves to deradicalize the KPRF, it will not achieve a deradicalization of society and “the protest energy will find some other outlet,” possibly reducing the usefulness of the KPRF in the upcoming elections.

            Maksim Shevcheko, a journalist and supporter of the KPRF, says that “the Kremlin has declared political war on the KPRF which is winning the support of the electorate.” The regime is putting “serious pressure on left-wing politicians” and provocations are to be expected. That should, he says, lead the party to change its relationship with the Kremlin.